In the Matter of The Petition of Robert Carter v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3:09cv2057 MRK.,3:09cv2057 MRK.
• Parties: In the Matter of the Petition of Robert CARTER, Jr., as owner of the Indigo Sky, for Exoneration from and Limitation of Liability.Robert Carter, Jr., Petitioner,v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Continental Casualty Co., Claimants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

743 F.Supp.2d 103

In the Matter of the Petition of Robert CARTER, Jr., as owner of the Indigo Sky, for Exoneration from and Limitation of Liability.Robert Carter, Jr., Petitioner,

v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Continental Casualty Co., Claimants.

No. 3:09cv2057 MRK.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Sept. 30, 2010.

Gerald A. Greenberger, Patrick J. Corbett, Rubin Fiorella & Friedman, LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioners.

John K. Fulweiler, Deorchis & Partners, Stamford, CT, for Respondent.

RULING AND ORDER

MARK R. KRAVITZ, District Judge.

This case arises from an August 14, 2009 fire at the Yankee Boat Yard and Marina (“Yankee Boat Yard”) in Portland, Connecticut. The fire destroyed Petitioner Robert Carter, Jr.'s motorboat, the Indigo Sky, and damaged other boats and property stored on land at the Yankee Boat Yard. The Indigo Sky may have been the source of the fire. Pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act (“Limitation Act”), 46 U.S.C. § 30501 et seq., Mr. Carter petitions this Court to limit his potential liability for the damage caused by the fire. See id. § 30505(a).

Pending before the Court are Claimant Allstate Insurance Co.'s (“Allstate's”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. # 20] and Claimant Continental Casualty Co.'s (“Continental's”) Motion to Dismiss Because of Lack of Admiralty Jurisdiction [doc. # 21], both pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . The central question presented by the two motions is whether the Limitation Act confers admiralty jurisdiction over petitions that arise from incidents that occurred entirely on land. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Limitation Act does not confer admiralty jurisdiction over petitions that arise from incidents that occurred entirely on land, and the two pending motions to dismiss are therefore GRANTED.

I.

The following undisputed facts are taken from Mr. Carter's Complaint [doc. # 1]. As it must, the Court draws all reasonable inferences from the Complaint in Mr. Carter's favor. See Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir.2008). Mr. Carter owed the Indigo Sky, a 36–foot Albin Trawler Motor Yacht manufactured in 1987. On August 14, 2009, the Indigo Sky had been in storage at the Yankee Boat Yard on the shores of the Connecticut River for ten months. On that day, a fire consumed the Indigo Sky and damaged other property stored on land at the Yankee Boat Yard. On August 19, 2009, a marine surveyor inspected the Indigo Sky and determined that its post-fire value was $0.00. The remains of Indigo Sky were crushed and thrown into a dumpster.¹

On October 28, 2009, Mr. Carter received notice of a claim for damages filed against him by Allstate as the insurer of Sandra Brunelle. Ms. Brunelle was the owner of another boat destroyed by the fire. After Mr. Carter received notice of Allstate's claim, he filed his Complaint seeking limitation of liability in this Court on December 17, 2009. Allstate filed an Answer [doc. # 7] and a Counterclaim [doc. # 8] against Mr. Carter on April 1, 2010. Continental filed an Answer [doc. # 19] and a Counterclaim [doc. # 18] against Mr. Carter on May 14, 2010. Allstate and Continental both argued in their Answers that this Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Carter's action because the fire occurred entirely on land.

Allstate filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. # 20] on May 17, 2010. Continental filed its Motion to Dismiss Because of Lack of Admiralty Jurisdiction [doc. # 21] on May 19, 2010. Rule 12(b) requires that a motion to dismiss be filed before an answer, and the two motions are thus untimely. However, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1), and this Court has not only the authority, but also a duty to dismiss an action at any time if it determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The Court therefore has an obligation to consider the arguments set forth in the motions even though they are untimely. Since the motions raise colorable arguments that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court has stayed all discovery in this action pending its decision on the motions. See Order [doc. # 32].

II.

The scope of this Court's review on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is not quite as narrow as the scope of its review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Mr. Carter has the burden of affirmatively showing that the Court has jurisdiction over the action. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008). That showing may not be made solely by implication. See id. If necessary, the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to determine whether or not it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. See id.

III.

Mr. Carter asserts that this Court has admiralty jurisdiction over this case.² The Constitution extends federal judicial power “to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. “The primary purpose of federal admiralty jurisdiction is to ‘protect [ ] commercial shipping’ with ‘uniform rules of conduct.’ ” Vasquez v. GMD Shipyard Corp., 582 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir.2009) (citations omitted).

While the Constitution sets the limits of federal admiralty jurisdiction, lower federal courts must look to specific statutes enacted by Congress to determine the extent of their subject-matter jurisdiction. See Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922) (“Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.”). Mr. Carter asserts two distinct statutory bases for jurisdiction here. First, Mr. Carter argues that the Court has jurisdiction under the two-prong test for 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) jurisdiction over maritime tort claims. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990). Second, Mr. Carter argues that the Liability Act independently confers jurisdiction even when the district court does not have jurisdiction based on the two-part test for maritime tort claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with both of Mr. Carter's arguments.

A.

The Court does not have admiralty jurisdiction over this case based on the two-prong test for 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) jurisdiction over maritime tort claims. See id. Before 1972, the Supreme Court consistently held that “[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.” The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866) (emphasis added). In 1972, the Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation of the scope of admiralty jurisdiction over maritime tort claims by holding that a tort is not an maritime tort unless it bears “a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). In Sisson, the Supreme Court clarified that to fall within the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction, a tort must have both occurred on navigable waters and borne a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See 497 U.S. at 362, 110 S.Ct. 2892. The Second Circuit has applied the two-prong test for § 1333(1) jurisdiction over maritime tort claims in numerous recent cases. See, e.g., Vasquez, 582 F.3d at 298–99; LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356–57 (2d Cir.1999); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 108–09 (2d Cir.1997).

In this case, the first prong of the test cannot be satisfied. It is apparent from Mr. Carter's Complaint, as well as from Allstate's and Continental's filings, that the fire at issue in this case began on land and occurred solely on land. See Transatlantic Marine, 109 F.3d at 109. The case does not involve a tort that occurred on navigable waters and merely had effects on land. See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). Furthermore, while it is true that under Supreme Court precedent vessels remain “in navigable waters” when they are in a graving dock, see Vasquez, 582 F.3d at 298–99 (citing The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 33–34, 24 S.Ct. 8, 48 L.Ed. 73 (1903)), this case involves storage of a vessel on land for a period of ten months, not temporary storage of a vessel in a graving dock.³ The distinction may seem arbitrary, but there must be some line where navigable waters end and the land begins. It is thus unnecessary for the Court to consider Mr. Carter's argument that the activities at issue—the storage and repair of pleasure boats—bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.

Most of the cases Mr. Carter cites in opposition to the pending motions are not at all to the contrary. Mr. Carter relies on numerous decisions interpreting the phrase “vessel in navigation” in litigation under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 349–50, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995); Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20, 20–21, 82 S.Ct. 5, 7 L.Ed.2d 1 (1961); McKinley v. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc., 980 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir.1992); Wixom v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 614 F.2d 956, 957 (5th Cir.1980); Drake v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 432 F.2d 276, 277–78 (5th Cir.1970). There is, however, no reason why this Court must give the phrase “on navigable waters” when used in determining...