In re Signorelli Co.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 01–13–01031–CV.,01–13–01031–CV.
• Citation: 446 S.W.3d 470
• Parties: In re The SIGNORELLI COMPANY, INC., Signorelli Operating Corporation, Signorelli Holdings, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Company, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Homes, Ltd., Signorelli Homes Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Media, Ltd., Lake Conroe Resorts, Ltd., and Lake Conroe Resorts Operating Company, L.L.C., Relators.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

446 S.W.3d 470

In re The SIGNORELLI COMPANY, INC., Signorelli Operating Corporation, Signorelli Holdings, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Company, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Homes, Ltd., Signorelli Homes Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Media, Ltd., Lake Conroe Resorts, Ltd., and Lake Conroe Resorts Operating Company, L.L.C., Relators.

No. 01–13–01031–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Aug. 19, 2014.

Eric Yollick, Travis Owens, Yollick Law Firm, P.C., The Woodlands, TX, for Relators.

Thomas M. Gregor, Gregor & Rippy, PLLC, Houston, TX, for Real Party Interest.

Panel consists of Justices KEYES, SHARP, and HUDDLE.

OPINION

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.

Relators, The Signorelli Company, Inc., Signorelli Operating Corporation, Signorelli Holdings, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Company, Ltd., Signorelli Investment Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Homes Ltd., Signorelli Homes Operating Company, L.L.C., Signorelli Media, Ltd., Lake Conroe Resorts, Ltd., and Lake Conroe Resorts Operating Company, L.L.C. (collectively, “Signorelli”), bring this original mandamus proceeding complaining of the trial court's order denying their motion to transfer venue from Harris County to Montgomery County based on the mandatory venue provision found in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011.¹ We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

Background

The underlying proceeding arises from a dispute concerning an agreement between Signorelli and real party in interest Champion Custom Home Builders, L.L.C. (“Champion”) related to a real estate development project.

Champion is a custom home builder. Signorelli is a real estate developer and home builder. In approximately 2007, Signorelli started a development named “Bella Vita” on a tract of land located in Montgomery County, Texas.² In connection with the development, Signorelli prepared an “Amended and Restated Declaration of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Bella Vita” (the “Declaration”). Pursuant to the Declaration, Signorelli appointed itself and its employees and agents as the “New Construction Committee,” which was in charge of approving builders for the development and ensuring that the builders operated in accordance with the Declaration and the rules and regulations adopted by the Bella Vita Homeowners Association.

In 2009, Champion became involved with Bella Vita when an owner of a lot in the development asked Champion to complete construction on the owner's home. Champion sought approval from Signorelli to complete the construction project, which was provided.

Subsequently, Champion was approached by other lot owners to construct additional homes in the Bella Vita development. It was at this point that Signorelli informed Champion that it must first become an “approved builder” before Champion could begin additional construction projects. The parties then engaged in discussions regarding the means by which Champion could become an approved builder. To this end, Champion and Signorelli entered into an Approved Builder Purchase Agreement (“Builders Agreement”), through which Champion purchased two lots in the Bella Vita development from Signorelli in exchange for Champion's becoming an approved builder. However, the parties' relationship appears to have deteriorated after the signing of the Builders Agreement.

Champion filed suit in Harris County district court, alleging that Signorelli had made false representations and promises to Champion in order to induce Champion to invest in the Bella Vita development. Champion asserted causes of action for fraud, statutory fraud, breach of the Builders Agreement and the Declaration, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and it sought to recover monetary damages. Champion also brought a claim for declaratory judgment and for rescission of the Builders Agreement, under which Signorelli had conveyed two parcels of land in the Bella Vita development to Champion.

Signorelli moved to transfer venue to Montgomery County arguing, inter alia, that venue was mandatory in that county pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011 as the county where the real property at issue in the case was located. Champion argued in its response that section 15.011 did not apply in the present case and that venue was proper in Harris County under general venue provisions as the county where all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.

The trial court denied Signorelli's motion to transfer venue, and Signorelli filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's denial.³

Standard of Review

Generally, a venue ruling is not a final judgment ripe for appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.064(a) (West 2002); Tex.R. Civ. P. 87(b). However, mandamus relief is appropriate to enforce a mandatory venue provision when the trial court has denied a motion to transfer venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642 (West 2002) ; In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex.2012) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

In an original proceeding regarding the application of a mandatory venue provision, the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion to transfer for an abuse of discretion. See In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Tex.2006) (orig. proceeding); In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.1998) (orig. proceeding). “[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion ....” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding). When a relator seeks to enforce a mandatory venue provision, it is not required to prove that it lacks an adequate appellate remedy and is only required to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by failing to transfer the case. See In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d at 176–77 ; In re Mo. Pac. R.R., 998 S.W.2d 212, 215–16 (Tex.1999) (orig. proceeding).

Analysis

Certain kinds of suits involving land must be filed in the county where the property is located. Specifically, Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011 provides:

Actions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or a part of the property is located.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.011 (West 2002).

Two venue facts must be established to show that venue is mandatory under section 15.011 : (1) that the nature of the suit fits within those listed in section 15.011 ; and (2) that all or part of the realty at issue is located in the county of suit. Poock v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 01–08–00415–CV, 2009 WL 2050905, at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Airvantage, L.L.C. v. TBAN Props. # 1, L.T.D., 269 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). It is undisputed that the property at issue in this original proceeding is located in Montgomery County; thus, the sole issue to be decided in this case is whether the suit falls within the parameters of section 15.011. See In re Applied Chem., 206 S.W.3d at 117.

The Texas Supreme Court has stated that we are to look at the “essence” of a dispute to determine whether it falls under the mandatory venue statute. See id. at 119 ; see also Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex.2001) (examining “substance of the dispute”). “It is the ultimate or dominant purpose of a suit that determines whether a particular suit falls under the mandatory venue statute, and not how the cause of action is described by the parties.” In re City Nat'l Bank, 257 S.W.3d 452, 454 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2008, orig. proceeding) (citing Bracewell v. Fair, 638 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ)).

The nature of the suit is determined by the facts alleged in the plaintiff's petition, the rights asserted, and the relief sought. Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 157 Tex. 607, 306 S.W.2d 706, 708 (1957) ; In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d 151, 161 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); see also Airvantage, 269 S.W.3d at 258 (“Whether the recovery is called conversion, breach of contract, or other non-real property types of recovery, the true nature of the lawsuit depends on the facts alleged in the petition, the rights asserted, and the relief sought.”). “Thus, once it is demonstrated that the court's judgment would have some effect on an interest in real property, the venue of the suit is properly fixed under section 15.011.” In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d at 161 (citing Bracewell, 638 S.W.2d at 615, and Airvantage, 269 S.W.3d at 259 ). If section 15.011 applies to one of the claims or causes of action, then all claims and causes of action arising from the same transaction must be brought in the county of mandatory venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.004 (West 2002) ; In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d at 161 ; Airvantage, 269 S.W.3d at 259.

Because of its mandatory nature, we must strictly construe section 15.011 and will “not hold that it applies unless [Champion's] suit is clearly within one of the categories set out in the statute.” Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); see also Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 241 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.) (“[W]e will strictly construe [section 15.011 ] and will not hold that it applies unless Ballard's suit falls clearly within one of the categories in the section.”); In re Riata Energy, Inc., No. 01–00–01138–CV, 2001 WL 1480291, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2001, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not...