Jesmer v. Dundon

• Decision Date: 09 June 1971
• Citation: 29 N.Y.2d 5,323 N.Y.S.2d 417,271 N.E.2d 905
• Parties: , 271 N.E.2d 905, 59 A.L.R.3d 629 In the Matter of J. Barry JESMER, as Director of Social Services of the Monroe County Social Services District, Respondent, v. Beverly S. DUNDON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 417

323 N.Y.S.2d 417

29 N.Y.2d 5, 271 N.E.2d 905, 59 A.L.R.3d 629

In the Matter of J. Barry JESMER, as Director of Social Services of the Monroe County Social Services District, Respondent, v. Beverly S. DUNDON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 9, 1971.

Leslie A. Bradshaw, Rochester, for appellant.

Charles G. Finch, Rochester, for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

In this case, we are called upon to decide the constitutionality of a statute requiring a parent to contribute to the support of a minor child institutionalized following a determination and order of the Family Court adjudicating him 'a juvenile delinquent' and 'a person in need of supervision'.

On February 19, 1970, following a juvenile delinquency proceeding in which he admitted taking part in a burglary, the Family Court, Monroe County, committed the appellant's 14-year-old son to Berkshire Farm for Boys. A short time later, the petitioner, who is Director of the county's Social Services District, brought this proceeding against the appellant for her son's support, pursuant to section 233 (subd. (b)) of the Family Court Act. ¹ She challenges the constitutionality of the statute on the ground, among others, that it denied her equal protection of the law because parents of other youngsters--such as wayward minors--institutionalized on criminal or quasi-criminal charges, are not required to contribute to their support. The court, rejecting the argument, ordered her to pay $600 toward her son's support at the Farm for the period between April 15 and December 31, 1970--which amounted to approximately $70 a month. ² Relying upon our decision in Matter of D. (Daniel), 27 N.Y.2d 90, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 261 N.E.2d 627, cert. den. 403 U.S. 926, 91 S.Ct. 2244, 29 L.Ed.2d 705--which denied juvenile delinquents a right to a jury trial--the court found it constitutionally permissible to distinguish between the latter and other types of young offenders vis-a -vis parental obligation to make support payments.

Some years ago, the Court of Appeals in a closely divided decision, held that section 56--a of the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York imposed upon a stepmother a duty to contribute to the support of her stepson, placed in an institution following his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, when the amount contributed by the child's father was insufficient to pay the full cost of such support. (See Department of Welfare of City of New York v. Siebel, 6 N.Y.2d 536, 190 N.Y.S.2d 683, 161 N.E.2d 1.) In reaching the conclusion it did, the court necessarily assumed the constitutional validity of the statute which, insofar as it rendered a parent liable for his child's support, is somewhat similar to the one now under consideration. However, since the question of constitutionality here raised was not expressly discussed, we address ourselves to it now. ³

Since a parent is under a duty to support his child (Family Court Act, §§ 412, 413), it may not be said that the statute now before us, section 233 (subd. (b)), deprives the appellant of her property without due process of law. Her equal protection argument does, however, require more extended treatment. There is 'no denial of equal protection of the laws', we recently wrote, 'if the differentiation made (between classes of persons) rests upon some rational consideration and is not palpably arbitrary. ' (T)he standards of equal protection, * * * are met if a classification, or a distinction among classes, has some reasonable basis.' (Matter of Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 607, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951, 237 N.E.2d 211 * * *.)' (Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 41, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 356, 256 N.E.2d 513, 520; see, also, Bucho Holding Co. v. State Rent Comm., 11 N.Y.2d 469, 477, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977, 983, 184 N.E.2d 569, 574.) Although a state 'may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class', the United States Supreme Court has said, it 'has broad power when it comes to making classifications', particularly in social and economic matters, as long as 'the line drawn is a rational one.' (Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71--72, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 20 L.Ed.2d 436; see, also, Glona v. American Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441.)

In the case before us, the appellant manifestly has no real ground for complaint simply because her responsibility for the support of her child continues while he is at Berkshire Farm. Her argument must necessarily be that his confinement and treatment are so similar to those for other incarcerated minors that there is no reasonable basis for relieving the parents of th latter children from their support obligations and that, in consequence, she is being invidiously discriminated against. The contention lacks force; in our view, the background and underlying purposes of the two types of confinement make it reasonable to distinguish the support obligations of such parents.

The Family Court--as the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization declared in 1962 in dealing with the then proposed new state-wide Family Court Act--is 'a special agency for the care and protection of the young and the preservation of the family' (1962 report, part 11, The Family Court Act, p. 2). And, as bearing on that, we would emphasize--to quote from a California case--that 'the basic philosophy of the juvenile court (which is similar to our Family Court) recognizes that the normal relationship of parent and child should not be disturbed except to insure protection of the public and the welfare of the child; that where interference with that relationship is necessary and warranted it should not extend beyond what is necessary to effect the necessary corrective measures; and that such measures as are taken should be directed to the restoration of a normal parent-child relationship.' (County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 548, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480, 489.) It followed, therefore, concluded the California court, that it was not unreasonable to impose the obligation of support upon the father of a boy institutionalized by the juvenile court.

The circumstance that safeguards afforded defendants in criminal cases are being increasingly accorded juvenile delinquents (see, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, revg. Matter of W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 247 N.E.2d 253; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527) does not narrow the difference between them and other youthful criminals; such safeguards have been afforded solely to assure them additional protection and treatment. Judge Bergan's statement in his opinion for the majority in Matter of W. still reflects this court's original purpose; 'young juvenile offenders', he wrote, are to be held 'as children apart from the usual methods and ineradicable consequences of the criminal law', for the design of Family Court proceedings and the intent...