In re Davis

• Decision Date: 11 August 2022
• Docket Number: 98340-2
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of Antoine Eugene DAVIS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

514 P.3d 653

In the MATTER OF the Personal Restraint of Antoine Eugene DAVIS, Petitioner.

No. 98340-2

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued February 24, 2022

Filed: August 11, 2022

Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Law Office of Alsept & Ellis, 621 Sw Morrison St. Ste. 1025, Portland, OR, 97205-3813, for Petitioner.

James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave., Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

¶ 1 Antoine Eugene Davis was 21 years old when he committed and was convicted of first degree murder and second degree attempted murder. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) (murder in the first degree), .050(1)(b) (murder in the second degree); RCW 9A.28.020(1) (attempted murder in the second degree). He received a standard range sentence of 767 months. Davis filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) more than one year after his judgment and sentence finalized and contends it is timely for two reasons: (1) In re Personal Restraint of Monschke¹ constitutes a significant, material, and retroactive change in law that applies to his de facto life sentence and (2) recent advances in neuroscience for late-aged adolescents qualify as newly discovered evidence. RCW 10.73.100(6), (1).

¶ 2 Because Davis seeks retroactive application of Monschke , he must identify, among other things, a holding that is retroactive and that applies to him. This he fails to do. Monschke concerns only defendants who were sentenced pursuant to RCW 10.95.030(1), and Davis was convicted under different statutes that do not mandate life sentences. Further, Monschke concerned a mandatory life sentence provision as applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants. Davis is 21 years old.

¶ 3 Davis also fails to show that recent neuroscience constitutes newly discovered evidence, another exception to the time bar. Even if he was able to do so, Davis fails to show prejudice because Miller v. Alabama ,² Monschke , and other juvenile sentencing cases have not been applied to 21-year-old defendants, and he fails to show there is a connection between his circumstances and the recent science. Because Davis does not satisfy any of the statutory criteria that exempt his petition from the one-year time bar, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ order dismissing Davis's PRP as untimely.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Davis relies on the facts from his direct appeal, and they are undisputed. Believing that Mario Spearman had ordered the shooting of their friend, Davis and three associates decided to seek retribution. State v. Davis , noted at 170 Wash. App. 1005, 2012 WL 3264239 at *1. They located Spearman in his car at a traffic intersection. One of Davis's group carried an assault rifle and Davis carried a handgun. While Spearman's car was stopped, Davis and two associates left their car, ran to Spearman's car, and opened fire. The group fired about 30 bullets of different sizes at the car before leaving the scene. Spearman was killed, the front-seat passenger was injured and survived, and the two back-seat passengers (a woman and her child) were not seriously wounded. Davis was 21 years old when he committed the charged crimes.

¶ 5 Police arrested Davis and the three members of his group. They were charged with one count of first degree murder for Spearman's death and three counts of attempted first degree murder for the other passengers. The individual driving Davis on the night of the murder pleaded guilty to lesser offenses and testified against Davis and the group. The jury convicted all three of first degree murder and the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder for the passengers. Davis requested an exceptional mitigated sentence or one at the bottom of the range because, at his age, it would "essentially" take Davis's life away. Pet'r’s Suppl. Br., Attach. at 25 (transcript of Davis's sentencing hearing). Defense counsel stated that Davis's actions were "out of character," id. at 24, and argued for an exceptional 516-month sentence based on a "multiple offense policy." State's Resp. to PRP, App. B (Wash. Ct. App. No. 79937-1-I (2019)) at 3-4 (defendant's sentencing memorandum). Davis did not seek an exceptional sentence based on his youth.

¶ 6 The sentencing judge indicated that she tried but was unable to find a reason to mitigate the sentences for Davis and his accomplices. The judge imposed the low end of the sentencing ranges for all the defendants. Davis received 767 months in confinement (approximately 64 years), including 240 months for firearm enhancement time.

¶ 7 Davis appealed only his convictions for attempted murder.

Davis , 2012 WL 3264239 at *2. In 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. The mandate issued in March 2013. Davis filed three collateral attacks in the following years.³ He filed the current petition in 2019 in this court, seeking a new sentencing hearing. The motion was transferred to the Court of Appeals for consideration. Davis argued that recent neuroscience constitutes newly discovered evidence and exempted his otherwise untimely petition under RCW 10.73.100(1). In support of his PRP, Davis included a declaration from Dr. Laurence Steinberg, an adolescent developmental psychologist, which describes the evolution of neuroscience in later-aged adolescents. The State countered that the late-adolescent brain research on which Davis relied was not new and that Davis could have presented the arguments prior to filing the PRP.

¶ 8 Division One of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely and successive. Order of Dismissal, In re Pers. Restraint of Davis , No. 79937-1-I, at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020). The court noted that Davis made a similar argument in an earlier petition that the sentencing court failed to consider his relative youth as a mitigating factor, and that Davis did not explain why he did not raise the argument previously. Next, the court concluded that Davis failed to show the evidence would probably change the result at trial because sentencing courts have always had discretion to consider youth and Davis presented no evidence showing the court declined to take his youthfulness into consideration. Id. at 2 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth , 191 Wash.2d 328, 336-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) ).

¶ 9 Davis sought review in this court, which we granted and consolidated with In re Personal Restraint of Rivas (No. 98031-4). Order, No. 98340-2 (Wash. Nov. 5, 2021). In December 2021, Rivas alerted the court that he would be imminently resentenced and intended thereafter to withdraw his motion for discretionary review. The court granted the joint motion to strike oral argument and dissolved the consolidation on December 15, 2021. Davis remained on our docket and proceeded independently for consideration.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Relief by way of collateral challenge to a conviction is an "extraordinary" remedy for which petitioners must overcome a " ‘high standard before [we] will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.’ " In re Pers. Restraint of Finstad , 177 Wash.2d 501, 506, 301 P.3d 450 (2013) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Coats , 173 Wash.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011) ). Generally, petitioners must bring a collateral attack against their judgment and sentence within one year of that judgment becoming final. RCW 10.73.090(1), (2). An untimely petition may be considered if the judgment was not valid on its face, the court lacked competent jurisdiction, or the petition is based solely on one or more of the exceptions to the time bar listed in RCW 10.73.100. Davis alleges two such exemptions: (1) Monschke is a retroactive change in the law that is material to his sentence, RCW 10.73.100(6), and (2) recent neurological studies of late-aged adolescents constitute newly discovered evidence, RCW 10.73.100(1). For the following reasons, we disagree.

1. PRP of Monschke

¶ 11 This court's decision in Monschke is split between a lead opinion, concurrence, and dissent. In Monschke , two defendants, aged 19 and 20, were convicted of aggravated first degree murder pursuant to RCW 10.95.020, which mandated a sentence of life without parole (LWOP) pursuant to RCW 10.95.030. 197 Wash.2d at 306, 308, 482 P.3d 276. Timeliness of the PRP was a threshold issue. Id. at 309-11, 482 P.3d 276. The Monschke petitioners argued that the aggravated murder sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied, satisfying the constitutionality exemption in RCW 10.73.100(2). Id. RCW 10.73.100(2) provides that a PRP is exempt from the one-year time bar if it asserts that the statute the defendant was convicted of violating was unconstitutional.

¶ 12 The lead opinion, signed by three other justices, reasoned that the aggravated murder statute was unique from other sentencing provisions. Id . at 310, 482 P.3d 276. RCW 10.95.030(1) requires the State to charge and the jury to find the defendant "guilty" of the same aggravated murder charge. The lead opinion therefore reasoned that a challenge to the sentencing requirement of .030(1) was a challenge to the statute the petitioners were " ‘convicted of violating.’ " Id .

¶ 13 The lead opinion then concluded that the 19- and 20-year-old petitioners were entitled to resentencing under Miller . The opinion noted that state and federal constitutional protections for juvenile defendants have become more protective in accordance with society's evolving standards of decency and that legislative line-drawing around age has historically been an arbitrary decision. Monschke , 197 Wash.2d at 307, 314-21, 482 P.3d 276. Most relevant to Davis's claim, the opinion observed that no "meaningful" developmental distinction exists in current neuroscience between 17- and 18-year-olds as a class. Id. at 321-25, 482 P.3d 276. Thus, the lead opinion concluded that defendants under and over the age of 18 are entitled to Miller ’s constitutional protections of individualized sentencing and consideration of youth as a mitigating factor. Id. at 326, 482 P.3d 276. The lead opinion relied on Mille...