Johnson v. Rell

• Citation: 119 Conn. App. 730,990 A.2d 354
• Decision Date: 09 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 30279.,30279.
• Parties: Keith JOHNSON et al. v. M. Jodi RELL et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

990 A.2d 354

119 Conn.App. 730

Keith JOHNSON et al. v. M. Jodi RELL et al.

No. 30279.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 7, 2009.

Decided March 9, 2010.

Keith Johnson, pro se, the appellant (named plaintiff).

Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

BISHOP, GRUENDEL and BEACH, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The pro se plaintiff Keith Johnson appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his federal cause of action against the defendants, Governor M. Jodi Rell, commissioner of correction Theresa Lantz and warden David Strange of the Osborn Correctional Institution.¹ The plaintiff contends that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his action. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at the Osborn Correctional Institution (Osborn). In February, 2008, he commenced in the Superior Court a federal cause of action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of his confinement.² See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ("§ 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody"); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1999) (prisoner may bring § 1983 claim "challenging the conditions of his confinement where he is unable to challenge the conditions through a petition for federal habeas corpus"). As characterized by the plaintiff in his appellate brief, his complaint "enumerated a laundry list of conditions at Osborn which are the basis of his constitutional challenge." Specifically, he alleged that Osborn is overcrowded, averring that "the cells ... were originally built as single cells containing one bed per cell, a desk, a toilet and sink and a storage chest.... A vast majority of the cells at Osborn now contain two inmates per cell." The plaintiff also alleged, inter alia, that "the ventilation system is grossly inadequate"; that "the heating system is ... inadequate and ineffective"; that "the plumbing is not in adequate and working condition"; that various fire hazards exist within Osborn; that "the procedures for the cleaning of cells ... are inadequate"; that "the shower facilities... are deplorable"; that "recreational opportunities ... are grossly inadequate"; that "the dining facilities and food preparation areas ... are unsanitary"; and that "the staffing of the medical department... is grossly inadequate." Exposure to such conditions, he alleged, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution.³

Notably, the plaintiff sued the defendants in both their official and individual capacities. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff requested declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and an award of costs and fees associated with the prosecution of the action.

Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 10-30 and 10-31(a)(1), the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That motion was predicated on multiple grounds, including lack of standing, immunity from suit and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.⁴ In response, the plaintiff filed an objection thereto, which was accompanied by his supporting affidavit. The court held a hearing on the matter on April 14, 2008. In its July 1, 2008 memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity barred the plaintiff's action against the defendants. As a result, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. From that judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

At the outset, we note that "in an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss on the ground of subject matter jurisdiction, this court's review is plenary. A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.... Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francis v. Chevair, 99 Conn.App. 789, 791, 916 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 901, 926 A.2d 669 (2007). "When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 393, 900 A.2d 82 (2006). Further, in addition to admitting all facts well pleaded, the motion to dismiss "invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henriquez v. Allegre, 68 Conn.App. 238, 242, 789 A.2d 1142 (2002).

Our consideration of the court's subject matter jurisdiction begins with the defendants' contention that the plaintiff lacks standing.⁵ They maintain that the plaintiff's failure to allege injury in his complaint deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction and mandated dismissal of the action. We agree.

It is well established that "a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... Our Supreme Court has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.... The court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear.... Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... Our review of the question of the plaintiff's standing is plenary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Slack, 110 Conn.App. 641, 643-44, 955 A.2d 620, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 417 (2008).

Standing is no mere procedural technicality. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments ... is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). As a result, "the exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show an injury resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate."⁶ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 473, 102 S.Ct. 752. The standing requirement further evinces a proper regard for the judicial branch's relationship with coequal branches of government under our constitutional structure. Thus, "it is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).

An allegation of injury is both fundamental and essential to a demonstration of standing. Under Connecticut law, standing "requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a plaintiff ordinarily establishes his standing by allegations of injury."⁷ (Emphasis in original.) Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 321 n. 6, 439 A.2d 349 (1981). "As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great." Id., at 321, 439 A.2d 349; see also Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 156, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004) ("only those individuals who have suffered a direct injury would have standing"). Furthermore, an allegation of injury is a prerequisite under federal law to the maintenance of an action under § 1983. See, e.g., Colombo v. O'Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir.2002) ("to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that some official action has caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his or her constitutional rights—in other words, there is an injury requirement to state the claim"), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 961, 123 S.Ct. 1750, 155 L.Ed.2d 512 (2003); Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.2002) ("in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private party acting under color of state law").

The complaint in the present case lacks that requisite allegation, as does the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in opposing the defendants' motion to dismiss. By the plaintiff's own...