Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. B179206.,B179206.
• Citation: 133 Cal.App.4th 496,34 Cal.Rptr.3d 863
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: William Keith JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

34 Cal.Rptr.3d 863

133 Cal.App.4th 496

William Keith JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

No. B179206.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5.

October 17, 2005.

Metzger Law Group, Gregory A. Coolidge, Long Beach, and Peter F. Klein for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey L. Bleich, San Francisco, Kathleen M. McDowell, Los Angeles, and Blanca F. Young, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

ARMSTRONG, J.

In this products liability case, defendant and respondent American Standard moved for summary judgment in part based on the legal principle which other jurisdictions have termed the sophisticated user doctrine. (See, e.g., Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating Partnership, L.P. (8th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 1098, 1102; Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc. (8th Cir.1981) 667 F.2d 682, 687; Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Machinery Corp. (N.D.Okla.1979) 483 F.Supp. 407, 413; Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (S.D.N.Y.1966) 268 F.Supp. 791, 798, and the cases collected therein.) We hold that the doctrine is part of California law. That is, we hold that a manufacturer cannot be liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to warn of a risk, if a sophisticated user should reasonably know of that risk.

Trial Court Proceedings

Plaintiff and appellant William Johnson is an EPA certified HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) technician who worked on commercial systems. He sued a number of manufacturers of air conditioning equipment, including American Standard, a number of chemical manufacturers, and a number of chemical suppliers, alleging that he was injured by the phosgene gas which was created during the ordinary maintenance and repair of commercial air conditioning systems.

The causes of action against American Standard were negligence, strict liability for failure to warn, and strict liability for design defect under the consumer expectations test. The factual allegations were that Johnson was injured while repairing refrigerant lines which were part of an evaporator manufactured by American Standard's Trane Division, in the air conditioning system at Bank of America's Del Amo branch. Specifically, Johnson alleged that he was injured by the phosgene gas created when he brazed (brazing is a form of welding) refrigerant lines containing R-22 refrigerant.

In each cause of action, Johnson's theory was that American Standard knew that harmful phosgene gas would be created when its evaporator was serviced, but failed to provide an adequate warning. (Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987, 1002, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528, 810 P.2d 549.) In Johnson's view, a warning would be adequate if it informed users that brazing refrigerant lines can result in creation of phosgene, that phosgene inhalation can result in potentially fatal lung disease, that phosgene can be detected through its fresh-cut-grass smell, changes in flame color during brazing, or physical symptoms like burning eyes or shortness of breath, and that users should wear respiratory protection while brazing and stop brazing on detection of phosgene.

American Standard moved for summary judgment on two grounds. In reliance on Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 357, 212 Cal.Rptr. 395 and Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 634, 173 Cal.Rptr. 20, it contended that it had no duty to warn about the dangers of refrigerant, which was another manufacturer's product. American Standard also raised the sophisticated user doctrine and sought summary judgment on the ground that it had no duty to warn because the risk was within the professional knowledge of HVAC installers and repairers, citing Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 930, 133 Cal.Rptr. 483 and Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862, 179 Cal.Rptr. 923. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds. Because we affirm under the sophisticated user doctrine, we need not and do not address the alternate ground.

Discussion

The sophisticated user doctrine

Under California law, "manufacturers are strictly liable for injuries caused by their failure to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time they manufactured and distributed the product." (Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104, 1108, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 162, 920 P.2d 1347.) The sophisticated user doctrine holds that "there is ordinarily no duty to give warning to members of a profession against generally known risks. `There need be no warning to one in a particular trade or profession against a danger generally known to that trade or profession.' 4 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence § 656 (Rev. ed.1941); see Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y 227, 237-238, 240-241, 140 N.E. 571, 574, 575 (1923); McDaniel v. Williams, 23 App.Div.2d [A.D.2d] 729, 257 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1st Dep't 1965); Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (Ct.Cl.1951), aff'd, 280 App.Div. [A.D.] 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1952); cf., Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.1957); Kappa [Kapp] v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 57 F.Supp. 32 (E.D.Mich.1944); Morocco [Morrocco] v. Northwest Eng'r Co., 310 F.2d 809, 810 (6th Cir.1962); Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855, 78 S.Ct. 84, 2 L.Ed. [L.Ed.2d] 63 (1957); Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.1946); Stottlemire v. Coward [Cawood], 213 F.Supp. 897 (D.D.C.1963)." (Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (S.D.N.Y.1966) 268 F.Supp. 791, 798.)

"[W]here the danger or potentiality of danger is known or should be known to the user, the duty (to warn) does not attach." (Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Machinery Corp. (N.D.Okla.1979) 483 F.Supp. 407, 413.)

There was no question but that Johnson was a sophisticated user of commercial HVAC systems, for purposes of the doctrine. The undisputed facts were that under Federal law, HVAC technicians who work on commercial equipment must be certified by the EPA with "universal" certification, which is granted after an exam. They are "trained professionals." Most HVAC technicians also have some kind of trade or professional training. Johnson had universal certification and had completed a one year course of study in HVAC systems at ITT Technical Institute.

The parties do disagree on whether the sophisticated user doctrine is, or should be, part of California law. We find that it arguably has been California law, and that it should be. "This rule of the `sophisticated user' is no more than an expression of common sense as to why a party should not be liable when no warnings or inadequate warnings are given to one who already knows or could reasonably have been expected to know of the dangers. . . ." (Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating Partnership L.P. (8th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 1098, 1102.)

Courts which have adopted the doctrine often cite section 388 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which says that suppliers of chattels can be liable to users of those chattels "if the supplier [¶] (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and [¶] (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, . . ." [Emphasis added.] Comment k to Clause (b) explains that "One who supplies a chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous character . . . if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved."

"Subsection (b) . . . has been interpreted to mean that there is no duty to warn if the user knows or should know of the potential danger, especially when the user is a professional who should be aware of the characteristics of the product. See Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464-65 (5th Cir.1976); Madrid v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 486 F.2d 856, 860 (10th Cir.1973); Lockett v. General Electric Co., 376 F.Supp. 1201, 1208-09 (E.D.Pa.1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir.1975); Bryant v. Hercules, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 241, 247 (W.D.Ky.1970). Other courts . . . have stated substantially the same position, although without explicit reference to the Restatement. See Kerber v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.1969); Thibodaux v. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co., 381 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir.1967); Hopkins v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872, 75 S.Ct. 108, 99 L.Ed. 686 (1954); Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F.Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y.1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1967)." (Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc. (8th Cir.1981) 667 F.2d 682, 687.)

Thus, for example, in Strong, the Court found that the sophisticated user doctrine was part of Nebraska law, and that under that doctrine, manufacturers of natural gas pipe and pipe connectors had no duty to warn a natural gas utility with high duty of care, or the utility's employee, of well known gas line dangers. Similarly, Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union (1982) 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814, applying the doctrine under Michigan law, found that a scaffolding manufacturer had no duty to give safe rigging directions to a professional painter experienced in rigging techniques. Akin v. Ashland Chemical Co. (10th Cir.1998) 156 F.3d 1030, 1037 found no duty under Oklahoma law to warn a purchaser as knowledgeable as the United States Air Force of the potential dangers of low-level chemical exposure. These are but examples. The cases are many.

As Johnson argues, no California court has squarely adopted the doctrine, but in our view, it is a natural outgrowth of the rule that there is no duty to warn of known risks or obvious dangers. For...