Jones v. King

• Decision Date: 14 June 1935
• Citation: 162 So. 353,120 Fla. 87
• Parties: JONES v. KING, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

162 So. 353

120 Fla. 87

JONES v. KING, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court

June 14, 1935

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Lee County; George W. Whitehurst, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by R. Percy Jones against Bob King, as sheriff of Lee county. To review a judgment refusing the writ, petitioner brings error.

Reversed.

BUFORD J., dissenting.

COUNSEL W. D. Bell, of Arcadia, Frank C. Alderman, F. C Alderman, Jr., R. A. Henderson, Jr., and Wm. J. Wood, all of Fort Myers, and Arthur Gomez, of Key West, for plaintiff in error.

Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This was a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by an attorney at law to secure his release from imprisonment under a contempt adjudication of the circuit court. The circuit judge entered a judgment refusing to issue the writ of habeas corpus, but allowing writ of error and supersedeas in connection therewith. The proposition argued before this court is whether or not the court erred in the entry of the judgment appealed from.

The writ of habeas corpus is the only remedy available to a person committed for contempt of court such as that here charged which is deemed a criminal contempt. When applied for, relief should not be summarily denied by the refusal of the judge to issue the writ when application for it is made but the writ should be issued and a return ordered to be made thereon in the manner required by law. This is so, because the object of the commitment in a criminal contempt case is entirely punitive in that it is to punish an already completed past judicial wrong, and is not to enforce continued respect and decorum in the judicial presence, or to exact compliance with some present lawful order of the court essential to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.

Criminal contempts, unlike ordinary contempts, have been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be within the pardon power of the executive (Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 45 S.Ct. 332, 69 L.Ed. 527, text 535, 38 A. L. R. 131), and therefore are to be dealt with and tried in a manner analogous to criminal proceedings of whose nature criminal contempts partake.

Since a circuit judge must necessarily sit in review of the propriety and validity of his own judicial act in the infliction of punishment for a criminal contempt of court which he has already investigated and found a conclusion on, he should issue the writ of habeas corpus instead of summarily denying it and thereby afford to the petitioner the right to invoke any appropriate proceedings available to him to have a different judge preside at the trial of the habeas corpus proceeding in conformity with the practice approved in disbarment cases which are analogous. See Hogan v. State, 89 Fla. 388, 104 So. 598.

Petitioner seeking by habeas corpus to review the validity and regularity of an order of the circuit court finding him guilty of a criminal contempt of court alleged to consist of knowingly and willfully participating in the bribery of a witness in a pending case, but admittedly outside the personal knowledge or view of the presiding judge, and depending for its support entirely upon the legal weight to be attached to the judge's finding on conflicting evidence of witnesses who have accused petitioner, an attorney at law in good standing at the bar, of the particular acts relied on to constitute the basis of the contempt charged and sustained, is entitled to have the writ of habeas corpus he applied for issued, a return made to it, and thereafter to be accorded a full and fair hearing of such issues of law and fact as may be made to appear on the hearing of the habeas corpus case considered as a review of the summary contempt judgment. See Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182; Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185.

In both decisions last cited, this court in acting as a court of review of the circuit court's contempt adjudications involved in those cases, issued its writ of habeas corpus, and determined the merits of the case upon the return as made to the process issued.

Reversed for appropriate proceedings.

WHITFIELD, C.J., and ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING

BUFORD Justice (dissenting).

It is with real regret that I find myself unable to agree with the majority of the court in this case.

Plaintiff in error was found guilty of contempt in the circuit court in and for Lee county, Fla.

The rule nisi alleged:

'Whereas, during the Fall Term of this Court in the Year 1934, and during the pendency of the case of the State of Florida against William Lee and Tom P. Downing, which case came on for trial at said term and during the trial thereof in open court on the 15th day of November, 1934 one Frank Givens, being called as a witness for the defendant Downing then on trial and after being duly sworn, testified in said cause-a true copy of his testimony being hereto attached and made a part hereof-which said witness testified, among other things, as follows: questions by Mr. Jones: 'I want you to tell the jury. I want you to tell the jury, did I ask you to swear to a falsehood under a bribe of $25.00, did I ask you to do that?' Answer, 'Yes, you did,' from which testimony it appears that you, R. Percy Jones, attempted to corrupt the said witness, to-wit, Frank Givens, by inducing and influencing him to testify falsely in said case then on trial in said Court; thereby corrupting, hindering and obstructing the administration of justice in the court aforesaid, in contempt of this court and the judge thereof.

'Therefore, it is ordered that you, R. Percy Jones, do appear before this court at the court house on Monday, November 26, 1934, at ten o'clock A. M., and show cause, if any you have, why you should not be adjudged judged and held in contempt of court.'

To this was attached transcript of the testimony of the witness Givens as given upon a trial referred to. Mr. Jones, to whom the citation was directed, answered under oath and denied that he had been guilty of any of the misconduct which had been charged against him in the testimony of Frank Givens.

A hearing was had and much testimony was taken. The testimony was extremely conflicting, but the circuit judge found Mr. Jones guilty of contempt as alleged and sentenced him to a period of thirty days in jail for such act. Mr. Jones filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. He made part of his petition for the writ the transcript of the proceedings had on the contempt charge.

The court made an order denying and refusing the writ of habeas corpus and allowing the petitioner writ of error to such judgment and fixed bond for the petitioner during the pendency of the writ of error in this court.

We have carefully considered the record. In cases of this kind it is not the province of this court to determine whether or not the evidence when conflicting is sufficient to sustain a charge of contempt of court.

In the case of Wilson v. Joughin, Sheriff, 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182, we held:

'Where the act charged clearly constitutes contempt, a denial under oath of a contemptuous intent in committing the act does not require a discharge. In such cases the question is not whether contempt was intended but whether the conduct constituted contempt. See United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L.Ed. 319, 8 Ann. Cas. 265; Emery v. State, 78 Neb. 547, 111 N.W. 374, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1124; O'Flynn v. State, 89 Miss. 850, 43 So. 82, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119, 119 Am. St. Rep. 727, 11 Ann. Cas. 530; Ex parte Bankhead, 200 Ala. 102, 75 So. 478; Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716; Pierce v. U. S., 37 App. D. C. 582; Carson v. Ennis, 146 Ga. 726, 92 S.E. 221 [281], L. R. A. 1917E, 650; In re Fountain, 182 N.C. 49, 108 S.E. 342, 18 A. L. R. 208.

"As a general rule, habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere irregularities of procedure where there is jurisdiction; and in order to sustain the writ there must be illegality, or want of jurisdiction. Ex parte Pitts, 35 Fla 149, 17 So. 76[96]; Ex parte Prince, 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659, 26 Am. St. Rep. 67; Ex parte Bowen, 25 Fla. 214, 6 So. 65[64]. When a person has been taken into custody under an order of a court exercising proper jurisdiction, a habeas...