In re JS, COA03-1047.
| Citation | 598 S.E.2d 658, 165 NC App. 509 |
| Case Date | July 20, 2004 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
598 S.E.2d 658
165 NC App. 509
No. COA03-1047.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
July 20, 2004.
John. F. Campbell, Fayetteville, for petitioner-appellee Cumberland County Department of Social Services.
Katharine Chester for respondents-appellants.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Respondents appeal the district court's Permanency Planning Order relieving Cumberland County Department of Social Services (DSS) of reunification and visitation efforts with the parents.
Respondents are the parents of three boys, now ages fifteen, eleven, and four. Respondent-father receives Social Security Disability due to several strokes he had in 1999 and is unable to work. Respondent-mother is also unemployed. On 15 March 2001, DSS filed a juvenile petition regarding the children, alleging they were neglected, in that they: (1) lived in unsanitary and unsafe conditions; (2) had poor attendance at school; (3) had very poor personal hygiene; (4) received inadequate medical care; and (5) the parents were unable to manage their finances in a responsible way. On 17 April 2001, the trial judge issued orders for non-secure custody of the three children, placing their custody with DSS. Additional orders for non-secure custody were issued on 4 May 2001 and 14 June 2001, finding that grounds existed to continue the non-secure custody order. On 12 June 2001, the trial court conducted the adjudication and dispositional hearings, where DSS moved to amend the petition to include allegations of dependency. Since respondents stipulated to dependency, DSS took a voluntary dismissal on the neglect allegations. The court continued the matter for review. On 15 November 2001, the trial court conducted a review hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-906. The trial court found that reasonable efforts were being made to reunite the children with their family, or to provide a permanent plan for the children, but that the return of the children to the parent's custody would be contrary to the welfare of the minors. While legal custody remained with DSS, physical custody of the two youngest boys was placed with relatives of respondents and the oldest boy was placed in foster care. The parents were allowed visitation with the children. The court conducted periodic permanency planning hearings on 20 February 2002, 20 March 2002, 12 June 2002, and 22 August 2002.
At the 22 August 2002 permanency planing review, the court relieved DSS from its reunification and visitation efforts as to the minor children. Respondents appeal.
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon...." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2003). Thus, the trial court must, through "processes of logical reasoning," based on the evidentiary facts before it, "find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law." In re Harton, 156 N.C.App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003). The resulting findings of fact must be "sufficiently specific to enable an appellate court to review the decision and test the correctness of the judgment." Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982). Where the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even if there is evidence which would support a finding to the contrary. In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003).
Here, the trial court's findings are not "specific ultimate facts," which are sufficient for this Court to determine that it was proper for the lower court to allow DSS to cease reunification efforts. In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (noting that "ultimate facts" are the resulting effect reached by the court's application of logical reasoning to the evidentiary facts). In this case, the trial court entered a cursory two page order. It did not incorporate any prior orders or findings of fact from those orders. Instead, the trial court...
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