People ex rel. J.S.R.
| Decision Date | 31 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 13CA1812 |
| Citation | 2014 COA 98,338 P.3d 1088 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, IN the INTEREST OF J.S.R., Juvenile–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Gail L. Morrison, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile–Appellant
¶ 1 The sentencing court sentenced defendant, J.S.R., to a one-year term of commitment in the custody of the Division of Youth Corrections (DYC), plus mandatory parole. It also ordered that, upon release from the DYC, J.S.R. was to serve a one-year term of probation. J.S.R. moved to correct an illegal sentence, which the district court denied. We conclude that the district court misinterpreted section 19–2–907(1), C.R.S.2013, as allowing the combination of a one-year term of commitment to the custody of the DYC followed by a one-year term of probation for J.S.R.'s single adjudication. And, because the court's combination of probation and commitment exceeded the 45–day maximum commitment allowed under section 19–2–925(1)(a), C.R.S.2013, we reverse the order, vacate the sentence, and remand the case with directions.
¶ 2 J.S.R. had previously been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent in two separate cases and had two new delinquency cases pending against him. He entered into a plea agreement wherein he pleaded guilty to one count of felony menacing and one count of possession of a handgun by a juvenile in one of the cases in exchange for dismissal of the remaining two counts and the second pending case. The agreement left sentencing to the court's discretion.
¶ 3 After accepting J.S.R.'s pleas, the court adjudicated J.S.R., who was then seventeen years old, a juvenile delinquent as a mandatory sentence offender and sentenced him to the DYC for a determinate one-year mandatory minimum term of commitment, and a mandatory parole period. The court also ordered that J.S.R. complete one year of probation immediately following his release from the DYC and advised him that, since he would be eighteen years old upon his release from the DYC, he would be subject to a county jail sentence if he did not comply with probation.
¶ 4 J.S.R. successfully completed his term of commitment and began serving his probationary term in February 2013. The parole board also imposed a period of parole supervision as required by statute.1
¶ 5 In June and July 2013, the probation department filed petitions to modify or revoke J.S.R.'s probation, which each resulted in his arrest. Soon thereafter, J.S.R. filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the probationary term was illegal. After a hearing, the court denied J.S.R.'s motion. When this appeal was filed, J.S.R. had posted bond awaiting resolution of the pending probation revocation petitions and was under parole supervision.
¶ 6 J.S.R. contends that the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering him to serve a one-year commitment in the DYC's custody followed by one year of probation. He argues numerous bases in support of that contention. We agree that the sentencing court erred in interpreting its sentencing authority pursuant to sections 19–2–907 and 19–2–908, C.R.S.2013, and that the sentence imposed was illegal.
¶ 7 Initially, we reject the People's contention that this issue is moot. “A case is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect on an existing controversy.” Warren v. People, 192 P.3d 477, 478 (Colo.App.2008).
¶ 8 J.S.R. is currently out on bail for alleged probation violations. Thus, whether or not a term of probation was authorized will have a direct effect on him, the pending petitions to revoke his probation, and his sentence, if any, for the alleged probation violations.
¶ 9 The district court denied J.S.R.'s motion to correct an illegal sentence, finding that section 19–2–907 allows for a combination of sentencing options and, therefore, the DYC commitment and sequential probation sentence was statutorily authorized.
¶ 10 Having reviewed the relevant statutes, and considering the legislative intent behind juvenile sentencing and the Children's Code as a whole, we conclude that the district court misinterpreted the scope of the sentencing court's authority pursuant to section 19–2–907(1) to combine sentencing options. Accordingly, the court erred by denying J.S.R.'s motion to correct an illegal sentence.
¶ 11 We reach this conclusion by first considering the relationship between the general sentencing statute, section 19–2–907 ; and the mandatory sentence offender sentencing provision, section 19–2908(1)(a). We then interpret a court's authority to impose a combination of sentencing options under section 19–2–907. We conclude that sections 19–2–907 and 19–2–908(1)(a) can be harmonized and applied together; however, here, the district court erred in the combination that it chose, thereby imposing an illegal sentence.
¶ 12 “An illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by law, meaning that it is inconsistent with the sentencing scheme established by the legislature.” People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76, ¶ 11, 305 P.3d 420 ; see Delgado v. People, 105 P.3d 634, 636 (Colo.2005). Such claims may be raised at any time. Crim. P. 35(a) ; Jenkins, ¶ 11 ; People v. White, 179 P.3d 58, 61 (Colo.App.2007). We review the legality of a sentence de novo. See People v. Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20, ––– P.3d –––– ; Jenkins, ¶ 11.
¶ 13 We also review issues involving statutory interpretation de novo. A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 10, 312 P.3d 168 ; Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo.2007). In doing so, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, “reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts.” A.S., ¶ 10. Id. at ¶ 11.
¶ 14 Section 19–2–907 lists the various sentencing options that a court may impose and, as relevant here, reads as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 15 The relevant portion of section 19–2–908 states:
¶ 16 J.S.R. contends that section 19–2–908(1)(a) is an independent sentencing provision that only authorizes the sentencing court to place or commit a mandatory sentence offender out of the home and, because it does not specifically authorize a probationary sentence, the court cannot impose one. He further argues that, because section 19–2–907(2) requires that a mandatory sentence offender be sentenced pursuant to section 19–2–908(1)(a), he is not subject to the provisions of section 19–2–907(1) or to any sentence or combination of sentences that could otherwise be imposed for a non-mandatory sentence offender.
¶ 17 J.S.R. also contends that, even if the court is permitted to use the sentencing options described in section 19–2–907(1) when it makes the necessary finding that an alternative sentence is more appropriate, because the sentencing court did not make such a finding and sentenced him to a mandatory minimum commitment period, none of the sentencing options provided in section 19–2907(1) were authorized.
¶ 18 The People contend that sections 19–2–907 and 19–2–908 are not mutually exclusive. They argue that a sentencing court is authorized to impose a sentence, or combination of sentences, as outlined in section 19–2–907(1) as long as it also complies with section 19–2–908(1)(a).
¶ 19 We conclude that section 19–2–908 is a supplement to, not a substitute for, section 19–2–907. We further conclude that the sentencing options listed in section 19–2–907 are applicable to mandatory sentence offenders and may be combined with the statutorily mandated one-year minimum sentence to out-of-home placement or commitment pursuant to section 19–2–908(1)(a) as long as any such sentence is authorized by and consistent with the other provisions of the Children's Code. To conclude otherwise would lead to absurd results. See A.S., ¶ 12 ().
¶ 20 If we interpret the language of section 19–2–908(1)(a) as fully describing the sentencing options available for a mandatory sentence offender, the sentencing court would be limited to the following sentences:
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