In Re The Detention Of John Paul Coppin
| Decision Date | 16 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 64963-9-I.,64963-9-I. |
| Citation | 157 Wash.App. 537,238 P.3d 1192 |
| Parties | In re the DETENTION OF John Paul COPPIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jodi R. Backlund, Backlund & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.
Brooke Elizabeth Burbank, Jana Ranae Hartman, Assistant Attorney General, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 The sexually violent predator act (SVPA), chapter 71.09 RCW, is civil in nature and provides for the right to demand a trial before a 12-person jury. 1 But the right to a jury trial in a civil case may be waived. Whether to refuse a jury demand after such waiver is a question addressed by the trial court's sound exercise of discretion. 2
¶ 2 Here, John Coppin did not make a jury demand until the morning of his trial. Moreover, he expressly waived, on the record during a court hearing and in writing, his right to a jury six days before his trial. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a jury on the first morning of his trial. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had previously been convicted of a “crime of sexual violence,” as required by the SVPA. His other claims, which we discuss in the unpublished portion of this opinion, are without merit. We affirm.
¶ 3 The facts of this case are undisputed. In 1982, Coppin was convicted in California of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under 14 and one count of oral copulation. In 1988, Coppin was convicted of two counts of statutory rape in the first degree in Washington. Based on these latter convictions, a trial court sentenced him to an exceptional sentence of 300 months of total confinement.
¶ 4 In November 2005, while Coppin was still in total confinement for his Washington convictions, the State commenced this proceeding to commit him as a sexually violent predator (SVP). The State simultaneously filed its written Demand for Jury Trial, dated November 22, 2005, requesting a trial by a jury of 12 persons. Coppin did not file a jury demand.
¶ 5 On October 31, 2007, the trial court set the case for trial on January 22, 2008. The State withdrew its jury demand at a hearing on January 16, 2008. Coppin did not object. At that same hearing, he expressly waived his right to have his case heard by a jury of 12, and the court accepted his waiver. Accordingly, the judge stated his intent to proceed with a bench trial the following week.
¶ 6 Six days later, on the first morning of the scheduled trial, Coppin sought to withdraw his earlier express waiver of a jury trial and requested that the case be heard by a jury. Following argument by counsel for both sides, the trial court denied Coppin's requests and proceeded with a bench trial.
¶ 7 At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coppin was an SVP and ordered that he be involuntarily committed for treatment.
¶ 8 Coppin appeals.
¶ 9 Coppin argues that the order of commitment was entered in violation of his right to a jury trial under both former RCW 71.09.050(3) and article I, section 21 of the Washington constitution. We disagree and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coppin's request for a jury on the first morning of trial.
¶ 10 The SVPA is civil in nature. 3 When a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense may meet the statutory criteria of a sexually violent predator, the department of corrections must refer the person to the appropriate prosecuting agency three months before his or her anticipated release from total confinement. 4 The State, through the appropriate prosecuting agency, may file a petition alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating sufficient facts to support the allegation. 5
¶ 11 Upon the filing of such a petition, “the judge shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a sexually violent predator.” 6 If such determination is made, the judge shall direct that the person be taken into custody. 7
¶ 12 The statute also provides for a trial on the allegations of the petition. 8
¶ 13 “The civil rules ‘govern the procedure in the superior court in all suits of a civil nature’ ” with the exceptions set out in Superior Court Civil Rule (CR) 81. 9 In pertinent part, CR 81 states that “ [e]xcept where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings, these rules shall govern all civil proceedings.” 10 “ ‘Proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW are special proceedings within the meaning of CR 81.’ ” 11
¶ 14 Washington's SVPA provides that the respondent as well as others involved in an SVP commitment proceeding may demand a 12-person jury trial. The legislature provided in former RCW 71.09.050(3) (1995), which was in effect at the time of Coppin's trial, as follows:
The person, the prosecuting attorney or attorney general, or the judge shall have the right to demand that the trial be before a twelve-person jury. If no demand is made, the trial shall be before the court.
¶ 15 Likewise, the state supreme court has promulgated a civil rule of procedure, CR 38, “JURY TRIAL OF RIGHT,” which provides:
(-) Defined. A trial is the judicial examination of the issues between the parties, whether they are issues of law or fact.
(a) Right of Jury Trial Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by article I, section 21 of the constitution or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
(b) Demand for Jury. At or prior to the time the case is called to be set for trial, any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing, by filing the demand with the clerk, and by paying the jury fee required by law. If before the case is called to be set for trial no party serves or files a demand that the case be tried by a jury of twelve, it shall be tried by a jury of six members with the concurrence of five being required to reach a verdict.
....
(d) Waiver of Jury. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule, to file it as required by this rule, and to pay the jury fee required by law in accordance with this rule, constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
¶ 16 Here, the State filed its written Demand for Jury Trial on November 22, 2005, seeking a jury of 12, pursuant to “CR 38 and RCW 71.09.050(3).” 12 Coppin never demanded a jury until the morning of the first day of his trial on January 22, 2008.
¶ 17 It appears that this case was initially set for trial to begin on February 25, 2008. At a status conference in October 2007, the court advanced the trial date to January 22, 2008. At that same conference, the State's attorney advised that the State's expert witness, Dr. Dennis Doren, had already retired but had “agreed as a courtesy to stay on this case and finish it out,” as long as the case “would be going forward no later than February [2008].”
¶ 18 At a subsequent review hearing on January 4, 2008, counsel for both parties and the court discussed the possibility of the State waiving its demand for a jury trial and proceeding with a bench trial. In the prior month, the State's counsel had indicated to Coppin's counsel that the State might be willing to waive its right to a jury trial. At the January hearing, the State confirmed that it was willing to waive a jury. Coppin's counsel told the trial court that he wanted an opportunity to confirm Coppin's willingness to do so as well. The judge declined to make any determinations at that time because Coppin was not present at the hearing. The judge directed the parties to schedule a hearing on the issue of jury waiver so that Coppin could participate in what the judge characterized as “a critical stage of the proceedings.”
¶ 19 That hearing was held on January 16, 2008. Coppin was present. His counsel indicated that he had spoken with Coppin both by phone and in person prior to the hearing. Counsel indicated that Coppin consented to have the matter tried as a bench trial. Counsel then handed forward a Waiver of Demand for Jury Trial dated January 16, 2008, which he, Coppin, and counsel for the State had signed.
¶ 20 The trial court then conducted a colloquy, on the record, with Coppin confirming his waiver of a jury. Thereafter, the trial court accepted Coppin's waiver of a jury and stated that the scheduled trial on January 22 would be to the bench.
¶ 21 Coppin does not challenge the validity of his express waiver of his right to a jury trial. He acknowledges that he “agreed to waive his right to a jury trial” at that January 16 hearing and that the waiver was effective.
¶ 22 Although Coppin does not challenge the validity of his express waiver of the right to a jury, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury on the first morning of his scheduled trial. He claims this was improper for several reasons, none of which withstand scrutiny.
¶ 23 First, he argues that under the language of former RCW 71.09.050(3), “a trial court must honor a jury demand even if it is made orally, late in the proceedings, and after an initial waiver of the jury right.” 13 We disagree.
¶ 24 In addressing this claim, we are guided by Sackett v. Santilli. 14 That was a civil case in which the supreme court considered whether CR 38(d), which provides for implied consent to the waiver of the right to jury trial in civil cases, contravened the state constitution. 15 Specifically, the plaintiffs in a personal injury action asserted that CR 38(d) was unconstitutional because it represented “an assumption by the judiciary of the legislature's exclusive power to provide for the waiver of the right to trial by...
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State v. Carter, 39392–1–II.
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