Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. D009129,D009129
• Citation: 217 Cal.App.3d 692,266 Cal.Rptr. 187
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 58 Ed. Law Rep. 699 Verushka JOHNSON, a minor etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 187

266 Cal.Rptr. 187

217 Cal.App.3d 692, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 699

Verushka JOHNSON, a minor etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D009129.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 29, 1990.

As Modified Feb. 20, 1990.

[217 Cal.App.3d 695] Biljana Kovacevic, for plaintiff and appellant.

McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre and Steven J. Cologne, San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

WORK, Associate Justice.

Verushka Johnson appeals a judgment dismissing her personal injury action against the San Diego Unified School District (District) entered after the District's motion for summary judgment was granted because Johnson did not comply with the filing provisions of the California Tort Claims Act (Act) (Gov.Code, § 900 et seq.). Johnson contends she substantially complied with the claim procedures by filing her claim with the State Board of Control and stating the place of the accident, naming the District as the agency causing the injury and giving the underlying facts of the incident. Alternatively, Johnson asserts the District is estopped to assert the defense of noncompliance. For the reasons which follow, we conclude neither contention has merit and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 21, 1986, Johnson was struck and injured by a speeding motorcycle as she was leaving Madison High school while walking across Kessling Street in San Diego. On May 20, she filed claims with the City of San Diego and the State Board of Control. (See Gov.Code, § 910.) The claim filed with the State Board of Control named the District as the responsible entity for failing to safely control or regulate traffic on a busy street students crossed during lunch hour to get to the shopping center. When the State Board of Control did not reply, Johnson filed her complaint for personal injury naming the District as one defendant. She specifically alleged timely presentation of her claim to both the City of San Diego and the State Board of Control.

On July 25, 1988, the trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment on the basis Johnson had failed to comply with Government Code section 900 et seq., because she had filed her claim with the State Board of Control rather than directly with the District, specifically finding no substantial compliance.

JOHNSON FAILED TO SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLY WITH THE CLAIM FILING PROVISIONS

Although Johnson acknowledges the District constitutes a separate entity apart from the Department of Education whose governing board establishes statewide education policy to be implemented by local school districts, she in any event contends the Department's role in establishing policies for local districts makes it a de facto governing body of the District. Therefore, she argues her claim with the State Board of Control apprising it she was seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the District's negligence was sufficient to alert the Board of Education a claim was being asserted against the District. The flaw in Johnson's reasoning is her characterization of the relationship between the District and the State educational entities within the factual and statutory context of this case.

The Act is designed to provide a governmental entity with sufficient information to enable it to investigate and timely evaluate the merits of uninsured claims and, where possible, avoid the expense of litigating meritorious claims. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 32, 234 Cal.Rptr. 612.)

"By requiring advance knowledge of potential claims, the claims statute provides an opportunity to the public entity to quickly rectify a dangerous condition and further provides an opportunity for the entity to take the potential claim into account in its fiscal planning. [Citation.]" (San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Superior Court (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 843, 847, 243 Cal.Rptr. 163.)

Compliance with the claims provisions is mandatory. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 454, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 32, 234 Cal.Rptr. 612; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 188, 165 Cal.Rptr "[w]here there has been an attempt to comply but the compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance controls. Under this test, the court must ask whether sufficient information is disclosed on the face of the filed claims 'to reasonably enable the public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit.' " (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083, 195 Cal.Rptr. 576, quoting City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 456, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 188, 165 Cal.Rptr. 29.)

                29.) 1  However, the claims statutes which are designed to protect governmental agencies from stale and fraudulent claims, provide an opportunity for timely investigation and encourage settling meritorious claims should not be used as traps for the unwary when their underlying purposes have been satisfied.  (Jamison v. State of California (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 518, 107 Cal.Rptr. 496;  Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist.  (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 74, 135 Cal.Rptr. 621.)   Consequently, the courts employ a test of substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, in determining whether the plaintiff has met the filing requirements of the Act.  (City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701;  Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33, 234 Cal.Rptr. 612;  Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Riverside, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 188, 165 Cal.Rptr. 29.)   In other words
                

In appropriate cases, where the public entity has suffered no prejudice, substantial compliance will be found. (Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 74, 135 Cal.Rptr. 621; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804, 224 Cal.Rptr. 57.) "So long as the purposes of the claims statute are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits." (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist., supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 33, 234 Cal.Rptr. 612; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726.)

On the other hand, "[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance is not applicable to a claim which is addressed to the wrong entity. (Jackson v. Board of Education [1967] 250 Cal.App.2d 856, 860 .)" (Jamison v. State of California, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 517, 107 Cal.Rptr. 496.) However, whether this rule applies to specific factual contexts is sometimes obscure. For instance, where the governing body (Board of Supervisors) of one public entity (County) is also the governing body of another public entity (County Flood Control District), a claim against one public entity delivered to the governing body of both substantially complies with the filing requirements. (Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist., supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 75-77, 135 Cal.Rptr. 621.) Moreover, in Jamison v. State of California, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 513, 107 Cal.Rptr. 496, the court held service of a timely claim upon an officer in the employ of a public agency allegedly responsible for the injury to be substantial compliance where the officer had a duty to forward the claim to the entity of which he is an officer or employee. In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." (Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 538, 148 Cal.Rptr. 729 [where a service of a claim on the County Education and our public schools are plainly matters of statewide concern and in fact state function (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 951, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669; Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 179, 302 P.2d 574), an obligation the state assumed through the adoption of the constitution (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist. (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 669, 226 P. 926). To perform this obligation, the state has established subordinate local school districts whose governing boards function as agents of the state. (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669; Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 181, 302 P.2d 574.) "However, the fact that a state agency is created by statute to discharge a duty constitutionally imposed on the state does not transmute the agency into 'the state,' nor render the state liable for its acts under a general theory of respondeat superior. [Citations.]" (First Interstate Bank v. State of California (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 627, 633, 243 Cal.Rptr. 8.)

                of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establishing the members of the respective governing boards were the same].) 2  Accordingly, service of a claim on one public agency, a subordinate agency to the governmental entity allegedly responsible for the injury, is substantial compliance with the filing requirements of the Act
                

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