In re Lundy

• Decision Date: 05 November 1914
• Docket Number: 11811.
• Citation: 143 P. 885,82 Wash. 148
• Parties: In re LUNDY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

143 P. 885

82 Wash. 148

In re LUNDY.

No. 11811.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 5, 1914

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; E. H Sullivan, Judge.

In the matter of the delinquency of Lyndelle Lundy, a minor. From an order holding the child to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile laws and authority, the delinquent and her mother appeal. Affirmed.

E. O Connor, of Spokane, for appellants.

Lawrence H. Brown, of Spokane, for respondent.

ELLIS J.

On October 9, 1913, a complaint was filed in the superior court of Spokane county, charging Lyndelle Lundy, a female child under the age of 18 years, with being a juvenile delinquent person. She answered, admitting that she is under the age of 18 years, but alleged that she was married on March 1, 1913 to a man 32 years old; that her mother gave written consent to the issuance of the marriage license, and to the marriage; and that on July 14, 1913, a decree annulling the marriage was entered. A demurrer to this answer was sustained. The cause was tried to the court upon a statement of agreed facts, stipulating that the girl is under the age of 18 years, to wit, of the age of 17 years; that she has been married to a man of full age; that the marriage has been annulled by a valid decree; that Lyndelle Lundy has been engaged in singing for wages in two restaurants, to wit, the St. Germain Café and the Silver Grill, in the evenings; that in each of these restaurants wines, liquors, and beer were sold and served, and there consumed by the patrons and diners; and that the girl was supporting herself and assisting in the support of her mother by the wages earned in singing in such restaurants. The court held that the girl, being only of the age of 17 years, is 'a minor child under the age of 18 years,' and subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile laws and authorities until she shall become of the age of 18 years. The delinquent and her mother prosecute this appeal.

As we view the matter, but two questions are presented for our consideration: (1) Is a girl under the age of 18 years within the purview of the Juvenile Law, and subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, whether she be married or single? (2) Does that law apply to a vocalist for hire, who sings in a public restaurant where liquors are sold and consumed? Both of these questions must be determined by the terms of the act, construed with reference to its manifest purpose and intent.

The scope of the act is determined by its first section, which, so far as here material, reads as follows:

'Section 1. This act shall be known as the 'Juvenile Court Law' and shall apply to all minor children under the age of eighteen years who are delinquent or dependent; and to any person or persons who are responsible for or contribute to, the delinquency or dependency of such children.

'For the purpose of this act the words 'dependent child' shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years. * * *

'(10) Who habitually visits any billiard room or pool room; or any saloon, or place where spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors are sold, bartered, or given away; or * * *

'(16) Who from any cause is in danger of growing up to lead an idle, dissolute or immoral life; or * * *

'(18) Any child under the age of twelve years found peddling or selling any article, or singing or playing on any musical instrument for gain upon the public street, or giving any public entertainment, or who accompanies, or is used in aid of, any person so doing: Provided, that this act shall not prohibit the giving of entertainments by regularly organized schools or societies where twelve or more musical instruments are used.

'The words 'delinquent child' shall include any child under the age of eighteen years who violates any law of this state, or any ordinance of any town, city, county or city and county of this state defining crime; or who habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language, or is guilty of immoral conduct; or who is found in or about railroad yards, or tracks; or who jumps on or off trains or cars; or who enters a car or engine, without lawful authority.

'For the purpose of this act only, all delinquent and dependent children within the state shall be considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the custody, care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided.'

Session Laws 1913, pp. 520, 521, 522; 3 Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1987-1.

The act, in its application to the delinquent, is not punitive in its nature or purpose. The policy underlying this law is protection, not punishment. Its purpose is not to restrain criminals, to the end that society may be protected and the criminal perchance reformed; it is to prevent the making of criminals. Its operation is intended to check the criminal tendency in its inception, and protect the unformed character in the facile period from improper environment and influences. In short, its motive is to give to the weak and immature a fair fighting chance for the development of the elements of honesty, sobriety, and virtue essential to good citizenship. While no person, whether minor or adult, should ever be restrained of liberty without due process, and in that respect the statute must be construed with all the strictness of a criminal law ( Weber v. Doust et al., 143 P. 148, just decided), in other respects it should be liberally construed, to the end that its manifest beneficent purpose may be effectuated to the fullest extent compatible with its terms.

The act, taken as a whole, will admit of no other view.

We are asked to hold that, because another statute (Rem. & Bal Code, § 8744) declares, 'All females married to a person of full age shall be deemed and taken to be of full age,' the admitted prior marriage of the child here involved caused her to become and remain of full age for all purposes, and that the annulment of the marriage did not restore her former status as a minor child, within the purview of the Juvenile Court Law. The statute referred to, however, in removing the disabilities of minority, does not use the words 'for all purposes,' which we are asked to read into it. That statute merely removes the common-law disabilities of minority. It was never intended to prohibit a classification of minors for the purposes of legislation, nor to limit the meaning of the word 'minor' in acts relating to minors as a class without that exception. As we view the Juvenile Court Law, we find it unnecessary to enter into a lengthy discussion of this point, or to determine whether the annulment of the marriage restored the delinquent's status as a minor for all purposes, or for any purpose. Viewed as a remedial rather than a punitive statute, we would not be justified in holding that the definition of a delinquent or dependent person, found in the language of the first section of the act which we have quoted, is dominated and controlled by the single word 'minor,' taken in its technical legal significance as found in other connections, and as applied in relation to other things. The purposes of the Juvenile Court Law have a clear and distinct connection with age as related to discretion and character. In passing it, the Legislature indulged the usual presumptions arising from human experience that there is ordinarily a lack of mature discretion, discriminating judgment, and stability of character in children under the age of 18 years; hence it...