State v. James

• Decision Date: 03 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. COA15–684.,COA15–684.
• Citation: 247 N.C.App. 350,786 S.E.2d 73
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Harry Sharod JAMES.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

247 N.C.App. 350

786 S.E.2d 73

STATE of North Carolina

v.Harry Sharod JAMES.

No. COA15–684.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 3, 2016.

Attorney General, Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General, Sandra Wallace–Smith, for the State.

Appellate Defender, Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defenders, David W. Andrews and Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Harry Sharod James ("defendant") appeals from judgment entered upon his resentencing for first-degree murder as ordered by our Supreme Court. For the following reasons, we affirm the constitutionality of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1340.19A et seq. , but reverse and remand this case for further resentencing proceedings.

I. Background

On 19 June 2006, a Mecklenburg County Grand Jury indicted defendant on one count of murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The indictments were the result of events that occurred on 12 May 2006 when defendant was sixteen years old.

At the conclusion of defendant's trial on 10 June 2010, a jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder both on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the first-degree felony murder rule and finding defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court then entered separate judgments sentencing defendant to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder and sentencing defendant to a concurrent term of 64 to 86 months imprisonment for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant's sentence of life without parole for first-degree murder was mandated by the version of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–17 in effect at that time. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–17 (2010).

Defendant appealed to this Court and, among other issues, argued a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the juvenile's rights under the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. In asserting his argument, defendant identified two cases in which petitions for writ of certiorari were pending before the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the constitutionality of sentences of life without parole for juveniles.

On 18 October 2011, this Court filed an unpublished opinion in defendant's case holding the constitutional issue was not preserved for appeal and finding no error below. State v. James, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 716 S.E.2d 876, available at 2011 WL 4917045 (18 October 2011) (unpub.). In so holding, we explained that defendant failed to preserve the issue by objecting at trial and, although significant changes in the applicable law may warrant review in some instances where an issue is not otherwise preserved, there had been no change in the law as it relates to sentencing juveniles to life without parole because the petitions for writ of certiorari in the cases referenced by defendant were still pending before the United States Supreme Court and there was no guarantee the Court would grant certiorari in either case, much less hold that sentences of life without parole for juveniles are unconstitutional. Id. at *5. From this Court's unanimous decision, defendant petitioned our Supreme Court for discretionary review.

Before our Supreme Court acted regarding defendant's petition in this case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the two cases referenced in defendant's argument to this Court, heard arguments in those cases in tandem on 20 March 2012, and issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), on 25 June 2012. In Miller, the Court meticulously reviewed its decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment), and then held "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller, 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d at 424. The Court summarized the rationale for its holding as follows:

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468, 183 L.Ed.2d at 423 (internal citations omitted). More concisely, "[s]uch mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2467, 183 L.Ed.2d at 422. "By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d at 424. Thus, "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2475, 183 L.Ed.2d at 430.

In response to Miller, our General Assembly approved "an act to amend the state sentencing laws to comply with the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama " (the "Act") on 12 July 2012. See 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 148 (eff. 12 July 2012). To meet the requirements of Miller, the first section of the Act established new sentencing guidelines for defendants convicted of first-degree murder who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense. See 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 148, sec. 1. The new sentencing guidelines, originally designated to be codified in Article 93 of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes as N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 15A–1476 to –1479, are now codified in Part 2A of Chapter 81B of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes as N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 15A–1340.19A to –1340.19D. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–17 was later amended to indicate that juveniles were to be sentenced pursuant to the new sentencing guidelines. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 410, sec. 3(a) (eff. 23 August 2013) (amending N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–17 to provide that "any person who commits such murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A–2000, except that any such person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the murder shall be punished in accordance with Part 2A of Article 81B of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. ") (emphasis added).

Following the enactment of the Act, our Supreme Court, by special order on 23 August 2012, allowed defendant's petition in this case as follows:

Defendant's Petition for Discretionary Review as amended is allowed for the limited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to [the new sentencing guidelines].

State v. James, 366 N.C. 214, 748 S.E.2d 527 (2012).

Prior to defendant's case coming on for resentencing, defendant filed various motions with memorandums of law seeking to avoid resentencing pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1340.19A et seq. Those motions raised many of the same issues now before this Court on appeal.

On 5 December 2014, defendant's case came on for a resentencing hearing in Mecklenburg County Superior Court before the Honorable Robert F. Johnson. That sentencing hearing continued on 8 December 2014 and concluded on 12 December 2014. Upon considering defendant's motions, the trial court denied the motions and proceeded to resentence defendant to life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1340.19A et seq. The judgment indicated it was nunc pro tunc 10 June 2010. A resentencing order filed the same day was attached to the judgment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Discussion

In State v. Lovette, 225 N.C.App. 456, 737 S.E.2d 432 (2013) ("Lovette I "), this Court summarized the pertinent portions of the new sentencing guidelines in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1340.19A et seq. as follows:

[N.C. Gen.Stat. § ] 15A–1340.19B(a) provides that if the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder solely on the basis of the felony murder rule, his sentence shall be life imprisonment with parole. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1340.19B(a)(1) (2012). In all other cases, the trial court is directed to hold a hearing to consider any mitigating circumstances, inter alia, those related to the defendant's age at the time of the offense, immaturity, and ability to benefit from rehabilitation. N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 15A–1340.19B, 15A–1340.19C. Following such a hearing, the trial court is directed to make findings on the presence and/or absence of any such mitigating factors, and is given the discretion to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment either with or without parole. N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 15A–1340.19B(a)(2), 15A–1340.19C(a).

Id. at 470, ...