In re F.S.T.Y.

• Decision Date: 05 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 129A19,129A19
• Citation: 843 S.E.2d 160,374 N.C. 532
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: F.S.T.Y., A.A.L.Y.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

374 N.C. 532

843 S.E.2d 160

In the MATTER OF: F.S.T.Y., A.A.L.Y.

No. 129A19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed June 5, 2020

Sheri Woodyard, for petitioner-appellee Davidson County Department of Social Services.

Forrest Firm, P.C., by Brian C. Bernhardt, Charlotte, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant father.

BEASLEY, Chief Justice.

The issue before the Court is whether due process requires that a nonresident parent have minimum contacts with the State of North Carolina in order to establish personal jurisdiction over him or her for purposes of termination of parental rights proceedings. Because we hold that the status exception to the minimum contacts requirement applies to termination of parental rights proceedings, we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent-father's parental rights.

I.

F.S.T.Y. (Florence) and A.A.L.Y. (Abigail)¹ are twin sisters who were born in South Carolina in August 2004. Their mother, Laura, and respondent-father were unmarried when the twins were born but eventually married two months following the twins’ birth. In May 2007, respondent-father was incarcerated for burglary. Laura then moved Florence and Abigail to North Carolina. Davidson County Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with Laura and the twins in January 2011, due to Laura's substance abuse, homelessness, and improper care of the children.

On 9 May 2016, a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a car containing Laura and the twins’ maternal grandmother. Both were arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor child abuse, possession of heroin, and possession of cocaine. On 11 May 2016, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging neglect and dependency of the twins. After a hearing, the court issued an order adjudicating the twins as neglected, placed the children in DSS custody, and ordered their mother and respondent-father to comply with a case plan.

Respondent-father did not request representation and was not present at the adjudication hearing, but the court appointed an attorney to appear on his behalf. During the hearing, the court acknowledged that respondent-father was a resident of South Carolina and ordered him to contact DSS upon his release from prison to set visitation. There were several hearings in the following months. Respondent-father was represented by an attorney at some of these proceedings; at others, he was not represented.

Reunification efforts ceased following a hearing on 3 May 2017, and DSS filed termination of parental rights petitions on 3 November 2017. Subsequently, respondent-father filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court ultimately denied respondent-father's motion to dismiss and terminated his parental rights. The court found that respondent-father had not provided substantial financial assistance or care for the children before they were placed into DSS custody. Furthermore, respondent-father's release date continued to be extended for infractions, and respondent-father failed to maintain contact with Florence and Abigail.

Respondent-father appealed the trial court's orders terminating his parental rights in both children, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights because he lacked minimum contacts with North Carolina.

II.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from rendering valid judgments against nonresidents. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court , 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) ). Due process requires that a nonresident against whom relief is sought be provided adequate notice of the suit and be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Tr. Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313–314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) and Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).

Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to require an individual to appear in the forum and defend an action brought against the individual in that forum. Before a court can exercise power over the individual, due process generally requires that the nonresident possess sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state so "that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Int'l Shoe Co. , 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940) ).

The minimum contacts requirement furthers two goals: (1) "it safeguards the defendant from being required to defend an action in a distant or inconvenient forum"; and (2) "it prevents a state from escaping the restraints imposed upon it by its status as a coequal sovereign in a federal system." Miller v. Kite , 313 N.C. 474, 477, 329 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1985) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 580, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) ). These protections are usually described in terms of "fairness" and "reasonableness." World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. 580. The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that "reasonableness" requires that, while the burden on the nonresident is always a primary concern, other relevant factors, including the state's interest, will be considered when appropriate. Id.

In addition to satisfying the constitutional requirement, courts must also satisfy the state's statutory requirements in order to render a valid judgment against a nonresident. North Carolina's long-arm statute provides, in relevant part, that the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in actions "brought under Statutes of this State that specifically confer grounds for personal jurisdiction." N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(2) (2019).

The North Carolina Juvenile Code provides that the courts of this State shall have "exclusive original jurisdiction" over termination of parental rights cases involving "any juvenile who resides in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency in the district" at the time of filing, provided that the requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 50A-201, - 203, or - 204 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) are met. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019).

The UCCJEA is a uniform state law that has been adopted by nearly all fifty states, including North Carolina. The relevant language in the UCCJEA as adopted by this State provides that "physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination." N.C.G.S. § 50A-201(c) (2019).

Respondent-father argues that although exercise of jurisdiction over him comports with North Carolina's statutory requirements, those requirements do not comport with constitutional due process requirements. We disagree.

This is an issue of first impression for the Court, and while this Court has not considered the requirements of due process as they relate to termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals has developed a line of case law in which minimum contacts are required only in instances in which the child or children were born in wedlock. Compare In re Finnican , 104 N.C. App. 157, 162, 408 S.E.2d 742, 745 (1991), overruled on different grounds by Bryson v. Sullivan , 330 N.C. 644, 663, 412 S.E.2d 327, 337 (1992) (holding that minimum contacts were required when the child was born in wedlock); and In re Trueman , 99 N.C. App. 579, 581, 393 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1990) (stating the same rule); with In re Dixon , 112 N.C. App. 248, 252, 435 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1993) (holding that minimum contacts are not required when the child is born out of wedlock and the father has not taken appropriate steps to legitimate the child, provide support for the child and mother, or establish paternity).

In Trueman , the father and mother were married and had a child. Later, the parties separated, and the mother moved to North Carolina with the child. Trueman , 99 N.C. App. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The district court in North Carolina entered a judgment awarding the mother custody of the child and an absolute divorce from the father. Id. at 580, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The mother then filed an action for child support, which was granted and transferred to Wisconsin where the father resided. Id. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. The father failed to make any payments, so the mother initiated a termination proceeding against him, and the termination was granted. The father was not present for the custody, divorce, or termination proceedings. Id.

The Court of Appeals relied on this Court's decision in Miller v. Kite , 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985), which held that determining whether personal jurisdiction exists requires the court to employ a two-step analysis. "First, it should be ascertained whether the statutes of this State allow our courts to entertain the action the plaintiff has brought against the defendant." Miller , 313 N.C. at 476, 329 S.E.2d at 665. If so, the court must then determine if the minimum contact requirement is met. Id. at 476–77, 329 S.E.2d at 665.

Thus in Trueman , the Court of Appeals held that although a suit to adjudicate a "status" between a parent and child was an in rem proceeding, the constitutional requirement, as set out in International Shoe , requires that a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident be consistent with due process requirements.²

Trueman , 99 N.C. App. at 581, 393 S.E.2d at 570. Thus, the father's "meager contacts" with the State were insufficient to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction over him for purposes of the termination proceeding. Id.

In In re Dixon , however, the Court of Appeals began to recognize that in some circumstances " ‘fair play and substantial justice’ do not...