In re Menten
| Decision Date | 26 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | A166531 |
| Citation | 461 P.3d 1075,302 Or.App. 425 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Brian C. MENTEN, Co-Petitioner-Respondent, and Lia C. Deatherage, aka Lia C. Menten, Co-Petitioner-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Bret D. Lubic argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Gregory T. Lusby, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ariana Denley and Arnold Gallagher P.C.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.
In this post-dissolution proceeding, wife appeals from an order of the trial court denying her motion to set aside a supplemental judgment awarding to husband property that the dissolution judgment had awarded to the parties jointly. Wife contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to set aside the supplemental judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the supplemental judgment and therefore affirm the trial court’s order.
In October 2015, the trial court dissolved the parties’ nine-year marriage through a stipulated judgment of dissolution. Under the judgment, the parties were to assign their jointly held real property "to a newly formed Oregon Limited Liability Company with Husband and Wife as managing members, each with 50% ownership in the LLC."
Subsequently, the parties disputed the management of their jointly held property, and wife filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Enforce Stipulated Judgment of Dissolution," citing as authority both ORS 107.104 and ORS 107.105. Husband filed a "response and counterclaim."
At a hearing on wife’s motion and husband’s counterclaim, the parties mutually requested that the trial court separate the parties’ interests by either liquidating or dividing the property.1 After the hearing, the trial court entered a supplemental judgment, drafted by husband’s counsel and approved "as to form" by wife’s counsel, awarding the property to husband, with an equalizing judgment to wife. Under the supplemental judgment, wife had 30 days within which to "cash out" husband, in which case husband would be awarded an equalizing judgment. In the event that wife was unable to pay husband for his interest in the property, the court determined that husband would take possession of the property and pay wife for her interest. The court reserved to a later time the determination of the amount to be awarded to either party as an equalizing judgment.
Wife was not able to purchase husband’s interest, and husband remained in possession and control of the property, a building. Husband then filed a motion to enforce the supplemental judgment, along with a motion seeking an order requiring wife to vacate the building. The trial court entered an order enforcing the supplemental judgment and requiring wife to immediately vacate the building.
Wife had not appealed the supplemental judgment. But she filed a motion to set it aside for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the judgment had made an unauthorized modification of the dissolution judgment’s property division. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying wife’s motion to set aside the supplemental judgment. On appeal, wife assigns error to the trial court’s denial of her motion, contending for the same reason raised below that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the supplemental judgment.
Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the type of case over which a court has authority to exercise judicial powers. The Supreme Court recently said in Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office v. Edwards , 361 Or. 761, 777-78, 399 P.3d 969 (2017), that subject matter jurisdiction is "the authority to exercise judicial power." In Callahan v. Employment Division , 97 Or. App. 234, 238, 776 P.2d 21 (1989), we said that a court’s "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the court has the authority to make an inquiry." See also Daly and Daly , 228 Or. App. 134, 139, 206 P.3d 1189 (2009) (citing Callahan , 97 Or. App. at 238, 776 P.2d 21 ); School Dist. No. 1, Mult. Co. v. Nilsen , 262 Or. 559, 566, 499 P.2d 1309 (1972) " (quoting Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 301 (1950)); Garner v. Alexander , 167 Or. 670, 675, 120 P.2d 238 (1941), cert. den. , 316 U.S. 690, 62 S.Ct. 1281, 86 L.Ed. 1761 (1942) . Subject matter jurisdiction exists "when the constitution, the legislature or the law has told a specific court to do something about the specific kind of dispute in issue." Greeninger v. Cromwell , 127 Or. App. 435, 438, 873 P.2d 377 (1994) (citing Garner , 167 Or. 670, 120 P.2d 238 ).
In Oregon, unless divested by statute or rule of law, "circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over all actions." State v. Terry , 333 Or. 163, 186, 37 P.3d 157 (2001) (). Furthermore, "[a]s a general rule, in order to divest the circuit courts of jurisdiction, the legislature must do so expressly." SpecialIty Risk Services v. Royal Indem. Co. , 213 Or. App. 620, 625, 164 P.3d 300 (2007).
As we have stated, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and may be raised at any time. Schwartz and Battini , 289 Or. App. 332, 338, 410 P.3d 319, rev. den. , 362 Or. 39, 403 P.3d 777 (2017). A court’s decision made at a time when the court lacked judicial power to act should be vacated. State v. Hemenway , 353 Or. 498, 504, 302 P.3d 413 (2013) ; see Garner v. Garner , 182 Or. 549, 561-62, 189 P.2d 397 (1948) ().
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular proceeding is a question of law, which we review for legal error. See State v. Hill , 277 Or. App. 751, 763, 373 P.3d 162, rev. den. , 360 Or. 568, 385 P.3d 82 (2016). There are many circumstances in which Oregon courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. , judicial power over a given dispute. For example, Oregon circuit courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review local land use decisions. ORS 197.825 (). Appellate courts lack "subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment that is not appealable." State v. Nix , 356 Or. 768, 773, 345 P.3d 416 (2015). Circuit courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide child custody matters that fall outside the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), ORS 109.701 to ORS 109.834. Dept. of Human Services v. T. F. , 292 Or. App. 356, 360, 425 P.3d 480 (2018) ().
We have noted that subject matter jurisdiction—the authority to exercise judicial power in a given subject area or dispute—is distinct from a court’s exercise of its authority within a given subject area or dispute. Southard v. Larkins , 275 Or. App. 89, 97, 364 P.3d 1006 (2015), rev. den. , 359 Or. 39, 370 P.3d 1252 (2016) (). A court may have authority to exercise judicial power in a given case, but then exercise that authority erroneously. A court’s erroneous exercise of its authority within an area over which it has subject matter jurisdiction does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Wood v. White , 28 Or. App. 175, 178, 558 P.2d 1289 (1977) (). Thus, an error in a dissolution judgment by a court that otherwise has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction does not divest the court of jurisdiction so as to render its judgment void and subject to collateral attack. Id.
In dissolution cases, "subject matter jurisdiction is founded on domicile." Watanabe and Watanabe , 140 Or. App. 85, 88, 914 P.2d 701, rev. den. , 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) ; Wood , 28 Or. App. at 178, 558 P.2d 1289. An Oregon circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over a dissolution when one of the parties resides in Oregon. ORS 107.075.
Post-dissolution, an Oregon court has explicit authority to address a modification of spousal support, child support, and child custody. ORS 107.135. But absent certain statutory exceptions ( ORS 107.135(1)(e) (); ORS 107.452(3) ()), courts do not have authority to modify a property division in a dissolution judgment. See Spady v. Graves , 307 Or. 483, 488, 770 P.2d 53 (1989). Relying on Spady , wife contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the property division and, therefore, its supplemental judgment is void.
We agree with wife that our case law is clear that, barring statutory exceptions, a property division is not subject to modification.
However, we need not decide whether, as a general matter, that is because a modification of a...
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