In re Estate of Cupples
| Decision Date | 03 December 1917 |
| Citation | 199 S.W. 556,272 Mo. 465 |
| Parties | In re ESTATE of SAMUEL CUPPLES; MAUDE CUPPLES SCUDDER, GLADYS CUPPLES SCUDDER and MARTHA CUPPLES OVERALL v. EDWARD KOELN, Collector of the Revenue, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Thomas L Anderson, Judge.
Affirmed.
Orville M. Barnett and Ernest A. Green for appellant.
(1) Respondents herein, as the daughters of Mrs. Scudder, are not exempt from Missouri inheritance tax by reason of the fact that they are children of an adopted child of testator. In order for the children of Mrs. Scudder to be exempt from an inheritance tax they must come within one of the following classes: First, legally adopted children of Samuel Cupples or, second, direct lineal descendants of Samuel Cupples. (2) The mere fact that the Scudder children were daughters of an adopted child does not make them "adopted children" and, a fortiori, does not make them the "legally adopted children" refered to in Sec. 309, R. S. 1909. Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 55; Hockaday v Lynn, 200 Mo. 461; Beach v. Bryan, 155 Mo.App. 50; Sarazen v. Railway Co., 153 Mo. 485. As Samuel Cupples neither complied with the statute of adoption with reference to the Scudder children, nor even attempted to do so, it cannot be seriously contended that they come within the term "legally adopted children." (3) The Scudder children by virtue of Mr. Cupples's adoption of their mother are not "direct lineal descendants" of Mr. Cupples. Mrs. Scudder is not a lineal descendant of Mr. Cupples. 1 Cyc. 934; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456; Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 496; 2 Bouvier, p. 260; Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 429. Lineal descendants of a person have a general right of inheritance both from the lineal ancestor and from his collaterals; on the other hand, an adopted child is uniformly held to be unable to inherit from the collateral kindred of its adopted parents, the ancestors of such parents or the natural children of such parents. Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133; Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536; Meader v. Archer, 65 N.H. 214; Phillips v. McComca, 59 Ohio St. 1; Sunderland's Estate, 60 Iowa 732; Helms v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446.
John H. Overall for respondents; Frederick N. Judson, of counsel.
(1) A child adopted in compliance with the statutes will inherit the property of the adopting parent the same as if born of such adopting parent in wedlock. Secs. 1671, 1673, R. S. 1909; Fosburg v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122; Moran v. Stewart, 122 Mo. 295; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456. (2) The children of an adopted child inherit the property of the adopting parent the same as if they are his natural grandchildren. Bernero v. Goodwin, 267 Mo. 427 Healey v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340; Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671; Atchison v. Atchison, 89 Ky. 488; Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kan. 217; Pace v. Klink, 51 Ga. 220; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274. (3) Section 309 exempts from its provisions legally adopted children and direct lineal descendants. (a) The term "legally adopted children" includes the children of such. Estate of Williams, 62 Mo.App. 349 (cited Johnson v. Autriker, 205 Mo. 247); Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274. (b) The term "direct lineal descendants," includes the children of an adopted child; they are in line of descent through command of the statute the same as if that line had been established by nature. We thus distinguish between lineal descendants by birth and statutory lineal descendants. Bernero v. Goodwin, 267 Mo. 427; In re Matter of Cook, 187 N.Y. 261; Webb's Estate, 250 Pa. 179; Sec. 332, R. S. 1909; Fosburg v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122; 25 Cyc. 1442; Levi v. McCarten, 31 U.S. 102; Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 469; Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483; Walker v. Walker, 25 Ga. 429; In re Woolworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322. (4) The collateral inheritance tax, since it imposes a special burden upon particular persons and property and is not in any proper sense a general tax, should be strictly construed in favor of the citizen. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578; Matter of Enston, 113 N.Y. 174; In re Stewart, 131 N.Y. 27; 27 Ency. Law, p. 340; Blakemore & Bancroft on Inheritance Taxes, sec. 241; In re Starbuck's Estate, 116 N.Y.S. 1030; Matter of Mergentine, 129 App.Div. (N.Y.) 367; English's Estate v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531.
This is a proceeding begun in the probate court for the city of St. Louis for the assessment of the collateral inheritance tax against the interest of the three respondents in the estate devised and bequeathed to them by Samuel Cupples, deceased. The amount of the interest of each was found to be $ 172, 253.96, and the tax demanded against each was $ 8,612.70. The probate court held these testamentary interests to be exempt from such taxation. The matter was appealed by the respondents to the circuit court for the city of St. Louis, where the action of the probate court was reversed, and judgment entered accordingly. A motion for a new trial was sustained, and the collector has appealed to this court from that order.
The facts are that in 1871 Samuel Cupples and wife adopted by deed made in accordance with the statute of this State in such cases, Amelia Ross Lowman (who had come to them as a child in 1868), with the consent of her parents evidenced by their joining in the deed. The child's name was changed from Lowman to Cupples and she grew up in the Cupples family, was married in 1885 to William H. Scudder, Jr., and became the mother of the three respondents, who lived in the Cupples family. Mr. Cupples characterized Mrs. Scudder in his will as my beloved daughter, and made an affidavit in which he stated that she had "always been our dutiful, obedient and affectionate daughter."
The income of the trust property only was to be paid to the beneficiaries during the first four years of the trust, and then one-fourth of the principal each year until all should be paid. All payments of principal and interest were to be contingent upon the beneficiary being alive at the time of the distribution -- otherwise the share to go elsewhere.
The question presented is whether or not the children of an adopted child of the testator are required to pay the collateral inheritance tax imposed by Section 309, Revised Statutes 1909, upon their respective legacies. The provisions of that section applicable are the following: "All property which shall pass by will, or by the intestate laws of this State . . . other than to or for the use of the father, mother, husband, wife, legally adopted children, or direct lineal descendant of the testator . . . shall be and is subject to the payment of a collateral inheritance tax of five dollars for each and every one hundred dollars of the clear market value of such property, and at and after the same rate for every less amount, to be paid to the collector of revenue of the proper county, and for the purpose of this article, the city of St. Louis shall be affected through its corresponding officers as if it were a county." The question depends entirely upon the legislative purpose in using the words "legally adopted children" in the provision quoted. If they were used for the purpose of making plain the intention that legally adopted children were to be classified with natural children of the testator or intestate in respect of their rights under the statutes of descents and distributions, then it is plain, as we shall presently see more clearly, that their descendants would come within the description of descendants of their adopted parent. If, on the other hand, these words were used as words of limitation, for the purpose of excluding them from that description, by the mention of their adopted parent, a contrary result would follow. In the consideration of that question we will be aided by certain general principles, too well settled to be open to discussion.
The Collateral Inheritance Tax Statute is not a general revenue law founded upon the provision of the State Constitution requiring that taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, but "is a bonus or duty levied upon the right or privilege of the devisee, heir or distributee, for receiving his share." [State er rel. v. Henderson, 160 Mo. 190, 215, 60 S.W. 1093; State ex rel. v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, 45 S.W. 245; In re Remme's Estate, Maguire v. University, 271 Mo. 359, 196 S.W. 737.] Such taxation must be imposed in clear and unambiguous terms, and exceptions will be liberally construed in connection with the whole body of the law upon the subject of which it treats. This leads us to an examination of the statutes relating to the adoption of children, as well as to those regulating descents and distributions of the estates of decedents, upon which it depends largely for its operation, and is, to that extent, a part.
The statute authorizing the adoption of children rests upon an element in the human character which manifests itself in the desire for children -- for some one to nurture and cherish as one's own flesh and blood, and to make return for such offices by bringing affection and comfort to one's old age. This is well illustrated in the case at bar. The three children by birth of the testator died in childhood, and the adopted child took their place and filled it so well that nearly forty years afterward he wrote of her in his will as his beloved daughter and took occasion in an affidavit, made for that...
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