Jenkins v. Miller
| Decision Date | 31 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-184 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Vermont |
| Parties | JANET JENKINS, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. KENNETH L. MILLER ET AL., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Janet Jenkins, for herself and as next friend of her daughter Isabella Miller-Jenkins, has brought suit against several individuals and organizations, alleging that they kidnapped and conspired to kidnap Isabella. Plaintiffs assert claims of commission of, and conspiracy to commit, an intentional tort of kidnapping and conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Defendants Liberty Counsel and Rena Lindevaldsen now file this motion for partial summary judgment as to all claims Plaintiff Janet Jenkins brings as a next friend of Isabella Miller-Jenkins, on account of the fact that Isabella reached the age of majority on April 16, 2020. Liberty Counsel and Lindevaldsen have also filed a motion for sanctions against Jenkins for her continued maintenance of these next friend claims.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on this issue is denied, and Defendants' motion for sanctions is denied.
This case arises out of the alleged international kidnapping of Isabella Miller-Jenkins in September 2009 by her mother, Lisa Miller, in obstruction of the parental rights of her other mother, Janet Jenkins. Defendants Zodhiates, Kenneth Miller, and Timothy Miller have been criminally convicted for conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting, the international parental kidnapping. ECF 439-9; ECF 439-16; ECF 439-21. Among the many claims Jenkins brings in this lawsuit, she brings claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting under Vermont law, as well as of conspiracy to violate civil rights under federal law, as a next friend of Isabella.
Isabella was born on April 16, 2002. ECF 494-1. On April 16, 2020, Isabella reached the statutory age of majority under Vermont law. Cavallari v. Martin, 169 Vt. 210, 213 (1999). That day, the Liberty Counsel Defendants and Lindevaldsen promptly filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all claims Jenkins brought as next friend of Isabella. These Defendants also brought a Rule 11 motion against Jenkins and her counsel for her continued maintenance of the claims.
Isabella is still missing; the federal government's efforts to locate her are ongoing. See Lisa Miller Docket Report 4, Ex. 1. Her last known location was in Jinotega, Nicaragua, where she was taken on April 27, 2010. Dep. Tr. 55, ECF 470-1.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment the movant must show "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact. In making this determination, the Court must view all facts "in the light most favorable" to the non-moving party. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). If the movant fails to meet her initial burden, the motion will fail even if the opponent does not submit any evidentiary matter to establish a genuine factual issue for trial. BBS Norwalk One, Inc. v. Raccolta, Inc., 117 F.3d 674, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1997).
If the movant meets her burden, "the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Jaramillo v. Weyerhauser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). In doing so, the opposing party must come forward with sufficient evidence that would justify a reasonable jury in returning a verdict in its favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). If "the party opposing summary judgment propounds a reasonable conflicting interpretation of a material disputed fact," summary judgment must be denied. Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1983).
In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, a court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). "A party asserting that a fact [ . . . ] is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by [ . . . ] citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the following:
The Second Circuit has offered guidance that Rule 11 sanctions should be "made with restraint." Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999). The decision whether to impose sanctions is a matter for the Court's discretion. Perez v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004).
Defendants Liberty Counsel and Lindevaldsen claim that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Jenkins' next friend authority and standing to sue on behalf of Isabella expired on April 16, 2020. Jenkins counters that she may proceed as Isabella's next friend under Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court's broad equitable powers. Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
As a general matter under Vermont law, a plaintiff's capacity to bring next friend claims on behalf of a minor expire when said minor reaches the age of majority. See Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Vt. 1977). Because Isabella clearly reached the age of majority on April 16, 2020, Jenkins no longer has standing to bring next friend claims based on Isabella's status as a minor.
However, Jenkins may still bring next friend claims on behalf of Isabella because she has shown that Isabella lacks access to the U.S. courts under Whitmore v. Arkansas. 495 U.S. 149 (1990). In Whitmore, the Supreme Court put forth a two-prong test to determine whether a party has standing to bring a next friend claim on behalf of another individual. Under this test, the putative next friend must first show that there is "an adequate explanation — such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability" to explain "why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action." Id. at 163. "Second, the 'next friend' must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate." Id.
Jenkins argues that the courts are inaccessible to Isabella because, based on the circumstances surrounding her disappearance in 2009 and the federal government's continued inability to locate her, Isabella is demonstrably being held captive outside of the United States, and thus lacks the practical and financial ability to access American courts. Defendants counter, however, that Jenkins has not sufficiently established that Isabella - now a legal adult - is actually being held against her will or otherwise facing serious barriers to accessing the U.S. court system. Based on the evidence in the record, however, Jenkins prevails in her argument.
Record evidence in this case clearly establishes that, in 2009, Isabella was removed from the country to Nicaragua by Lisa Miller; Zodhiates, Kenneth Miller, and Timothy Miller have been criminally convicted for conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting, international parental kidnapping based on these events. ECF 439-9; ECF 439-16; ECF 439-21. Efforts to locate Isabella by the federal government, law enforcement, and Jenkins over the course of many years have yielded no results, providing strong evidence that, at least up until now, Isabella's kidnapping has been ongoing.
As a district court held in Ali Jaber v. United States, individuals may be found to lack access to U.S. courts based on a holistic showing of barriers in the record, even if none of these obstacles would categorically prevent the individual from making a court appearance. 155 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, the Ali Jaber court held that the estates of individual civilians killed in Yemen did not have access to the American judicial system due to an ongoing civil war, financial hardship, and infrastructure limitations which made it impossible for them to travel or to communicate with American courts. Id. at 76-77. Here, too, record evidence of Isabella's longstanding status as a victim of kidnapping...
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