IN RE ESTATE OF STANTON, 04-179.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-179.,04-179. |
| Citation | 114 P.3d 1246,2005 WY 74 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Sarah W. STANTON, Deceased. Darlene Baker, Appellant (Respondent), v. Julie Enis, Personal Representative of the Estate of Sarah W. Stanton, Appellee (Petitioner). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Thomas C. Bancroft, of Bancroft Law Firm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: William R. Shelledy, Jr., of Scott, Shelledy & Luhm, P.C., Worland, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] This case involves interpretation of the Last Will and Testament of Sarah W. Stanton. The district court determined that the will was unambiguous and ordered distribution of the assets in dispute through the residual clause of the will. Appellant, Darlene Baker, challenges that decision. We reverse.
[¶ 2] Ms. Baker states the following issues:
Julie Enis, the personal representative of the estate, identifies one issue:
1. Whether the District Court correctly interpreted sentence 1 of Article III, of the Last Will and Testament of Sarah W. Stanton wherein it determined that said paragraph excepted the stock held in Sarah Stanton's name individually and placed said stock in the residuary estate for distribution?
[¶ 3] Sarah Stanton signed her Last Will and Testament on May 24, 2001, in Thermopolis, Wyoming. Ms. Stanton died on October 11, 2003. The will was admitted to probate and Julie Enis was appointed as personal representative.
[¶ 4] At the time of her death, Ms. Stanton held a safety deposit box at First State Bank jointly with her sister, Ms. Baker. The safety deposit box contained, among other items, stock certificates in the sole name of Ms. Stanton. The stock was valued at $253,252.16.
[¶ 5] Article III of Ms. Stanton's will states:
To my sister, Darline [sic] Baker, I give her the contents of my Safety Deposit Box No. 287 located at the First State Bank, said box held in our joint names and that she is entitled to all property therein with the exception of any joint tenancy property or property such as stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit that are issued in some other name or names besides hers and/or mine jointly. These items, if any, will descend to those persons names [sic] either as joint tenant with me or as named legal owner of the property located therein. All other property located in said safety deposit box will become the sole and absolute property of Darline [sic] Baker together with all the contents of my home, including but not limited to jewelry, antiques, furniture and furnishings, dishes, heirlooms, keepsakes, appliances, etc., provided she survives me by sixty (60) days.
[¶ 6] The will also contained a residuary clause. Pursuant to that clause (Article V), Ms. Stanton directed that any remaining or residual property in her estate be divided into five equal shares and distributed to the beneficiaries identified in the residuary clause. Ms. Enis and her husband were named as beneficiaries of one of those shares.
[¶ 7] Ms. Enis, as personal representative of the estate, petitioned the district court for authorization to sell the stock and distribute the proceeds to the beneficiaries named in the residuary clause. Ms. Baker objected to the petition on the basis that she was the rightful beneficiary of the stock pursuant to Article III of the will. Ms. Enis responded with a motion seeking the district court's interpretation of Article III. Ms. Baker countered with a request for resolution of the dispute pursuant to the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.1
[¶ 8] A hearing was held on July 2, 2004. No evidence was presented. After hearing argument, the district court announced its decision stating:
An order to that effect was entered. Ms. Baker appeals from that decision.
[¶ 9] The district court determined that the Last Will and Testament of Sarah W. Stanton was unambiguous and expressed her intention that stock in her name be distributed pursuant to the residuary clause of the will. Whether language is ambiguous is a question of law which we review de novo. Samuel v. Zwerin, 868 P.2d 265, 266 (Wyo.1994). The proper interpretation of an unambiguous will is also a question of law which we review de novo. In re Estate of Armijo, 128 N.M. 565, 995 P.2d 487, 489 (App.1999); Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 2004 WY 61, ¶ 42, 90 P.3d 724, ¶ 42 (Wyo.2004). Because we conduct a de novo review, we afford no deference to the legal conclusions of the district court. In re Estate of Corpening, 2001 WY 18, ¶ 7, 19 P.3d 514, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001); Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo.2000).
[¶ 10] Ms. Stanton's intent, as expressed in the will, controls the legal effect of her disposition. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-105 (LexisNexis 2003). We articulated our standards for the construction of wills in In re Estate of Seader where we stated:
In re Estate of Seader, 2003 WY 119, ¶¶ 31-32, 76 P.3d 1236, ¶¶ 31-32 (Wyo.2003).
[¶ 11] Although both parties assert that the will is unambiguous and clearly reflects Ms. Stanton's intent, they offer competing interpretations of the will relating to distribution of the stock held solely in the name of Ms. Stanton. If a will is unambiguous the intent of the testatrix is to be determined solely from the language of the will. In re Estate of Croft, 713 P.2d 782, 783 (Wyo.1986). If a will is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be utilized to properly interpret the will. Id. at 784. A will is ambiguous if it is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a double meaning is present. Id. Disagreement between the parties as to the will's meaning does not create an ambiguity. See, e.g., Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy Co., 979 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo.1999).
[¶ 12] We must determine if Ms. Stanton's intent regarding distribution of the disputed assets is unambiguously expressed in her will. The parties agree that the three sentences of Article III should serve as the primary focus of our inquiry. In the first sentence, Ms. Stanton expressed her intention to bequeath the entire contents of the safety deposit box to Ms. Baker, except for two types of property described in that sentence. The second sentence of Article III provides direction regarding distribution of the excepted property. In the third sentence, Ms. Stanton reiterated her intention that the contents of the safety deposit box be distributed to Ms. Baker.
[¶ 13] The dispute centers around the excepted property referenced in the first sentence. Specifically, we must determine Ms. Stanton's intent regarding the phrase "hers and/or mine jointly." The parties offer differing interpretations of this phrase. We agree that this phrase, read in isolation, is subject to more than one meaning. The parties concede that in order to determine Ms. Stanton's intent, we must construe the provisions of the will in pari materia. However, they focus on different words, phrases and provisions of the will to ascertain Ms. Stanton's intent.
[¶ 14] Ms. Baker contends that the plain meaning of the first sentence is that Ms. Baker is to receive all stock in the name of Ms. Baker (her name), stock in the name of Ms. Stanton (my name), and/or stock in the name of Ms. Baker and Ms. Stanton jointly. According to Ms. Baker, this interpretation is buttressed by the second sentence of Article III where Ms. Stanton describes and provides instruction regarding the property which would not pass to Ms. Baker. The second sentence states, "[t]hese items, if any, will descend to those persons names [sic] either as joint tenant with me or as named legal owner of the property located therein." "These items" refers to property excepted from the bequest made to Ms. Baker by the preceding sentence.
[¶ 15] Ms. Enis asserts that the language of Article III can be reduced to the following:
To my sister [Darlene Baker] ... I give her the contents of my safety deposit box... and that she is entitled to all the property therein with the exception of ... stocks ... that are...
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