In re Marriage of Dennis M., B199973 (Cal. App. 6/23/2008)
Decision Date | 23 June 2008 |
Docket Number | B199973 |
Parties | In re Marriage of DENNIS M. and SHERRY LYNN SCHWARTZ DENNIS M. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. SHERRY LYNN SCHWARTZ, Respondent |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. NWD120688, Michael J. Convey, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Dennis Schwartz, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearance on behalf of Respondent.
Dennis M. Schwartz appeals from a June 27, 2007 order reducing but not terminating his spousal support obligation to his former wife, Sherry Lynn Schwartz. (Fam. Code, §§ 3554, 3651.) We affirm the order.
The parties were married on November 23, 1968, and separated in December 1989. On January 5, 1994, the trial court ordered Mr. Schwartz to pay his former spouse support of $4,000 per month until July 30, 1995, and $2,000 per month thereafter until her death or remarriage or until further court order. The trial court ordered, "[Ms. Schwartz] is advised to seek employment." Additionally, the trial court held: "[T]his order will meet the needs of [Ms. Schwartz], and will allow [her] to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with her lifestyle . . . during the marriage." On March 1, 1996, the trial court denied Ms. Schwartz's motion to increase spousal support.
Mr. Schwartz filed a September 27, 2006 order to show cause to terminate spousal support. Mr. Schwartz asserted Ms. Schwartz was earning more than $75,000 a year and was self-supporting, therefore spousal support should be terminated. The trial court reduced the spousal support from $2,000 to $1,000 a month. Mr. Schwartz appeals from this order.
An order modifying spousal support rests within the trial court's sound discretion. (In re Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1299, fn. 34; In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47; In re Marriage of Biderman (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 409, 413.) The Court of Appeal has held: (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480; accord, In re Marriage of Geraci, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286; In re Marriage of Rising (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 472, 478.) It is Mr. Schwartz's burden on appeal to affirmatively establish an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Rothrock (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 223, 230; Furniss v. Furniss (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 138, 141.)
Mr. Schwartz does not argue the trial court abused its discretion. Mr. Schwartz asserts his former wife is self-supporting and, therefore, the trial court's refusal to terminate spousal support violates his right under the United States Constitution not to be married and to associate with her. There are several problems with this argument. First, we agree the right to marry is protected by the United States and California Constitutions. (Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1, 12; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 485-486; In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 809-810; Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 577; Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 161.) But, there is no constitutional right not to be married or to associate with an ex-spouse. (See Mattingly by Mattingly v. Heckler (7th Cir. 1986) 784 F.2d 258, 269 [ ]; Whitehouse v. Ives (D.Me. 1990) 736 F.Supp. 368, 374 [ ]; Reese v. Reese (Ill.App. 1971) 278 N.E.2d 122, 123-124 [ ].) Mr. Schwartz can point to no legal authority for the proposition that requiring him to pay continued spousal support violates his constitutional rights.
Second, even if Ms. Schwartz is self-supporting, the trial court was not required to terminate spousal support. Family Code section 4320 governs spousal support. (All further statutory references are to the Family Code.) The trial court must independently consider and weigh each of the relevant factors set forth in section 4320. (In re Marriage of Geraci, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297; In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302-304; In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.) In so doing, the trial court determines the weight to be accorded each factor. (In re Marriage of Geraci, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297; In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 304.) The spousal support decision must be made based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the modification is requested and the order is made. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575; In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808, 824; In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 498; In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 645, 656.)
Section 4320 states:
We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court carefully considered the statutory factors and the circumstances of the parties. Given the 21-year length of the marriage, Mr. Schwartz's undisputed ability to pay spousal support, Ms. Schwartz's apparently stable but limited earning capacity, the age and health of the parties, and the balance of hardships, the trial court could reasonably conclude Mr. Schwartz should continue to pay $1,000 a month in spousal support. (See In re Marriage of Beust (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 24, 28-31.)
Mr. Schwartz asserts the state's interest in requiring spousal support was to allow Ms. Schwartz to become self-supporting, and once she did so, spousal support was no longer warranted. That contention is without merit. As the statutory factors demonstrate, Ms. Schwartz's ability to support herself is but one consideration. Moreover, as expressly stated in section 4320, subdivision (l) with respect to the self-supporting goal, "[N]othing in this section is intended to limit the court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties."
Mr. Schwartz cites In re Marriage of Brantner (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 416, 420, for the proposition that, "The State's compelling interest is to mitigate the harm to the [wife's] career caused by periods of unemployment to perform marital duties during the marriage." In Brantner, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District described the wife as, "[A]n unemployed and currently unemployable woman, 44 years of age, facing the possibility of becoming blind . . . ." (Id. at p. 419.) The Court of Appeal held in part: ...
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