Jordan v. King
| Decision Date | 04 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-cv-11-KHJ-MTP |
| Parties | JERETT JORDAN PLAINTIFF v. RON KING, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [40] filed by Defendants Ron King, James Fillyaw, and Pelicia Hall and sua sponte for evaluating whether Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Adana Pierre[1] should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Having considered the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment [40] be granted, that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Adana Pierre be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff Jerett Jordan is a post-conviction inmate incarcerated at the Marion County Regional Correctional Facility. On October 8 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.[2] Plaintiff's claims arise from events which occurred while he was incarcerated at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility (“CMCF”). In his complaint and as clarified by his testimony at the Spears hearing,[3] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate protection from harm.
According to Plaintiff, two to three weeks after he arrived at CMCF in 2019, he noticed that his belongings had been disturbed and that certain belongings were missing. Plaintiff confronted another inmate about the missing items and demanded that the inmate not touch his belongings. In response, multiple inmates attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not expect the attack. The attack allegedly resulted in injuries to Plaintiff's back, jaw, and teeth.
Although Plaintiff could not see the tower officer, Defendant Pierre, or know what she did during the attack, Plaintiff alleges that Pierre failed to properly respond to the attack. Plaintiff believes that Pierre called for other officers during the attack, but did not attempt to physically stop the attack or verbally command the inmates to stop the attack.
According to Plaintiff, a female officer who responded to the attack laughed at him and instructed him to gather his belongings and go outside. Once outside, the female officer instructed Plaintiff and the inmates who attacked him to get into a truck. Plaintiff and the other inmates were taken to another location at the prison, where Plaintiff was loaded into a van and taken to the hospital. During the ride in the truck, neither Plaintiff nor the other inmates were restrained. Additionally, there were no officers in the back of the truck. The inmates allegedly threatened Plaintiff, but did not touch him. Plaintiff complains that they could have attacked him and that the responding officer created an unsafe situation.
Defendant Ron King was the supervisor of CMCF and Defendant James Fillyaw was the warden of CMCF at the time of the alleged attack. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants allowed deficiencies at the prison. They allegedly failed to provide sufficient staffing and staff training[4] and failed to protect Plaintiff from inmate violence. Plaintiff did not speak with these Defendants and does not know if they have any personal knowledge concerning Plaintiff's attack. Pelicia Hall was the MDOC Commissioner. According to Plaintiff, Hall was aware of the insufficient staffing and inmate violence at CMCF.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 from each Defendant, an injunction requiring Defendants to operate CMCF properly, and that criminal charges be brought against the inmates who attacked him.
On July 6, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the unnamed responding officer for failure to state a claim because no injury occurred during Plaintiff's transportation. See Order [37]. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief because he was transferred to another prison and does not have a constitutional right to have anyone criminally prosecuted. Id. Thus, only Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages against Defendants King, Fillyaw, Hall, and Pierre remain at issue.
On August 15, 2022, Defendants King, Fillyaw, and Hall filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [40]. In support of their Motion [40], Defendants submitted a transcript of the Spears hearing, Plaintiff's grievances, and a report of the subject incident prepared by Officer Diamond McKee. According to the incident report, at approximately 8:05 p.m. on July 31, 2019, Defendant Pierre alerted officers of an attack involving Plaintiff, and at approximately 8:10 p.m., an officer entered the zone and removed Plaintiff. See [40-2]. Later, other officers, including Defendant Pierre, escorted the attackers out of the zone. Id.
Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment [40]. Instead, on September 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal [49], seeking to challenge on appeal the Court's dismissal of his claims against the unnamed responding officer. Noting that this Court retains jurisdiction to consider the Motion for Summary Judgment [40] because Plaintiff is seeking to appeal non-appealable interlocutory orders, the Court entered an Order [61] on December 6, 2022, directing Plaintiff to file a response to the Motion [40] on or before December 20, 2022. Plaintiff did not file a response as ordered.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Where the burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant must then “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001)). “An issue is ‘genuine' if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable [fact-finder] to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812 (citation omitted).
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, “[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is mandatory “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 766 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violence by fellow inmates. Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)). However, not every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another amounts to a constitutional violation by prison officials. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To prevail on a failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must show that “he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference consists of the official being aware of both the “facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate indifference “‘is an extremely high standard to meet.'” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Domino v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)). Negligent failure to protect an inmate does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990). The test for establishing deliberate indifference is “one of subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
It is well-settled that § 1983 does not “create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). “To state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts reflecting the defendants' participation in the alleged wrong, specifying the personal involvement of each defendant.” Jolly v Klien, 923 F.Supp. 931, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1992)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege, much less show, that Defendants King, Fillyaw, or Hall had any actual knowledge of the danger Plaintiff's attackers...
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