John C., Matter of

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Citation: 519 N.Y.S.2d 223,130 A.D.2d 246
• Parties: , 56 USLW 2191 In the Matter of JOHN C. (Anonymous), Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 223

519 N.Y.S.2d 223

130 A.D.2d 246, 56 USLW 2191

In the Matter of JOHN C. (Anonymous), Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Lenore Gittis, New York City (Dustin P. Ordway, of counsel), for appellant.

Peter L. Zimroth, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Stephen J. McGrath and Lin B. Saberski, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and BRACKEN, BROWN and SPATT, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

On this appeal we are asked to determine whether the Family Court properly applied the Miranda rule's "public safety" exception (see, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d 550; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) in denying the appellant's motion to suppress certain statements made to the arresting officer concerning the location of the gun used in the underlying incident. We conclude that the court erred in applying the exception and, accordingly, reverse the final order of adjudication and disposition, suppress the statements in issue, and remit the matter for further proceedings.

The appellant, John C., who was eleven years old at the time of his arrest, was charged in a juvenile delinquency petition with committing a number of acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted, inter alia, the crimes of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1] ), attempted manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.20[1] ), assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.10[1], [3]; § 120.05[1], [2], [4] ) and reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25). The charges arose out of an incident which occurred on February 3, 1986, during which the appellant is alleged to have shot a 14-year-old youth in the back.

Appellant moved to suppress certain statements made by him to one of the arresting officers on the grounds that they were obtained without Miranda warnings and in violation of Family Court Act § 305.2.

At the suppression hearing, Police Officer Erwin Valle testified that on the day in question he and his partner responded to a radio report of a youth having been shot in apartment 5E at 108-09 159th Street in Jamaica. When the officers arrived at the location, Officer Valle was led by a youth into a bedroom where he saw another youth, the complainant, lying face down on the floor with a blood stain on his shirt. After the officer radioed for an ambulance, a woman entered the bedroom with another youth, the appellant. The officer brought the appellant to where the complainant was lying and asked the complainant if it was the appellant who had shot him. The complainant responded affirmatively. At that point, the officer stated that he "investigated the incident of what happened by asking [the appellant] 'Why did you shoot him and where is the gun?' " to which the appellant responded "I took the cartridge out. I didn't know the gun was loaded. I didn't mean to shoot my friend. I don't have it".

The officer testified further that he then placed the appellant under arrest and took him to the living room where he continued to question him with respect to the location of the gun because he was fearful for the safety of the children who were in the house. When the officer asked the appellant a second time where the gun was located, the appellant, according to the officer's testimony, stated "I don't have it". The officer testified further that he persisted in asking the appellant where the gun was located and told him "There's something serious that you have done here. Please tell us--tell me where the gun is". The appellant then, the officer stated, told him that he had given the gun to a friend named Steve who lived across the street. When an investigation revealed that the appellant had provided a false name, Officer Valle again confronted the appellant who then gave the friend's correct name. After ascertaining that the appellant's friend did in fact live across the street, the officer testified that he then asked the appellant why he had given the gun to his friend and the appellant responded that he had held the gun for his friend who sells cocaine.

The officer testified further that he and his partner thereafter took the appellant to the police precinct where, for the first time in the Youth Holding Room, he was given his Miranda warnings in the presence of his aunt and legal guardian, Jeanette C. The appellant stated at that time that he did not want to answer any further questions. Later, while the appellant was being questioned by Officer Valle and his partner as to pedigree information, he made a further statement, which is not at issue on this appeal.

The only other witness at the hearing was the appellant's aunt, who testified that she estimated that there were about eight uniformed officers and six plainclothes detectives in the apartment, and that about one half of the uniformed officers and two or three of the detectives questioned the appellant in the apartment during the nearly one-hour period prior to his being taken to the police precinct. The aunt testified that at no time during this period was the appellant permitted to be alone with her.

The hearing court in its decision divided the appellant's comments into four groups and ruled upon them separately. The court ruled that the first statement, which consisted of the appellant's response to the question as to why he had shot the complainant, was the product of custodial interrogation, and, since it was not preceded by Miranda warnings, was inadmissible at the fact-finding hearing. The court ruled that the second statement--which in fact consisted of the appellant's responses to three separate inquiries as to where the gun was located--although also the product of a custodial interrogation, fell within the purview of the public safety exception to the Miranda rule as set forth in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, supra. The court ruled further that the third statement, consisting of the appellant's response to the inquiry as to why he had given the weapon to his friend, was not necessitated by any concern for the public safety and thus was inadmissible. Finally, the court found that the appellant's fourth statement made at the police precinct during processing was a spontaneous outburst not the product of police interrogation and was therefore admissible. As previously indicated, however, this latter statement is not at issue on this appeal.

Following the court's partially unfavorable ruling on his suppression motion, the appellant admitted to committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree. He was thereafter adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed with the Division of Youth, Title III, for a period of 18 months.

On this appeal, appellant argues that the court erred in refusing to suppress his statement made in response to the officer's questioning as to the location of the gun. He contends that no exigent circumstances existed which would warrant the application of the public safety exception to the Miranda rule which was recognized by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, supra. We agree.

It is axiomatic that custodial interrogation of an individual which is not preceded by warnings as to the rights he is foregoing and a waiver thereof will be deemed violative of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 supra ). In New York v. Quarles, supra, however, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the Miranda rule which is best explained by examining the facts of that case. In Quarles, two police officers on patrol were stopped by a woman who told them that she had just been raped by a man and that he had just entered a nearby supermarket and was carrying a gun. One of the officers entered the supermarket and, near the checkout counter, spotted an individual meeting the description of the suspect provided by the woman. When the man fled toward the rear of the store, the officer pursued him with a drawn gun and then, after losing sight of him for several seconds, ordered him to stop. Upon frisking the suspect, the officer discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, the officer asked him where the gun was. The suspect responded by nodding toward some empty cartons and stating "the gun is over there". After retrieving the weapon, the officer formally placed the defendant under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. When the defendant indicated his willingness to answer questions without an attorney being present, the officer proceeded to question him as to the ownership of the gun and where it had been obtained by him. In a subsequent prosecution of the defendant on weapons charges, the suppression court excluded the defendant's statement that "the gun is over there" on the ground that it had been obtained in the absence of Miranda warnings and excluded his answers to the ensuing questions as to ownership and place of purchase on the ground that they were tainted by the prior improperly obtained statements. This court affirmed (People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84) as did a divided Court of Appeals (People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 444 N.E.2d 984).

In reversing and remitting the case, the United States Supreme Court created a so-called "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. In several previous cases, the Supreme Court had pointed out the Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights in and of themselves, but rather are prophylactic measures to insure protection of the right against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation (see, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41...