In re H.G.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 04-07-00656-CV.,04-07-00656-CV.
• Citation: 267 S.W.3d 120
• Parties: In the Interest of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G., Children.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

267 S.W.3d 120

In the Interest of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G., Children.

No. 04-07-00656-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

June 11, 2008.

Jay Robert Brandon, Law Office of Jay Brandon, San Antonio, TX, for appellant.

Michael D. Bowles, San Antonio, TX, Bruce Gibbens, Cibolo, TX, for appellee.

Sitting: ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.

OPINION ON APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR REHEARING

Opinion by: STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.

On April 23, 2008, we issued an opinion and judgment affirming the trial court's judgment. Appellants Deborah and Donald Glynn have filed a motion for rehearing. We deny the motion but withdraw our April 23, 2008 opinion and issue this opinion in its place. Our April 23, 2008 judgment remains unchanged.

This is an appeal from a trial court's dismissal of a petition in intervention for lack of standing. The only issue is whether the trial court properly concluded that the defense of estoppel or quasi-estoppel is inapplicable when the Texas Legislature has declined to confer standing on a party and, in fact, has statutorily precluded such standing. We affirm the trial court's decision.

BACKGROUND

The parental rights of the biological parents of H.G., K.G., J.G., and T.G. ("the children") were terminated. Before the termination Donald and Deborah Glynn, who are the biological maternal grandparents of the children, were named managing conservators. After the termination, Lori and Bruce Gibbens adopted the children with the Glynns' consent. In November of 2005, more than two years after the final adoption, Lori Gibbens filed for divorce and a final decree was entered in March of 2006. The decree named the Gibbenses joint managing conservators of the children.

Approximately eight months after the final decree was entered, the Glynns filed an "Intervenor's [sic] Petition for Modification of Parent-Child Relationship to Provide Grandparent Access"¹ by which they sought an order permitting them "possession of or access to the children." The Glynns claimed the Gibbenses secured the Glynns' consent to the adoption by promising the Glynns could continue visitation with the children after the adoption. Lori Gibbens filed a motion to strike the intervention, contending the Glynns lacked standing and there was no basis in law for their argument regarding quasi-estoppel.

A hearing was held before the trial court. Following the hearing, the trial court found that even if the Gibbenses promised the Glynns continued visitation with the children and even allowed visitation in the past, the Glynns had no standing to bring the action. In its order the trial court stated that the Glynns' theories of estoppel or quasi-estoppel were inapplicable even if the facts as alleged were true. The trial court dismissed the Glynns' intervention for lack of standing and the Glynns perfected this appeal.

ANALYSIS

Because the Glynns were managing conservators at the time of the adoption, their consent was part of the adoption process. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 162.010 (Vernon 2002). The Glynns claim that but for the Gibbenses' representations that they would be permitted on-going visitation, they would not have consented to the adoption. Accordingly, when the promised visitations were discontinued by the Gibbenses, the Glynns filed suit seeking continued access. Failing to include any statutory standing allegations in their petition in intervention, the Glynns argued:

Under the principles of estoppel and quasi-estoppel, [Lori] should be estopped from denying that [the Glynns] have standing to ask for access to these children, because [Lori] promised [the Glynns] that they would continue to have a relationship with the children, and [the Glynns] acted on that promise to their detriment. Furthermore, [Lori] has continued to allow [the Glynns] to have limited contact with the children, and it would not be in the children's best interest to discontinue that contact.

In this appeal, the Glynns assert the trial court erred in concluding their theory of estoppel or quasi-estoppel was inapplicable and could not confer standing in this matter. The Glynns argue the trial court had the equitable authority to estop the Gibbenses from asserting an absence of standing because they made misrepresentations to the Glynns to secure the consent to the adoption and without the Glynns' consent the adoption may have not occurred.

In her motion to strike the Glynns' intervention, Lori Gibbens contended that section 153.434 of the Texas Family Code precluded the Glynns' suit:

A biological or adoptive grandparent may not request possession of or access to a grandchild if:

(1) each of the biological parents of the grandchild has:

* * *

(B) had the person's parental rights terminated ... and

(2) the grandchild has been adopted, or is subject of a pending suit for adoption, by a person other than the child's stepparent.

TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 153.434 (Vernon Supp.2007). Lori Gibbens also argued there was no authority, statutory or common law, to permit the trial court to use estoppel or quasi-estoppel in this matter. She essentially makes these same arguments in response to the Glynns' appeal.

"When standing has been statutorily conferred, the statute itself serves as the proper framework for a standing analysis." Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see Tex. Dep't of Prot. and Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2001) (reviewing applicable standing provisions in Texas Family Code to determine whether purported father had standing); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34-35 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (holding that to determine whether sperm donor had standing to file suit to adjudicate parental rights under Family Code, court was required to engage in statutory construction of relevant provisions of Code). The party seeking relief must allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used in the statute. Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851 (citing Scott v. Bd. of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex.1966)). The Texas Legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory framework for standing in the context of suits involving the parent-child relationship. See TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. §§ 102.003, 102.004, 102.0045, 102.005 and 102.006 (Vernon Supp.2007). The Legislature has precluded standing in suits such as this. Id. § 153.434²; cf. § 102.004(b) (stating that original suit requesting possessory conservatorship may not be filed by grandparent or other person). The Glynns cannot demonstrate statutory standing under any provision of the Texas Family Code and are statutorily barred from pursuing this action. Hence, their quasi-estoppel argument.

We recognize that courts, including this court, have applied the doctrine of estoppel or quasi-estoppel in various contexts, including suits relating to the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., In re A.L.G., 229 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (applying doctrine of quasi-estoppel to bar ex-wife from recovering child support arrearage); Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 42-43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.); In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 651-53 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (applying equitable estoppel to preclude mother from litigating child's parentage). And, in Hausman, we held, in the context of paternity and citing a supreme court case involving copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation, a trial court can apply equitable principles to estop a defendant from relying on a statutory bar to recovery. 199 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.1996)). However, neither Hausman nor any of the other cases relied upon by the Glynns have held that estoppel can be used to confer standing where none exists under the legislative framework.

Standing is not merely a "statutory bar." Rather, standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex.1993). Subject matter jurisdiction "`involves a court's power to hear a case.'" Tellez v. City of Socorro, 226 S.W.3d 413, 413 (Tex.2007) (quoting U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002)). For a court to act, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990). Any judicial action by a court without jurisdiction is void. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction exists by operation of law and cannot be conferred or taken away by consent or waiver. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444-45; Fed. Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1943). Nor can subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by estoppel. Taub v. Aquila S.W. Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 461 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). An absence of standing deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and renders any trial court action void. Id.

Consequently, while equity may estop a party from relying on a mere statutory bar to recovery, it cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444-45; Taub, 93 S.W.3d at 461. If the Texas Legislature has not conferred subject matter jurisdiction on a trial court, the courts cannot mindlessly produce that result based on equity. Accordingly, we hold the cases relied upon by the Glynns and other cases using equity to preclude application of statutory or other bar to suit or recovery, including Hausman, are distinguishable and inapplicable because they do not bear on a court's jurisdiction.

The dissent relies upon the principle of quasi-estoppel to suggest the Glynns have standing in this matter. To support its contention, the dissent first declares that "this court's equity jurisdiction can be used to estop a party from arguing that another party lacks standing." In support of this statement the dissent cites Eckland...