Jenkins v. City of Cedar Park
| Decision Date | 24 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-13-00215-CV,03-13-00215-CV |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
| Parties | Christopher Jenkins, Appellant v. City of Cedar Park, Texas, Appellee |
NO. D-1-GN-12-002849, HONORABLE GISELA D. TRIANA, JUDGE PRESIDING
Christopher Jenkins challenges the district court's order granting the City of Cedar Park's plea to the jurisdiction in a case arising under the Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Act. See generally Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 143.001-.363 (the Civil Service Act or the Act). Jenkins, a fire fighter, appealed his indefinite suspension to a hearing examiner, who upheld the suspension. On appeal to the district court, Jenkins argued that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by upholding the indefinite suspension without finding he violated a local civil service rule and by upholding the suspension on the basis of untimely discipline. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the district court granted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The City of Cedar Park adopted the Civil Service Act in 2003, promulgated the City of Cedar Park Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Commission Rules and Regulations (the Local Civil Service Rules) in compliance with the Civil Service Act, and thereby provides a civil service system for its fire department.1 See id. § 143.004; Cedar Park, Tex., Code of Ordinances § 9.11.001. Jenkins was employed as a fire fighter with the Cedar Park Fire Department for more than eight years.2 After a series of rule violations, Jenkins agreed to a twenty-day suspension. On September 9, 2010, while still on suspension, Jenkins was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). The conduct that led to his arrest and DWI charge included blocking two lanes of a roadway at a red light. On August 15, 2011, Jenkins entered a plea bargain, pleaded no contest to a charge of blocking a roadway, and received deferred adjudication. On December 16, 2011, the fire chief issued Jenkins a notice of indefinite suspension, which is equivalent to dismissal from the department. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 143.052(b). The notice charged violations of subsections (1), (4), (6), (7), (8), and (12) of section 143.051 of the Local Government Code; section 143.056(g) of the Local Government Code; Local Civil Service Rule 143.051(1); and three department rules.
Jenkins exercised the option to appeal his indefinite suspension to an independent hearing examiner. See id. § 143.057 (); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Tex. 2009). The hearing examiner found that Jenkins violated subsections (4), (7), (8), and (12) of section 143.051 but did not violate subsections (1) and (6). He also found that Jenkins violated the three department rules. The hearing examiner made no finding as to the one Local Civil Service Rule allegedly violated.3 The hearing examiner then found that the suspension was appropriate and denied the appeal.
Jenkins appealed to the district court, claiming that the examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by upholding the suspension on improper grounds. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 143.057(j) ().4 The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the hearing examiner did not exceed his jurisdiction because Jenkins's claims did not fall within the narrow right to appeal afforded under section 143.057(j). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,which the district court heard concurrently with the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The district court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction and did not rule on the motions for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Our standard of review for pleas to the jurisdiction is de novo and well established. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-28 (Tex. 2004). Jenkins's issues also involve matters of statutory construction, for which the standard of review is also de novo and well established. See Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Tex. 2010); see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4. Additionally, we must apply the standard applicable under the statutory scheme of the Civil Service Act. A hearing examiner's decision is reviewable only on the grounds that the hearing examiner had no jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction or that the order was procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 143.057(j). It is undisputed that the hearing examiner had jurisdiction to hear Jenkins's appeal, and Jenkins does not allege that the decision was procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means. Jenkins alleges only that the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction in upholding the indefinite suspension. A hearing examiner exceeds his jurisdiction "when his acts are not authorized by the Act or are contrary to it, or when they invade the policy-setting realm protected by the nondelegation doctrine." City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010) (quoting City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. 2009)). Jenkins does not argue that the hearing examiner's actsviolated the nondelegation doctrine. Therefore, the scope of our review includes whether the hearing examiner's acts were not authorized by the Act or were contrary to it. See id.
Violation of Civil Service Rule
In his first issue, Jenkins argues that the district court erred in granting the City's plea to the jurisdiction because the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by upholding Jenkins's indefinite suspension based only on violations of the Local Government Code and not on violations of the City's Local Civil Service Rules. Jenkins contends that the plain language of the Civil Service Act makes it clear that local civil service rules are the only rules that a fire fighter can be disciplined for violating. He cites to several sections in the Civil Service Act that provide for removal or suspension for violation of a "civil service rule," see Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 143.052(b), .053(g), .056(c), and argues there is no provision in the Civil Service Act that allows a fire chief to suspend a fire fighter for anything other than a local civil service rule. Jenkins further contends that section 143.051 of the Act does not provide any grounds for removal or suspension of a fire fighter but merely sets the parameters for the rules that a local commission may adopt. See id. §§ 143.008(c) (), .051 (listing grounds for removal or suspension commission rules may involve). In short, Jenkins argues that because the hearing examiner's decision to uphold the suspension was based on violations of the Civil Service Act rather than of the Local Civil Service Rules, it was not authorized by the Act or was contrary to it.
The City argues that there is no law to support Jenkins's argument and numerous courts have upheld suspensions for violations of 143.051 or its predecessor, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.art. 1269m, § 5.5 Jenkins's argument, the City contends, puts form over substance. We agree. Jenkins acknowledges that no court has directly addressed the argument he urges and has cited no cases, nor have we have found any, in which the courts have held that removal or suspension must be based on local civil service rules and cannot be based on alleged violations of section 143.051.6 Moreover, our decision in this case is informed by the approach the supreme court has taken inaddressing suspensions under the Civil Service Act. In Kelley, a police officer's suspension was "based on Section 143.051(7) [of the Local Government Code], which provides that a police officer may be removed or suspended for drinking intoxicants while on duty or for intoxication while off duty, and Section 143.051(12) [of the Local Government Code], which provides for the removal or suspension of an officer for violation of an applicable fire or police department rule or special order." 309 S.W.3d at 540. Thus, under the supreme court's reading of section 143.051 of the Local Government Code, it "provides that a police officer [or fire fighter] may be removed for" certain conduct and "provides for the removal or suspension for" certain violations. See id. (emphasis added). In summarizing the procedures for discipline under the Act, the supreme court also stated that "[i]nvoluntary discipline of an officer by the department head may be only for violation of a civil service rule." Id. at 545 (citing section 143.052(b)). The supreme court did not note any conflict between the Civil Service Act's provisions for discipline based on violations of a "civil service rule" and the charges against Kelley that were based on violations of section 143.051 of the Civil Service Act rather than on violations of local civil service rules.7
The supreme court and intermediate appellate courts have also upheld suspensions for violations of department rules. See Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of Fort Worth v. Lockhart, 626 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1981) (); City of Carrollton Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Peters, 843 S.W.2d 186, 187, 190 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (); Vick v. City of Waco, 614 S.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (...
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