In re Estate of Henkel, No. M2006-02641-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 11/16/2007)
| Decision Date | 16 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. M2006-02641-COA-R3-CV.,M2006-02641-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF MARY V. HENKEL, DECEASED. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; L. Vincent Williams, Deputy Attorney General for Appellant, Tennessee Bureau of TennCare.
Laura Tek of Madison, Tennessee for Appellee, Estate of Mary V. Henkel, Deceased.
W. Frank Crawford, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Alan E. Highers, P.J., W.S. and David R. Farmer, J., joined.
After procuring an administrator of the estate of an elderly decedent, the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare filed a claim against the estate seeking reimbursement of properly paid benefits to the nursing facility on decedent's behalf. The heirs excepted to the claim, and the trial court issued an opinion barring the claim as untimely under T.C.A. §30-2-310(b) (2001) and In Re: Estate of Luck, No. W2004-01554-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1356448 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2005). The Bureau appeals. We affirm.
The material facts in this case are undisputed. On July 1, 1991, Mary Virginia Jones Henkel ("Decedent") became the beneficiary of medical assistance paid through the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare ("Bureau," or "Appellant"). Ms. Henkel died on February 19, 2003. In March, 2003, Guardian and Trust Company ("GTC"), Conservator for Ms. Henkel, sent the Bureau a final accounting for the conservatorship, and the Bureau responded by sending GTC a letter and printout of medical services paid by the State. GTC forwarded the communication to Ms. Henkel's children.
On June 11, 2003, October 17, 2003, and November 6, 2003, the Bureau sent letters notifying Ms. Henkel's children that the Bureau may have an interest in the estate. However, the Bureau did not expressly demand reimbursement for medical assistance costs paid on behalf of Ms. Henkel. On or about January 6, 2004, the Bureau received a request for release from Ms. Henkel's son, Larry. In response, the Bureau sent another letter to Larry Henkel, again informing him that the Bureau may have an interest in his mother's estate.
Ms. Henkel's children did not seek to open an estate. Consequently, on September 8, 2005, in accordance with T.C.A. § 30-1-301 et seq., the Bureau filed a complaint to appoint an administrator for Ms. Henkel's estate (the "Estate," or "Appellee"). As provided for in T.C.A. § 30-1-303, the complaint named Larry Henkel, David Henkel, and Judy Clifford as defendants. Letters of Administration were issued to Jonathan Richardson on September 9, 2005. On November 4, 2005, Larry Henkel filed an answer and counter-petition for letters of administration and transfer to the Circuit Court. A document purporting to be Ms. Henkel's will was attached to Larry Henkel's petition.
The matter was transferred to the Seventh Circuit Probate Court on November 30, 2005. Thereafter, on December 2, 2005, the trial court declared the appointment of Mr. Richardson as administrator to be void ab initio. Following a hearing, on January 20, 2006, the trial court entered an Order appointing Mr. Richardson administrator pendente lite.
On January 30, 2006, the Bureau filed a claim against the Estate for $287,646.30. This claim was made for properly paid medical benefits pursuant to T.C.A. § 71-5-116(c) (2004), which reads as follows:
(c)(1) There shall be no adjustment or recovery of any payment for medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of any recipient pursuant to this part from the recipient's estate, except in the case of a recipient who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older at the time the recipient received medical assistance or services pursuant to this part. In that case, adjustment or recovery from the recipient's estate may be pursued only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under eighteen (18) years of age or no surviving child, as defined in § 1614 of the Social Security Act, who is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or a child who became blind or permanently and totally disabled after reaching majority, if the TennCare bureau and the personal representative agree, or, in the event of a disagreement, the court, after de novo review, finds that repayment would constitute an undue hardship to the blind or disabled child.
Pursuant to this statute, the Bureau filed the Affidavit of Jeanie Taylor, Administrative Services Assistant with the Estate Recovery Unity for the Bureau of TennCare, which Affidavit states that Ms. Henkel was over fifty-five years of age at the time she received the medical benefits, that she was not survived by a spouse or any children under the age of twenty-one or who were blind or permanently and totally disabled.
The Bureau also requested that the administrator publish notice to creditors. That notice was published and ran for three consecutive weeks beginning on April 13, 2006. On the same day, Larry Henkel filed a claim against the Estate for $11,679.97 for property taxes allegedly paid for the years 1994 to 2005. On April 13, 2006, on behalf of Decedent's heirs, Larry Henkel excepted to the Bureau's claim, alleging that the "Estate is not indebted to the claimant in any way whatsoever." Mr. Richardson, the administrator, did not take a position on the Bureau's claim.
A hearing was held on June 22, 2006. On October 30, 2006, the trial court entered its order barring the Bureau's claim. Specifically, the trial court held that, "based upon In re Estate of Luck, 2005 WL 1356448 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2005), read in conjunction with T.C.A. § 30-2-310(b), which makes the one year statute of limitation applicable to the State of Tennessee, the claim of TennCare against the Estate of Mary Henkel was untimely filed and is therefore barred." The Bureau filed a timely notice of appeal. The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in barring the Bureau's claim as untimely filed.
Because this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we review the case de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the trial court. Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm absent error of law.See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). As noted above, the facts in this case are undisputed. The sole issue before us involves statutory interpretation and, as such, is a question of law. Consequently, our review of the trial court's order is de novo upon the record with no presumption of correctness accompanying the trial court's conclusions of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Waldron v. Delfss, 988 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); Sims v. Stewart, 973 S.W.2d 597, 599-600 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).
In construing statutes, the Court's role is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822 (Tenn.2005); McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002). In McGee, the Court said:
The rule of statutory construction to which all others must yield is that the intention of the legislature must prevail. Mangrum v. Owens, 917 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995)(citing Plough, Inc. v. Premier Pneumatics, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983); City of Humboldt v. Morris, 579 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978)). "[L]egislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, when read in the context of the entire statute, without any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend the import of the language." Id. (citing Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn.1977)). The Court has a duty to construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant. The Court must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence of the Act in order to achieve the Legislature's intent, and it must construe a statute so that no section will destroy another. Id. (citing City of Caryville v.. Campbell County, 660 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983); Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn.1975).
In In Re: Estate of Daughrity, 166 S.W.3d 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), this Court addressed the applicability of the statute of limitations to claims against estates by the Bureau. The Daughrity Court held that there are two limitations periods that apply to creditor's claims under Tennessee probate law. First, T.C.A. § 30-2-306 and § 30-2-307 establish a four month limitations period applicable to creditor's claims. These statutes were applicable in the Daughrity case, and the Court specifically held that the four month statute of limitations contained therein did not apply to the Bureau under the doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi, i.e. time does not run against the king, to wit:
The courts of this state have consistently held that, when the State of Tennessee, acting through its various departments, files a claim in a governmental capacity, statutes of limitations do not bar the state's claim absent an express legislative directive to the contrary.
The common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurit regi, which is literally translated as "time does not run against the king," prevents an action brought by the State from being dismissed due to the expiration of the statutory period of limitations normally applicable to the specific type of action. This doctrine has been justified on the ground "that the public should not suffer because of the negligence of its officers and agents ..." State ex rel. Board of University & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir.1982).... This doctrine is not to be lightly regarded, as we have repeatedly stated that...
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