In re Interest of Justin B.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2017
• Docket Number: Opinion No. 27716,Appellate Case No. 2015-000992
• Citation: 419 S.C. 575,799 S.E.2d 675
• Parties: IN the INTEREST OF JUSTIN B., a Juvenile under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

419 S.C. 575

799 S.E.2d 675

IN the INTEREST OF JUSTIN B., a Juvenile under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000992

Opinion No. 27716

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard February 9, 2017

Filed May 3, 2017

John Brandt Rucker, of The Rucker Law Firm, L.L.C., of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry J. Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW :

Justin B., a minor, was found delinquent for committing criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree. The family court imposed the mandatory, statutory requirement that he register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor, both for life. Justin B. claims the mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring on juveniles is unconstitutional. We affirm the family court.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In April 2013, Justin B. was charged with criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree under subsection 16-3-655(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2015). Justin B. was fifteen years old, and his victim was five. The family court conducted a hearing in January 2015. The State called the detective from the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office who investigated the sexual assault complaint. The detective testified she met with Justin B. to discuss the allegations against him, and that he admitted to sexually assaulting the victim. Specifically, Justin B. admitted to putting his penis in the victim's mouth, putting the victim's penis in his mouth, and attempting to put his penis in the victim's anus.

The victim and his mother also testified. The victim—seven years old at the time of the hearing—testified Justin B. sexually assaulted him on several occasions in the manner described by the detective. The victim's mother testified that a friend called to report that the victim was caught showing the friend's son a "game" that involved sexual acts. She asked the victim about it and he told her Justin B. showed him this "game." The victim's mother then contacted the police.

The court found Justin B. committed criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree, and declared him delinquent. The court imposed the mandatory, statutory requirement that Justin B. register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor for the remainder of his life. Justin B. objected to mandatory lifetime registration for juveniles on the grounds it is unconstitutional. The court overruled the objection, stating this Court had already ruled on the issue. Justin B. appealed the family court's decision. The State then moved to certify the case for our review under Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, and we granted the motion.

II. The Sex Offender Registry

In 1994, the Legislature enacted the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2016). The Act created the sex offender registry, which is maintained "under the direction of the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED)." § 23-3-410(A) (2007). The purpose of the registry is set forth in section 23-3-400 (Supp. 2016), which provides,

The intent of this article is to promote the state's fundamental right to provide for the public health, welfare, and safety of its citizens.

....

The sex offender registry will provide law enforcement with the tools needed in investigating criminal offenses. Statistics show that sex offenders often pose a high risk of re-offending. Additionally, law enforcement's efforts to protect communities, conduct investigations, and apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses are impaired by the lack of information about these convicted offenders who live within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction.

Pursuant to subsection 23-3-410(A) (2007),

SLED shall develop and operate the registry to: collect, analyze, and maintain information; make information available to every enforcement agency in this State and in other states; and establish a security system to ensure that only authorized persons may gain access to information gathered under this article.

Section 23-3-430 provides any person—regardless of age—who is convicted or declared delinquent for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree must register as a sex offender. § 23-3-430(A), (C) (2007 & Supp. 2016). Subsection 23-3-490(D)(1)(c) (Supp. 2016) further provides the public may view who is registered for criminal sexual conduct with a minor. Under section 23-3-460, Justin B. must register every ninety days for life. § 23-3-460(A), (B) (Supp. 2016).

Justin B. must also wear an electronic monitoring device. § 23-3-540(A) (Supp. 2016). The monitor utilizes a web-based computer system to actively monitor and record the sex offender's location at least once every minute twenty-four hours a day. § 23-3-540(P) (Supp. 2016). Under subsection 23-3-540(H), the sex offender must wear the electronic monitor for as long as he is on the registry, subject to judicial review. § 23-3-540(H) (Supp. 2016).

III. Prior Decisions

As the family court indicated, we have already addressed many of the issues Justin B. raises in his challenge to the imposition of sex offender registration and electronic monitoring requirements. In State v. Walls, 348 S.C. 26, 558 S.E.2d 524 (2002), we considered whether the sex offender registry violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 348 S.C. at 29, 558 S.E.2d at 525. We stated, "For the ex post facto clause to be applicable, the statute or the provision in question must be criminal or penal in purpose and nature." 348 S.C. at 30, 558 S.E.2d at 526. We then held the sex offender registry did not violate the ex post facto clause because "it is clear the General Assembly did not intend to punish sex offenders, but instead intended to protect the public from those sex offenders who may re-offend and to aid law enforcement in solving sex crimes." 348 S.C. at 31, 558 S.E.2d at 526.

In Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 579 S.E.2d 320 (2003), we considered whether requiring a convicted Colorado sex offender to register in South Carolina violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 353 S.C. at 547, 579 S.E.2d at 322. As to the equal protection challenge, we found classifying an out-of-state sex offender as a sex offender in South Carolina "did not affect a fundamental right," and therefore we applied the "rational relationship" test. 353 S.C. at 550, 579 S.E.2d at 324. Under that test, a statutory classification will be constitutional if the "classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose," "the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions," and "the classification rests on some reasonable basis." Id. (quoting Curtis v. State , 345 S.C. 557, 574, 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) ). We held requiring an out of state offender to register in South Carolina was "reasonably related to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the public and aiding law enforcement in limiting the risk that sex offenders pose to communities." Id. As to the due process challenge, we followed our holding in Walls that the sex offender registry is non-punitive and did not implicate a liberty interest, and therefore held there was no due process violation. 353 S.C. at 552, 579 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Walls, 348 S.C. at 31, 558 S.E.2d at 526 ).

Later that year, we decided In re Ronnie A. , 355 S.C. 407, 585 S.E.2d 311 (2003), in which an eleven-year-old challenged the mandatory lifetime registration requirement after he was found to have committed criminal sexual conduct with a minor. We followed Hendrix , and held "sex offender registration, regardless of the length of time, is non-punitive and therefore no liberty interest is implicated." 355 S.C. at 409, 585 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Hendrix , 353 S.C. at 552, 579 S.E.2d at 325 ).

We reiterated our holding in Walls that the legislative purpose for the sex offender registry "is to protect the public from those offenders who may re-offend." Id. (citing Walls, 348 S.C. at 31, 558 S.E.2d at 526 ). We then concluded, "The registration of offenders, including juveniles who have proved themselves capable of certain sex offenses, is rationally related to achieving this legitimate objective. Appellant has offered no valid basis upon which to distinguish juvenile sex offenders for purposes of due process." 355 S.C. at 409-10, 585 S.E.2d at 312.

Finally, we considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to the section 23-3-540 requirement that juveniles submit to electronic monitoring for life in In re Justin B. ,¹ 405 S.C. 391, 747 S.E.2d 774 (2013). We held "the General Assembly intended section 23-3-540 as a civil scheme for the protection of the public." 405 S.C. at 405, 747 S.E.2d at 781. We concluded, "Section 23-3-540's electronic monitoring scheme bears a clear and rational connection to a non-punitive purpose," and stated "the continuous monitoring of these offenders supports the General Assembly's valid purpose of aiding law enforcement in the protection of the community." 405 S.C. at 407, 747 S.E.2d at 782-83. We held, however, "sex offenders ... are entitled to ‘avail themselves of the section 23-3-540(H) judicial review process.’ " 405 S.C. at 408, 747 S.E.2d at 783 (quoting State v. Dykes , 403 S.C. 499, 510, 744 S.E.2d 505, 511 (2013) ).

IV. Analysis

Justin B. raises one issue on appeal: whether "the mandatory placement of juveniles convicted of certain [sex] crimes on the South Carolina sex offender registry is unconstitutional." Beginning with Walls , and continuing through Hendrix , Ronnie A. , Dykes , and Justin B. , we upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory lifetime sex offender registry requirement with electronic monitoring for adults and juveniles. However, Justin B. makes four arguments that his constitutional challenge should be decided...