Juarez v. State

• Decision Date: 24 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 06–14–00052–CR,06–14–00052–CR
• Parties: Martin Suarez Juarez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

461 S.W.3d 283

Martin Suarez Juarez, Appellant

v.The State of Texas, Appellee

No. 06–14–00052–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted: January 21, 2015

Decided: March 24, 2015

Julie Jones Woods, Dallas Public Defender's Office, Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Tara Cunningham, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas, TX, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Burgess

The State charged Martin Suarez Juarez with assault family violence against Juana Morcia, the mother of his child.¹ See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West Supp.2014). The jury found Juarez guilty and sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. On appeal,² Juarez (1) argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection during voir dire to the State's allegedly improper commitment question, (2) brings five points of error complaining of several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings, and (3) argues that the written judgment of conviction lists the incorrect statute of offense. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either overruling Juarez' objection during voir dire or in deciding the evidentiary issues which Juarez actually preserved, we overrule Juarez' first six points of error. However, we modify the judgment to reflect that Juarez was convicted under Section 22.01(b)(2)(B) of the Texas Penal Code and affirm the trial court's judgment, as modified.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Overruling Juarez' Objection During Voir Dire

A. Background

During voir dire, the State engaged in the following conversation with several venire members regarding the State's evidentiary burden:

[BY THE STATE]: .... So correct me if I'm wrong. But what I hear you saying that if, for example, it's just a he-said-she-said type of deal that that would not be sufficient for you; that you would require that the State bring something else—another witness, some DNA, something else other than the word of one person against another.

THE VENIREPERSON: Yes.

[BY THE STATE]: Are you saying that you would require the State of Texas to prove its case in a particular manner? In other words, something more than just one person?

THE VENIREPERSON: Yes.

[BY THE STATE]: Okay. Anybody else in the second row?....

THE VENIREPERSON: I would have to see bodily injury as opposed to just judging somebody on credibility, on what he said and what she said.

[BY THE STATE]: Okay. Sure. I just want to make sure we're all on the same page here. You understand that bodily injury is defined legally as physical injury, illness or impairment of the physical condition.

THE VENIREPERSON: Right.

[BY THE STATE]: You understand that could mean [that there] are no visible injuries on someone. That's what the law says. What I hear you telling me that even though that's what the law says, you're not comfortable with that. You would need to see some type of blood or guts or something more serious than maybe just physical pain and that you would require the State of Texas to prove something more than what is required under the law. Is that what you're saying?

THE VENIREPERSON: Correct.

....

Due to the seriousness of this and the allegations, yes, I would need more; some type of physical evidence.

[BY THE STATE]: And again I'm just going to kind of cover the same thing. You understand what the law requires.

THE VENIREPERSON: Yes, ma'am.

[BY THE STATE]: And what you're telling me is that that is not sufficient for you in this case?

THE VENIREPERSON: Correct.

....

[BY THE STATE]: Anybody in the second row feel like some of you feel already? How about Mr. Thompson?

THE VENIREPERSON: Talking about choking somebody, if we're talking about choking, I would like to see a bruise or something rather than she said he choked me.

[BY THE STATE]: Now, you understand Mr. Thompson that the law requires that we show evidence that bodily injury was sustained through—we're going to call it choking because that whole long definition is too long to repeat. You understand we have to prove that to you beyond a reasonable doubt. And are you telling me you would require that proof to be in the form of some type of bruising?

THE VENIREPERSON: Yes.

The State then asked the following question of Venireperson Thompson, which prompted an objection from Juarez' trial counsel:

[BY THE STATE]: And if that bruising wasn't there, then you would be inclined to find somebody not guilty—

[BY THE DEFENSE]: Judge, I'm going to object as to that being a commitment question.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[BY THE STATE]: You would require the State to prove more than what is required under the law?

THE VENIREPERSON: Yes.

Juarez contends that the State asked an improper commitment question.

B. Standard of Review

In Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established the test for determining whether a question is an improper commitment question: (1) whether the question is a commitment question; (2) if so, whether the commitment question gives rise to a valid challenge for cause; and (3) if it does, whether the question adds facts beyond those necessary for a challenge for cause. Id. at 179–84 ; see also Lee v. State, 206 S.W.3d 620, 621–23 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). Improper commitment questions are prohibited in order “to ensure that the jury will listen to the evidence with an open mind—a mind that is impartial and without bias or prejudice—and render a verdict based upon that evidence.” Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). The trial court's ruling is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (citing Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) ); see Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

C. Analysis

We first determine whether the question is a commitment question. Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 179 ; Braxton v. State, 226 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. dism'd, untimely filed). A commitment question “ ‘attempt[s] to bind or commit a prospective juror to a verdict based on a hypothetical set of facts.’ ” Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 179 (quoting Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) ). Commitment questions “require a venireman to promise that he will base his verdict or course of action on some specific set of facts before he has heard any evidence, much less all of the evidence in its proper context.” Sanchez, 165 S.W.3d at 712. Finally, a question is a commitment question “if one or more of the possible answers is that the prospective juror would resolve or refrain from resolving an issue in the case on the basis of one or more facts contained in the question.” Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 180.

Here, the State does not challenge Juarez' contention that the question was a commitment question. The question “if bruising wasn't there, then you would be inclined to find somebody not guilty” has two possible answers, “yes” or “no.” A yes answer would resolve the issue of guilt based upon the absence of bruising alone. Consequently, “one ... of the possible answers is that the prospective juror would resolve ... an issue in the case on the basis of ... facts contained in the question,” and the question is a commitment question. See Delacerda v. State, 425 S.W.3d 367, 382 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (finding question asking whether jury members could convict defendant in absence of physical evidence to be commitment question).

Next, we consider whether the question gave rise to a valid challenge for cause. “[J]urors must be open-minded and persuadable, with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness.” Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). A veniremember may be challenged for cause if he “has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann . art. 35.16(b)(3) (West 2006); see Delacerda, 425 S.W.3d at 382. “The State may properly challenge a prospective juror for cause when the juror would hold the State to a burden higher than beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delacerda, 425 S.W.3d at 382 (citing Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) ).

The Texas Penal Code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp.2014). During voir dire, the State explained that the term “bodily injury” included any type of physical pain and inquired whether the prospective jurors would be able to find the bodily-injury element in this case without physical evidence, prompting Thompson's reply. The State's question to Thompson was designed to demonstrate that Thompson would require physical evidence in addition to testimony to establish bodily injury. Thus, we find that the answer would give rise to a proper challenge for cause. See Delacerda, 425 S.W.3d at 382 (citing Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (“[A] juror who would require more evidence than necessary to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt would be subject to a challenge for cause.”); Harris v. State, 122 S.W.3d 871, 880 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd) (“Although the State may not bind a prospective juror to a specific set of facts, the State is permitted to determine whether a prospective juror will require evidence the law does not require to convict a defendant.”)); see also Kaiser v. State, No. 05–07–00575–CR, 2008 WL 2611367, at *2 (Tex.App.–Dallas July 3, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).³

Finally, we must determine whether the question “contain[s] only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective juror is challengeable for cause.” Standefer, 59 S.W.3d at 182. Standefer established the rule that a commitment question is improper when “the State's question suppli[es] facts beyond what [i]s...