Lewis v. Slack

• Decision Date: 30 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 29262.,29262.
• Citation: 110 Conn.App. 641,955 A.2d 620
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Scott LEWIS v. Christopher SLACK et al.

955 A.2d 620

110 Conn.App. 641

Scott LEWIS v. Christopher SLACK et al.

No. 29262.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 28, 2008.

Decided September 30, 2008.

Scott Lewis, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Peregrine Zinn Rowthorn, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

GRUENDEL, J.

The pro se plaintiff, Scott Lewis, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his appeal from a decision of the statewide grievance committee (committee). The dispositive issue is whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue that appeal. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

On March 27, 2007, the plaintiff filed with the committee a complaint concerning the conduct of the defendant Christopher Godialis, an assistant state's attorney, in the plaintiff's direct appeal of his criminal conviction before our Supreme Court. See State v. Lewis, 245 Conn. 779, 717 A.2d 1140 (1998). On April 27, 2007, the New Britain judicial district grievance panel dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. The decision stated in relevant part: "[T]he panel finds no probable cause to conclude that [Godialis] violated any of the potentially applicable Rules of Professional Conduct in this matter.... Based on this determination, the panel has dismissed the complaint. This dismissal constitutes a final decision and there shall be no review of the matter by the [committee].... [W]hile this decision is surely disappointing to the complainant, it must be understood that Connecticut law provides that this decision is not subject to any further review." (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff nevertheless requested further review of that decision by the committee. In a letter dated May 14, 2007, the committee informed the plaintiff that "the rules governing the attorney grievance process provide for no further review of your dismissed complaint." Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-38, the plaintiff then filed a petition for judicial review with the Superior Court.¹ That pleading named Christopher Slack, first assistant bar counsel to the committee, Beth Cvejanovich, counsel for the New Britain judicial district grievance panel, and Godialis as defendants. In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the court granted following argument thereon. From that judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal. We disagree.

"[A] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.... [Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.... [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear.... Moreover, [t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent.... Standing ... is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002). "Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn.App. 568, 574, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998). Our review of the question of the plaintiff's standing is plenary. See West Farms Mall, LLC v. West Hartford, 279 Conn. 1, 12, 901 A.2d 649 (2006).

"To be entitled to invoke the judicial process, a party must have suffered an aggrievement." Kelly v. Dearington, 23 Conn.App. 657, 660, 583 A.2d 937 (1990). "Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory.... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share.... Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.... Statutory aggrievement ... exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 64-65, 946 A.2d 862 (2008). We address each in turn.

The plaintiff has presented no plausible statutory basis in support of his claim of aggrievement. The General Statutes do not provide for appellate review of a decision of the committee. Although he characterized his pleading as an "administrative appeal," our Supreme Court has rejected attempts to appeal from a decision of the committee pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., concluding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking thereunder. Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 526-27, 576 A.2d 532 (1990). The plaintiff's contention that General Statutes § 51-197b(a) confers standing is equally untenable. That statute, titled "administrative appeals," merely provides that "[e]xcept as provided in § 31-301b, all appeals that may be taken from administrative decisions of officers, boards, commissions or agencies of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall be taken to the Superior Court." General Statutes § 51-197b(a). Put simply, § 51-197b(a) does not create any right of appeal.

By contrast, our rules of practice expressly permit appellate review of the committee's decision in certain circumstances. Practice Book § 2-38(a) provides in relevant part: "A respondent may appeal to the superior court a decision by the statewide grievance committee or a reviewing committee reprimanding the respondent...." (Emphasis added.) As the defendants note in their brief, neither Practice Book § 2-38 nor any other section of the rules of practice permits an appeal by a complainant of the dismissal of a grievance complaint. In addition, when the grievance panel dismisses a given complaint due to lack of probable cause, our rules of practice provide that, absent an allegation in the complaint that the respondent committed a crime, "[s]uch dismissal shall be final and there shall be no review of this matter by the [committee]...."² Practice Book § 2-32(i)(2). Those rules indicate that a complainant generally is not permitted to appeal from the committee's dismissal of the complaint.

Relying on our recent decision in Brunswick v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 103 Conn.App. 601, 931 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 929, 934 A.2d 244 (2007), the plaintiff posits that the inherent authority of the judges of this state to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar vests in the Superior Court the jurisdiction to review an appeal from a complainant whose grievance complaint is dismissed for lack of probable cause. The plaintiff misreads that precedent. In Brunswick, we emphasized the committee's "unique status as an arm of the court"; it is not an administrative body. Id., at 610, 931 A.2d 319. We explained that because our courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over attorney conduct, they necessarily retain jurisdiction to review an order of the committee disciplining an attorney. Id., at 608, 931 A.2d 319; see also Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 216 Conn. 228, 232, 578 A.2d 1075 (1990).³ Brunswick did not address judicial review of the dismissal of a complaint by the committee or its local grievance panel. Furthermore, just as our judges exercised their inherent supervisory authority by "authoriz[ing] grievance panels and reviewing committees to investigate allegations of attorney misconduct and to make determinations of probable cause"; Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162, 167, 575 A.2d 210 (1990); the judges of this state, in adopting ...