Jesus F. v. Washoe Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re M.F.)

• Decision Date: 31 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 67063.,67063.
• Citation: 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 19,371 P.3d 995
• Parties: In the Matter of the PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.F., M.F., and N.F., Minor Children. Jesus F., Jr., Appellant, v. Washoe County Department of Social Services, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

371 P.3d 995

132 Nev. Adv. Op. 19

In the Matter of the PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.F., M.F., and N.F., Minor Children.

Jesus F., Jr., Appellant

v.Washoe County Department of Social Services, Respondent.

No. 67063.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

March 31, 2016.

Jennifer L. Lunt, Alternate Public Defender, and Carl William Hart, Alternate Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant.

Christopher J. Hicks, District Attorney, and Jeffrey S. Martin, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, GIBBONS

, J.:

In this opinion, we consider whether appellant is entitled to a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding. We conclude that neither the United States Constitution nor the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Additionally, we conclude that the district court relied on substantial evidence in terminating appellant Jesus F.'s parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court order terminating Jesus F.'s parental rights as to his three minor children.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed Jesus F.'s six children from his home in January 2010 due to drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision. All six children were placed in protective custody pursuant to NRS 432B.330

based on parental neglect and resided in various out-of-home placements over the next four years. By the time the three older children had reached the age of majority, WCDSS filed a petition to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three minor children.

Jesus F. filed a demand for a jury trial with the district court. The district court issued an order denying Jesus F.'s jury trial demand, concluding that the right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding is not guaranteed by common law, statute, or the Nevada Constitution. Following a bench trial, the district court terminated Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three minor children. On appeal, Jesus F. argues that the district court erred in (1) denying Jesus F.'s demand for a jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding, (2) concluding that it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights pursuant to the statutory presumption contained in NRS 128.109(2), and (3)

concluding that Jesus F.'s parental fault had been established pursuant to NRS 128.105(2).

DISCUSSION

The district court did not err in denying Jesus F.'s demand for a jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding

“Constitutional issues, such as one's right to a jury trial, present questions of law that we review de novo.” Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. 613, 618, 173 P.3d 707, 711 (2007)

.

Upon de novo review, we conclude that neither the United States Constitution nor the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding, as outlined below.

The United States Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding

“Termination of parental rights is an exercise of awesome power.” In re Parental Rights as to N.J.,

116 Nev. 790, 795, 8 P.3d 126, 129 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right to a jury trial in civil cases in certain circumstances, but that Amendment does not apply to the states. See

Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 216, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 (1917) ; see also

Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the states may not terminate parental rights without due process of law because “the companionship, care, custody and management of [one's] children” is an important interest that “undeniably warrants protection,” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650–51, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Court has not addressed whether due process requires a jury trial for a termination of parental rights proceeding. However, because “parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life,” due process requires states to provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

To evaluate whether such a proceeding violates a parent's due process rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)

, which consists of the following factors: (1) the private interest affected by the proceeding, (2) the risk of error inherent in the state's procedure, and (3) the countervailing government interest. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Elaborating on these factors, the Court has indicated that “[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one.” Id. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, the state maintains a dual stake in the outcome—a parens patriae interest in promoting the child's welfare and an “administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of termination proceedings.” Id. at 766, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Using the test, the Court has refused to guarantee the right to counsel in a termination proceeding because the parent does not risk a loss of personal liberty. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25–26, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (“[A]s a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel.”).

While Jesus F. correctly argues that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental interest under Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983)

, he fails to demonstrate that this status automatically affords a parent the right to a jury trial in this type of action. Instead, because Jesus F. does not risk a loss of personal liberty in the termination proceeding, this court applies the due process balancing test outlined in Eldridge to evaluate the private interests at stake against the government's interest and the risk that the procedures used would have led to an erroneous decision. See

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (stating that parents do not have a per se right to counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding because parents do not risk the loss of personal liberty). Under Eldridge, Jesus F.'s interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his three minor children must be weighed against the state's interest in the welfare of the children, conservation of judicial resources, and the need for an accurate and fair outcome. Since both parties have compelling interests, the analysis turns on an evaluation of the risk that the procedures used would have resulted in an erroneous decision.

We conclude that the district court's decision to hold a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial posed only a minimal risk of an erroneous decision for several reasons. First, a jury, while important, is not a required component of accurate fact-finding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971)

(“[O]ne cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (“We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.”); see In re Weinstein, 68 Ill.App.3d 883, 25 Ill.Dec. 322, 386 N.E.2d 593, 596 (1979)

(interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver as follows: “implicit in the rationale of the holding is that a jury trial is not a fundamental concept of due process”). Here, the family court judge demonstrated familiarity with the rules of evidence, the legal standards of a termination action, and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court applied the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard of proof.

Second, Jesus F. was given notice of the proceeding, was afforded competent counsel to represent his interests, and was afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543–45, 91 S.Ct. 1976

(explaining that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings as long as other fact-finding procedures such as “notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof” are in place to ensure accuracy and protect the juvenile's interests); see also

In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 383, 115 P.3d 223, 227 (2005) (providing that while “no absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings exists in Nevada,” counsel may be appointed if a case-by-case analysis pursuant to NRS 128.100(2) requires it). Third, Jesus F. retained the right to appeal from an adverse decision. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not violate Jesus F.'s due process rights pursuant to the U.S. Constitution by denying his demand for a jury trial.

The Nevada Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding

In Nevada, “[t]he right of trial by [j]ury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate forever; but a [j]ury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law....” Nev. Const. art. 1, § 3

. This court has determined that the phrase “shall ... remain inviolate forever” indicates an intent to perpetuate the jury trial right as the framers understood it when Nevada's Constitution was adopted in 1864. See

Awada, 123 Nev. at 621, 173 P.3d at 712 (concluding that Nevada's modem jury trial...