James v. Brickhouse
| Decision Date | 28 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 3:19-cv- 00070-FDW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | HARRY SHAROD JAMES, Petitioner, v. TOM BRICKHOUSE and STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondents. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7) moving this Court to grant summary judgment on Petitioner's application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court advised Petitioner of his right to respond and the burden of proof he carried in so doing in a Roseboro notice (Doc. No. 9) and Petitioner timely filed a Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion (Doc. No. 10). Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED and Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED.
Petitioner, Harry Sharod James, is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina currently residing at Hyde Correctional Center in Fairfield, North Carolina. On June 10, 2010, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder on the theories of malice, premeditation and deliberation, and under the felony murder rule. (See Doc. No. 8-4, p. 3). Petitioner was also convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and to a concurrent sentence of sixty-four to eighty-six months imprisonment for his conviction of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id.
Petitioner timely appealed, and on October 18, 2011, the North Carolina Court of Appeals (NCCOA) filed an unpublished opinion and found no error. See State v. James, 716 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), review allowed and remanded, 366 N.C. 214, 748 S.E.2d 527 (2012).
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Discretionary Review (PDR) in the North Carolina Supreme Court (NCSC). During this time, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19A et seq. was enacted following the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibited "a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). On August 23, 2012, the NCSC allowed Petitioner's PDR for remand to the NCCOA and to the trial court for resentencing. See State v. James, 366 N.C. 214, 748 S.E.2d 527 (2012). At the conclusion of Petitioner's resentencing hearing on December 12, 2014, Petitioner was resentenced to life without parole.
Petitioner gave timely notice of appeal. The NCCOA affirmed the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19A et seq. but remanded the case because "the trial court did not issue sufficient findings of fact on the absence or presence of mitigate factors as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19C(a)." State v. James, 247 N.C. App. 350, 367, 786 S.E.2d 73, 84 (2016), review allowed, writ allowed, appeal dismissed, 369 N.C. 537, 796 S.E.2d 789 (2017), and aff'd as modified and remanded, 371 N.C. 77, 813 S.E.2d 195 (2018).
Petitioner filed another PDR in the NCSC on June 3, 2016, challenging the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.19A et seq. The State filed a PDR requesting review of the NCCOA finding that N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A to 15A-1340.19D contained a presumption in favor of a life sentence without parole. The NCSC determined that N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A to 15A-1340.19D is constitutional, but the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that it created a presumption in favor of a sentence of life without parole. State v. James, 371 N.C. 77, 99, 813 S.E.2d 195, 211 (2018). The NCSC remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for remand to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County for sentencing. Id.
On June 25, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) seeking relief from his current conviction. (Doc. No. 8-14). On September 25, 2018, the MAR was denied. (Doc. No. 8). Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 11, 2019. (Doc. No. 1). Respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on April 1, 2019 (Doc. No. 7) supported by a Memorandum (Doc. No. 8). Following the Court's issuance of a Roseboro notice, Petitioner filed his Response (Doc. No. 10) on April 17, 2019.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); See also United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must proffer competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246-47 (1986).
In determining whether a "genuine issue of material fact" exists, any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Erwin v. United States, 591 F.3d 313, 327 (4th Cir. 2008). However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Rather, "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude summary judgment." Thompson v. Carlisle, 2010 WL 382044, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2010). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
In addition to the motion for summary judgment standard set forth above, this Court must also consider the petition for writ of habeas corpus under the requirements set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is well settled that § 2254 sets a particularly high bar a person in custody requesting habeas relief must overcome. See Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2013); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); Sigmon v. Stirling, No. 18-7, ---F.3d----, 2020 WL 1856396, at *6 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2020); Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 103 (4th Cir. 2011); Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2007). The highly deferential standard under § 2254 "ensures 'state proceedings are the central process, not just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas proceeding.'" Sigmon, 2020 WL 1856396, at *6 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). Accordingly, a court may grant habeas relief on claims adjudicated on their merits in State court only if the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, it is well established that § 2254 maintains a highly deferential standard to the state courts' decisions. See Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351 (2013); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; Sigmon, 2020 WL 1856396, at *6; Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 103 (4th Cir. 2011); Cummings, 475 F.3d at 238. A court may grant habeas relief on claims adjudicated on their merits in state court only if the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. See Sigmon, 2020 WL 1856396, at *6; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner argues that his indictment for robbery with a dangerous weapon was defective because the indictment failed to state the value of the stolen goods, and therefore he lacked proper notice. (Doc. No. 1). Petitioner alleges this notice is required by North Carolina and Federal law; however, he does not indicate any other North Carolina or Federal cases where courts have held that the value of the stolen goods is a required element of robbery with a dangerous weapon. (Doc. No. 1).
Petitioner argues that the value of the stolen goods is an element of the crime because (1) it is a fact essential to the punishment of the crime and (2) punishment varies with value. (Doc. No. 10). However, under North Carolina law, the elements for robbery with a dangerous weapon are "(1) the unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from the person or in the presence of another (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened." State v. Small, 328 N.C. 175, 181, 400 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1991); See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-87; see also State v. McLean, 251 N.C. App. 850, 855, 796 S.E.2d 804, 808 (2017); State v. Hill, 365 N.C. 273, 275, 715 S.E.2d 841, 843 (2011). Accordingly, the value of the goods is not an essential element of the crime, and "it is not necessary or material to describe accurately or prove the particular identity or value of the property taken, further than to show it was the property of the person assaulted or in his care, and had a value." State v. Waddell, 279 N.C. 442, 445, 183 S.E.2d 644, 646 (1971) (internal citations omitted)....
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