In the Matter of James B. Hill v. Dep't of Labor

• Decision Date: 13 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 40394–3–II.,40394–3–II.
• Citation: 253 P.3d 430,161 Wash.App. 286
• Parties: In the Matter of James B. HILL, Appellant,v.DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

161 Wash.App. 286

253 P.3d 430

In the Matter of James B. HILL, Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Respondent.

No. 40394–3–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

April 13, 2011.

Carroll Guy Rusk Jr., Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, Appellant.Michael Walter Rothman, Office of Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.VAN DEREN, J.

[161 Wash.App. 289] ¶ 1 James Hill, a former inmate in Washington's Department of Corrections (DOC), appeals from the trial court's denial of his summary judgment motion and its order granting summary judgment to the Department of Labor and Industries (L & I). He contends that L & I improperly calculated the wage basis for his time-loss compensation payments under former RCW 51.08.178(1) (1988) because it should have calculated his wages under former RCW 51.08.178(4). We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Hill, as a DOC inmate, performed work in a Class II inmate work program as defined by RCW 72.09.100.¹ DOC paid Hill $0.85 per hour for work he was performing for correctional industries. On December 10, 2002, while on the job painting, Hill stepped down from a ladder, tripped, and injured both knees.

¶ 3 After Hill's release from incarceration, L & I issued an order allowing time-loss compensation benefits to Hill based on its determination that, at the time of his injury, he worked 7.5 hours per day, 6 days per week, and earned $0.85 per hour. L & I's January 3, 2007, order also determined that he was single with three dependents.²

¶ 4 Hill timely appealed the January 3 order to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). In response to Hill's interrogatories, DOC repeatedly stated that Hill was not a DOC employee and, by law, it does not pay Class II inmate workers “wages” but, instead, it pays them a “gratuity.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 159. DOC also indicated that it does not report gratuity payments to the Internal Revenue Service for inmate workers such as Hill.³ Hill moved for summary judgment before an industrial appeals judge (IAJ). L & I filed a cross motion for summary judgment and DOC filed a supporting brief consistent with L & I's position. The IAJ entered a proposed decision and order granting L & I's summary judgment motion and affirming all orders on appeal. Hill unsuccessfully petitioned the Board for review of the IAJ's proposed decision and order, which the Board adopted as its own.

¶ 5 Hill appealed the Board's order to the trial court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied Hill's motion, granted L & I's motion, and affirmed the Board's decision. Hill appeals.

ANALYSIS

Time–Loss Compensation Payments to Former DOC Inmates

A. Standard of Review

¶ 6 First, we clarify the standard of review for appeals from Board decisions. Under RCW 51.52.115, the superior court reviews the Board's determinations de novo.⁴ As our Supreme Court observed, the superior court applies RCW 51.52.115's standards:

The Board's decision is prima facie correct under RCW 51.52.115, and a party attacking the decision must support its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. On review, the superior court may substitute its own findings and decision for the Board's only if it finds “from a fair preponderance of credible evidence, that the Board's findings and decision are incorrect.”Ruse v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 138 Wash.2d 1, 5, 977 P.2d 570 (1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McClelland v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 65 Wash.App. 386, 390, 828 P.2d 1138 (1992)).

¶ 7 RCW 51.52.140 further provides in pertinent part that “the practice in civil cases shall apply to appeals prescribed in this chapter. Appeal shall lie from the judgment of the superior court as in other civil cases.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, as Division One of this court observed, “This statutory review scheme results in a different role for the Court of Appeals than is typical for appeals of administrative decisions pursuant to, for example, the Administrative Procedure Act, where we sit in the same position as the superior court.” ⁵ Rogers v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash.App. 174, 180, 210 P.3d 355 (footnote omitted), review denied, 167 Wash.2d 1015, 220 P.3d 209 (2009). Normally, our “ ‘review is limited to examination of the record to see whether substantial evidence supports the findings made after the superior court's de novo review, and whether the court's conclusions of law flow from the findings.’ ” Ruse, 138 Wash.2d at 5–6, 977 P.2d 570 (quoting Young v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 81 Wash.App. 123, 128, 913 P.2d 402 (1996)); accord Rogers, 151 Wash.App. at 180, 210 P.3d 355. Here, where summary judgment was appropriate at the trial court because Hill concedes that “no material facts are in dispute” and the dispositive issue is one of statutory interpretation, a question of law, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Br. of Appellant at 6; Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Granger, 159 Wash.2d 752, 757, 153 P.3d 839 (2007); Madera v. J.R. Simplot Co., 104 Wash.App. 93, 96, 15 P.3d 649 (2001); see also RCW 51.52.140; Malang v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash.App. 677, 683–84, 162 P.3d 450 (2007) (reviewing de novo appeal from superior court's grant of summary judgment affirming Board's decision).

B. Applicability of Former RCW 51.08.178(1)

¶ 8 Hill argues that the trial court erred in granting L & I's summary judgment motion because his $0.85 per hour pay at the time of his injury was a gratuity, not wages, under former RCW 51.08.178(1). L & I responds that Hill's pay constituted wages under the statute because it was consideration received in exchange for the work he performed while incarcerated.

¶ 9 Our fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d 226, 242, 88 P.3d 375 (2004). We discern plain meaning not only from the provision in question but also from closely related statutes and the underlying legislative purposes. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d at 242, 88 P.3d 375. If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after this inquiry, then the statute is ambiguous and we may resort to additional canons of statutory construction or legislative history. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.

¶ 10 We give effect to all statutory language, considering statutory provisions in relation to each other and harmonizing them to ensure proper construction. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 560, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). We avoid construing a statute in a manner that results in “unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Glaubach v. Regence BlueShield, 149 Wash.2d 827, 833, 74 P.3d 115 (2003).

¶ 11 We give substantial weight to an agency's interpretation of the law within its expertise, such as regulations the agency administers. Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 159 Wash.2d 868, 885, 154 P.3d 891 (2007); Granger, 159 Wash.2d at 764, 153 P.3d 839. But an agency's interpretation does not bind us, and “deference to an agency is inappropriate where the agency's interpretation conflicts with a statutory mandate.” Granger, 159 Wash.2d at 764, 153 P.3d 839. “ ‘[R]ules that are inconsistent with the statutes they implement are invalid.’ ” Granger, 159 Wash.2d at 764, 153 P.3d 839 (quoting Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wash.2d 700, 715, 153 P.3d 846 (2007)).

¶ 12 Title 51 RCW is a “self-contained system” governing procedures and remedies for injured workers. Brand v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash.2d 659, 668, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999). RCW 72.60.102 provides that Title 51 RCW applies to inmates in certain work programs, including the Class II program in which Hill participated. Former RCW 51.08.178(1) specifically governed the bases of time-loss compensation payments to injured workers.⁶ It provided:

For the purposes of this title, the monthly wages the worker was receiving from all employment at the time of injury shall be the basis upon which compensation is computed unless otherwise provided specifically in the statute concerned. In cases where the worker's wages are not fixed by the month, they shall be determined by multiplying the daily wage the worker was receiving at the time of the injury:

[By a calculation based on the number of days per week the worker was employed]

The term “wages” shall include the reasonable value of board, housing, fuel, or other consideration of like nature received from the employer as part of the contract of hire, but shall not include overtime pay except in cases under subsection (2) of this section. However, tips shall also be considered wages only to the extent such tips are reported to the employer for federal income tax purposes. The daily wage shall be the hourly wage multiplied by the number of hours the worker is normally employed. The number of hours the worker is normally employed shall be determined by the department in a fair and reasonable manner, which may include averaging the number of hours worked per day.

[161 Wash.App. 295] ¶ 13 Under its plain language, former RCW 51.08.178(1) was the default provision for time-loss compensation at the time L & I calculated Hill's wages and it must be used unless L & I establishes that it does not apply. Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Avundes, 140 Wash.2d 282, 290, 996 P.2d 593 (2000). Hill contends that the legislature characterizes payment for inmate participation in DOC work programs as a gratuity, which includes tips in its ordinary meaning. He reasons that, because DOC does not report these gratuity payments to the Internal Revenue Service as wages, they are not wages for purposes of L & I's computation of the wages used to...