Jerald C., In re

• Decision Date: 20 April 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24392
• Citation: 36 Cal.3d 1,678 P.2d 917,201 Cal.Rptr. 342
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 678 P.2d 917 In re JERALD C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HIRAM G., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 342

201 Cal.Rptr. 342

36 Cal.3d 1, 678 P.2d 917

In re JERALD C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HIRAM G., Defendant and Appellant.

S.F. 24392.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 20, 1984.

Terry A. Green and Dreyer, Shulman, Dubbin, Kraft & Green, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.

Alden J. Fulkerson, San Diego, Margaret Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, Amitai Schwartz and Cynthia L. Remmers, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Selby Brown, Jr., County Counsel, San Jose, and Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, San Diego, Ann Miller Ravel, Acting County Counsel, Debra L. Cauble and Thomas Wm. Cain, Deputy County Counsel, San Jose, for plaintiff and respondent.

Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, Arlene Prater, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gloria F. DeHart and Mary A. Roth, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, John H. Larson, County Counsel, Los Angeles, Robin A. Ruffra, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, L.B. Elam, County Counsel, John H. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, John Dougherty, Dist. Atty. and Michael E. Barber, Deputy Dist. Atty., Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

The father of Jerald C., a minor, appeals from an order requiring reimbursement to the County of Santa Clara for the costs of the care and support of Jerald while in custody.

Jerald was declared a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 ¹ and was placed in custody at juvenile hall and boys ranch. He was subsequently committed to the California Youth Authority. The county sought reimbursement under the provisions of section 903 at the rate of $265 per month for juvenile hall and boys ranch custody for periods prior to September 1980, at the rate of $33 per day for 33 days in juvenile hall in October and November 1980, and at the rate of $25 per month for the subsequent commitment to the California Youth Authority. After a hearing, appellant was ordered to pay the above amounts at the rate of $100 per month. ²

Section 903 provided: "The father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a minor person, the estates of such persons, and the estate of such minor person, shall be liable for the cost of his care, support, and maintenance in any county institution in which he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court, or for the cost to the county in which the juvenile court making the order is located, of his care, support, and maintenance in any other place in which he is placed, detained, or committed pursuant to the order of the juvenile court. The liability of such persons (in this article called relatives) and estates shall be a joint and several liability." ³

Statutes requiring responsible relatives to reimburse governmental agencies for support have been sustained against claims of denial of equal protection. In Swoap v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840, this court upheld statutes requiring responsible adult children to support needy or poor elderly parents and providing that the children must reimburse the state for support provided by it to the parents. Pointing out that a long tradition of law and a measureless history of societal custom had established the duty of adult children to support their poor parents, the court concluded that the duty imposed by the statutes bears a rational relationship to the accomplishment of the state purpose of relieving the public treasury and that the statutes do not arbitrarily charge one class of society for the cost of public assistance. (10 Cal.3d at pp. 502-507, 111 Cal.Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840.)

In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204 upheld a statute requiring parents to reimburse the state for the costs of counsel in juvenile proceedings. Pointing out that legal assistance essential to protect and preserve the minor's constitutional rights comes within the parental support obligation, the court concluded that imposition of parental liability for counsel fees cannot be characterized as arbitrary or a denial of equal protection. (2 Cal.3d at p. 518, 86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204, et seq.)

Similarly, medical treatment of a minor's physical injuries and care of a mentally retarded minor come within the parent's support obligation, and statutes providing for parental liability to reimburse governmental agencies providing such treatment and care have been upheld against claims of denial of equal protection. (In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 404, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790 et seq.; County of Alameda v. Kaiser (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 817-818, 48 Cal.Rptr. 343.)

However, relative responsibility statutes have been invalidated when the government charges were not for support which the relative refused or failed to provide but for the cost of maintaining public institutions for public benefit.

"A statute obviously violates the equal protection clause if it selects one particular class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports such classification. [Citations.] Such a concept for the state's taking of a free man's property manifestly denies him equal protection of the law." (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 722-723, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 remanded 380 U.S. 194, 85 S.Ct. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 753; subsequent opn. 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321; see Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Com. (1916) 239 U.S. 478, 484-485, 36 S.Ct. 204, 206, 60 L.Ed. 392; Norwood v. Baker (1898) 172 U.S. 269, 279, 19 S.Ct. 187, 190, 43 L.Ed. 443 et seq.; Furey v. City of Sacramento (1979) 24 Cal.3d 862, 874-875, 157 Cal.Rptr. 684, 598 P.2d 844; Dawson v. Town of Los Altos Hills (1976) 16 Cal.3d 676, 684, 129 Cal.Rptr. 97, 547 P.2d 1377.) Such limitation on the government's ability to raise money has been traced to the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right. (See tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, Part III (1965) 17 Stan.L.Rev. 614, 643.) To charge the cost of operation of state functions conducted for public benefit to one class of society is arbitrary and violates the basic constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. (Id., at p. 639.)

In accordance with this fundamental principle, it has been recognized that parents may not be charged for costs when adult children are incarcerated in prison or committed to state hospitals for the dangerous. Nor may adult children be charged for such incarceration or commitment of their parents. The cases have reasoned that when incarceration or commitment is for the protection of society, it is arbitrary to assess relatives for the expense. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247, 251, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22 et seq.; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 949, 950, 83 Cal.Rptr. 559 et seq.)

In Kirchner the court explained: "Recently in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22], the department, relying upon this same section 6650, attempted to collect from a father for the cost of care, support and maintenance in a state hospital for the mentally ill or insane of his son who had been charged with crime, but before trial of the criminal issue (and obviously without adjudication of that issue) had been found by the court to be insane and committed to such state hospital. We there held (pp. 255-256 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22] ) that '[t]he enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions--subject of course, to the constitutional guaranties--who would endanger themselves or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate ) be borne by the state.' (Italics added.) We further held that recovery could not constitutionally be had against the father of the committed patient. This holding is dispositive of the issue before us. Whether the commitment is incidental to an alleged violation of penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the instant case, the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause." (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)

Whatever the basis for other commitments by the juvenile court (see §§ 300, 601), the purposes of the confinement and treatment in commitments pursuant to section 602 include "the protection of society from the confined person." (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.)

The basis of commitment under section 602 is criminal conduct. The section provides: "Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts which may adjudge such person to be a...