Jean v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1984
• Citation: 460 N.E.2d 197,391 Mass. 206
• Parties: Fritz JEAN v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 197

460 N.E.2d 197

391 Mass. 206

Fritz JEAN v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 10, 1983.

Decided Feb. 15, 1984.

Aaron Krakow, Law Student (Mark Mitshkun, Boston University Legal Aid Program, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Michael S. Bearse, Boston, for Ruland Manufacturing Co., Inc., submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

After being discharged from his job as a "chucking machine" operator at Ruland Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Ruland), on July 2, 1982, Fritz Jean applied for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A. His claim was allowed and Ruland filed a timely appeal. A hearing was held on August 11, 1982, by a review examiner of the Division of Employment Security (division). The review examiner made findings and, relying on G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), ² reversed the allowance of benefits. The division's board of review (board) denied Jean's application for further review, making the review examiner's decision the final decision of the board. G.L. c. 151A, § 41(c ). The decision was affirmed by a judge of the Boston Municipal Court. It was reported here under G.L. c. 151A, § 42. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We summarize the review examiner's findings of fact. ³ Jean was employed by Ruland as a chucking machine operator from August 12, 1981, to July 2, 1982. Ruland alleges that during that period Jean was counseled several times on the use of the chucking machine he operated. According to Ruland, Jean was unreceptive to such direction or to corrective criticism. As a result, Ruland claims, Jean was reprimanded on several occasions for failure to follow instructions and improper operation of the chucking machine. In late June, 1982, Jean's assigned machine had a break down which was attributable to negligence on the claimant's part in not checking chuck pressure. Ruland had the machine repaired. After the repairs were completed, Jean was specifically instructed to go through a series of six operations on the chucking machine. He was directed to do these operations manually to assure that the machine was in proper working condition and would not malfunction again. Jean, however, performed only three of the operations manually. The other three were done under power. He then reported that the machine had been checked through the six operations and was in proper working order. Nevertheless, the machine malfunctioned within thirty minutes into its production operation. This second malfunction caused Ruland considerable labor and lost production cost. Upon being confronted by his supervisor, Jean admitted to having not followed instructions. He declared, however, that he was not responsible as another employee was operating the machine when it malfunctioned.

The board found as follows: "It is found from conflicting testimony that the claimant was discharged when after reprimand he again failed to follow instructions resulting in a machine breakdown with costly repairs and lost production. Such discharge is attributable solely to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of employing unit interests within the meaning of Section 25(e)(2) of the Mass. Employment Security Law and it is so found."

Jean challenges the board's findings on two grounds. First, he claims the board's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Second, he argues that the board's decision was improper because the board failed to make subsidiary findings on the employee's state of mind. We do not address Jean's first claim as we agree that the board acted improperly in rendering its decision under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e )(2), without making subsidiary findings of fact regarding Jean's state of mind. See Reavey v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 913, 914, 387 N.E.2d 581 (1979).

In examining whether the Legislature intended to preclude a discharged employee from the benefits of G.L. c. 151A by the application of § 25(e )(2), Garfield v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 94, 95-96, 384 N.E.2d 642 (1979), we must examine whether a claimant "has brought about his own unemployment through intentional disregard of standards of behavior which his employer has a right to expect." Id. at 97, 384 N.E.2d 642. This examination is in two parts. Both "deliberate misconduct" and "wilful disregard" of an employer's interest by the claimant are required to deny benefits under § 25(e )(2). Torres v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 387 Mass. 776, 778-779, 443 N.E.2d 1297 (1982). Goodridge v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 434, 436, 377 N.E.2d 927 (1978). Findings as to both of these issues under § 25(e )(2) must be made to warrant disapproval of benefits. "An administrative agency must make findings on each factual issue essential to its decision." Manias v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 388 Mass. 201, 205, 445 N.E.2d 1068 (1983), quoting Reavey v. Director of the Div. of Employment...