In re Falls

• Decision Date: 18 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 26792.,26792.
• Citation: 849 N.W.2d 265,2014 S.D. 35
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: SAVE OUR NEIGHBORHOOD—SIOUX FALLS; Bonita Schwan; Dan Wray; Gale Wray; Richard V. Wilka; Mitchell Arends; Erin Arends; Rebekka Klemme; Neil Klemme; Dana Van Beek Palmer; Anne Rasmussen; and Duane O'Connell, Petitioners and Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS; and The Sioux Falls City Council, Respondents and Appellees.

849 N.W.2d 265

2014 S.D. 35

SAVE OUR NEIGHBORHOOD—SIOUX FALLS; Bonita Schwan; Dan Wray; Gale Wray; Richard V. Wilka; Mitchell Arends; Erin Arends; Rebekka Klemme; Neil Klemme; Dana Van Beek Palmer; Anne Rasmussen; and Duane O'Connell, Petitioners and Appellants,

v.CITY OF SIOUX FALLS; and The Sioux Falls City Council, Respondents and Appellees.

No. 26792.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued April 29, 2014.

Decided June 18, 2014.

Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Pamela R. Bollweg of Johnson, Heidepriem & Abdallah, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for petitioners and appellants.

James E. Moore, Blayne N. Hagen of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, PC, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for respondents and appellees.

KONENKAMP, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Landowner members of “Save Our Neighborhood” seek to invalidate an annexation resolution adopted by the City of Sioux Falls under SDCL 9–4–1, annexing property to be developed for a Walmart store. Located in Lincoln County, the land is unplatted and zoned for agricultural use. Its owner voluntarily petitioned for its annexation to Sioux Falls. Save Our Neighborhood contends that the City failed to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners under SDCL 9–4–5. The circuit court denied writs of certiorari and prohibition, ruling that SDCL 9–4–5 did not apply to a resolution adopted under SDCL 9–4–1.

Background

[¶ 2.] On January 22, 2013, Springdale Development, LLC petitioned the City of Sioux Falls to annex its property under SDCL 9–4–1. Unplatted and zoned for agricultural use in Lincoln County, Springdale's 39 acres lie contiguous to the City. As part of its standard practice, the City notified Lincoln County of Springdale's request and asked for comment. Lincoln County submitted no comment. In April 2013, the City adopted Resolution No. 25–13 to annex Springdale's real property. The City filed the approved resolution with the Lincoln County Register of Deeds, but did not seek approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners.

[¶ 3.] In July 2013, eleven landowners, neighbors to Springdale's property, joined as “Save Our Neighborhood” and petitioned the circuit court for writs of prohibition and certiorari. They sought to invalidate the City's annexation resolution and to prohibit the City from rezoning the property to allow a Walmart store. Save Our Neighborhood asserted that SDCL 9–4–5 required the City to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before legally adopting a resolution to annex Springdale's unplatted agricultural land.

[¶ 4.] At the hearing before the circuit court, Chief Planning and Zoning Official Jeff Schmitt and City Attorney Dave Pfeifle testified. The parties also submitted a statement of stipulated facts. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Save Our Neighborhood's petitions. It ruled that SDCL 9–4–5 was ambiguous and thus relied on legislative history to conclude that the Legislature intended SDCL 9–4–5 to apply only to a city-initiated annexation under SDCL 9–4–4.2.

[¶ 5.] Save Our Neighborhood appeals asserting that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of SDCL 9–4–5 and in its denial of the petitions for writs of prohibition and certiorari. “Our review of certiorari proceedings is limited to whether the challenged court, officer, board, or tribunal had jurisdiction and whether it regularly pursued its authority.” Esling v. Krambeck, 2003 S.D. 59, ¶ 6, 663 N.W.2d 671, 675 (citation omitted). We review the circuit court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Id. (citing Ridley v. Lawrence Cnty. Comm'n, 2000 S.D. 143, ¶ 5, 619 N.W.2d 254, 257).

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 6.] Save Our Neighborhood argues that SDCL 9–4–5 applies to all resolutions for annexation, and therefore, the City exceeded its jurisdiction and acted in irregular pursuit of its authority when it passed Resolution No. 25–13 to annex Springdale's Lincoln County property without first obtaining approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners. SDCL 9–4–5 provides, in part, that “[n]o such resolution describing unplatted territory therein may be adopted until it has been approved by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such unplatted territory is situate.” Springdale's property was unplatted at the time Springdale petitioned for annexation, and it is undisputed that the City did not obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before adopting Resolution No. 25–13. Quoting this Court's oft-repeated maxim that “[t]he intent of a statute is determined from what the Legislature said, rather than what we think it should have said,” Save Our Neighborhood contends that because the plain language of SDCL 9–4–5 does not distinguish between landowner-initiated or city-initiated actions for annexation, the City was required to comply with SDCL 9–4–5.

[¶ 7.] The City, on the other hand, asserts that the word “such” in SDCL 9–4–5 makes the statute ambiguous. It is ambiguous, the City argues, because “such” is a demonstrative adjective that must refer to an antecedent, but there is no antecedent within SDCL 9–4–5. Directing us to the legislative history related to SDCL chapter 9–4, the City maintains that the Legislature intended SDCL 9–4–5 to apply only to a city-initiated action for annexation under SDCL 9–4–4.2.

[¶ 8.] Our interpretation of a statute is confined to the language used by the Legislature. See In re Estate of Gossman, 1996 S.D. 124, ¶ 10, 555 N.W.2d 102, 106 (citations omitted). “Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and [this] Court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.” Dep't of Transp. v. Clark, 2011 S.D. 20, ¶ 5, 798 N.W.2d 160, 162 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[a] court is not at liberty to read into the statute provisions which the Legislature did not incorporate, or enlarge the scope of the statute by an unwarranted interpretation of its language.” In re Adams, 329 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1983) (citation omitted).

[¶ 9.] Because legislative “[i]ntent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject,” we begin by looking at the structure of chapter 9–4. See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 1996 S.D. 16, ¶ 4, 543 N.W.2d 787, 789 (citations omitted). Under SDCL 9–4–1, a landowner may voluntarily request, by petition, that the governing body of a municipality adopt a resolution to annex property contiguous to that municipality. The petition must be “signed by not less than three-fourths of the registered voters and by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the value of the territory sought to be annexed to the municipality.” Id.

[¶ 10.] Another means to annex property is provided in SDCL 9–4–4.1: “Except as provided by § 9–4–1, before a municipality may extend its boundaries to include contiguous territory, the governing body shall conduct a study to determine the need for the contiguous territory and to identify the resources necessary to extend the municipal boundaries.” Based on the results of the study, SDCL 9–4–4.2 gives a governing body authority to “adopt a resolution of intent to extend its boundaries.” This action is commonly referred to as a “city-initiated” or “involuntary” annexation. The statute dictates what information the resolution of intent must contain, and SDCL 9–4–4.3 requires that before the adoption of the resolution of intent, the governing body must give notice and hold a hearing in compliance. After a resolution of intent is adopted, SDCL 9–4–4.4 requires the governing body to hold another hearing, at which “[t]he governing body shall consider any objections to the resolution of annexation and the adopted resolution of intent [.]” Thereafter, the governing body “may adopt the resolution of annexation [.]” Id.

[¶ 11.] The next sections, SDCL 9–4–4.5 through SDCL 9–4–4.9, deal with the right to submit the resolution of annexation to a vote for its rejection or approval. And SDCL 9–4–4.10 gives “[a]ny person of the annexed area” a right “to compel performance of any aspect of the resolution of intent or the resolution of annexation[.]” SDCL 9–4–4.11 governs a resolution of intent by a small municipality.

[¶ 12.] SDCL 9–4–5—the statute at issue here—is entitled, “Annexation of unplatted territory subject to approval by county commissioners.” It states:

No such resolution describing unplatted territory therein may be adopted until it has been approved by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein such unplatted territory is situate. For the purposes of this section, unplatted territory is any land which has not been platted by a duly recorded plat or any agricultural land as defined in § 10–6–31.

The next several sections, SDCL 9–4–6 through SDCL 9–4–10, relate to a petition for exclusion of a territory from a municipality. Then, SDCL 9–4–11 governs the recording of a resolution “[w]henever the limits of any municipality are changed[.]” The remaining statutes, not relevant to this case, deal with the annexation of territory near a municipal airport. SeeSDCL 9–4–12 to –14.

[¶ 13.] Looking at the structure of chapter 9–4 as a whole and, in particular, the words used by the Legislature in SDCL 9–4–5, it is unclear whether the Legislature intended SDCL 9–4–5 to apply both to voluntary and city-initiated actions to annex unplatted territory. There are two means by which a governing body can annex property by resolution—on its own initiative under SDCL 9–4–4.2 or upon a landowner's petition under SDCL 9–4–1. Yet nowhere in SDCL chapter 9–4 does the Legislature connect the restriction in SDCL 9–4–5. This is problematic because the first phrase of SDCL 9–4–5—“[s]uch resolution”—suggests that the Legislature had in mind a specific...