Town of Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Commission

Decision Date10 March 1961
PartiesTOWN OF MILTON et al. v. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

John J. Murray, Town Counsel, Boston Joseph G. Crane, Boston with him), for petitioners.

Joseph H. Elcock, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Metropolitan Dist. Commission.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPIEGEL, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by the town of Milton and its selectmen. The petitioners seek to have the court require the Metropolitan District Commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission, to establish the proportions in which the cities and towns in the Metropolitan Sewerage System shall make annual payments to the Commonwealth to meet interest and principal charges attributable to sewer construction costs. The case was reserved by a judge of the Superior Court without decision and reported to this court upon (1) the petition; (2) the answer; (3) the agreed statement of all the material facts and exhibits attached to said agreement, constituting a case stated; and (4) the motion to amend the petition.

Under § 5A OF G.L. C. 921, inserted by § 3 of St.1959, c. 612, the commission is required to establish, not later than September 1, 1960, and in every fifth year thereafter, the proportion in which each of the cities and towns served by the Metropolitan Sewerage System shall annually pay money to the Commonwealth to meet interest and principal requirements on the debt which the Commonwealth incurred in constructing the Metropolitan sewers and sewerage works.

The petitioners allege that prior to September 1, 1960, they sought to have the commission establish the proportions to be paid by the various cities and towns for the five year period beginning January 1, 1961, and to have the commission take into consideration changes in the town of Milton's sewer connections in establishing Milton's proportion. The petitioners further allege that they were aggrieved by the failure of the commission to establish such proportions and that the commission was required to do so under G.L. c. 92, § 5A, as inserted. The commission denies that it has failed to comply with the provisions of § 5A.

There is no need to resort to the legislative history of St.1959, c. 612, because its words are unequivocal. Indeed, because of its clarity we should not interpret it by resorting to its legislative history. Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 321 Mass. 259, 266, 72 N.E.2d 543.

General Laws c. 92, § 5, 2 as inserted by St.1959, c. 612, § 3, sets forth the procedure for arriving at the proportion of the total amount each city and town in the Metropolitan Sewerage System shall pay to the Commonwealth to meet the interest and principal requirements on debts for sewers and sewerage works. There is no dispute between the parties as to the meaning or effect of this section.

General Laws c. 92, § 5A, 3 as inserted, requires the commission, not later than September 1, 1960, and in every fifth year thereafter, to establish the proportions using the procedure laid down by § 5.

Statute 1959, c. 612, § 5, 4 which was not incorporated into the General Laws, establishes percentages the commission shall adopt in determining the proportions in which the cities and towns served by the Metropolitan Sewerage System shall pay money to the Commonwealth to meet interest and principal requirements in the year 1960, pursuant to the duties imposed on the commission by G.L. c. 92, § 5A, as inserted.

The petitioners argue that the Legislature, by the terms of § 5 of St.1959, c. 612, made a specific provision for the year 1960; that the percentages set forth in § 5 applied solely to the year 1960; and that on or before September 1, 1960, the commission was required to make another apportionment for the five years beginning January 1, 1961, in accordance with G.L. c. 92, § 5, as inserted.

This interpretation disregards words and phrases contained in § 5 of G.L. c. 92, as inserted, and § 5 of St.1959, c. 612. To say that the percentages set down in St.1959, c. 612, § 5, are to be used by the commission only in determining the debt charges for 1960 of each city and town in the Metropolitan Sewerage System and not in establishing, on or before September 1, 1960, the proportions to be annually paid by each city and town pursuant to § 5A of G.L. c. 92, as inserted, is to treat as surplusage the phrase found in § 5 of St.1959, c. 612: '* * * in discharging duties imposed on it [the commission] by section five A of chapter ninety-two of the General Laws, inserted by section three of this act * * *.' 'It is not to be assumed that words in a statute have no force or effect.' Gillam v. Board of Health of Saugus, 327 Mass. 621, 623, 100 N.E.2d 687, 688. 'None of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but each is to be given its ordinary meaning without overemphasizing its effect upon the other terms appearing in the statute, so that the enactment considered as a whole shall constitute a consistent and harmonious statutory provision capable of effectuating the presumed intention of the Legislature.' Bolster v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85, 64 N.E.2d 645, 647.

For the commission to make one apportionment for 1960 based on the percentages supplied by the Legislature in St.1959, c. 612, § 5, and another for the five years beginning January 1, 1961, as the petitioners contend it must, would be in obvious conflict with the terms of § 5A of G.L. c. 92, as inserted. Section 5A grants the commission the power to make only one apportionment in 1960, and that not later than September 1, and the next date on which an apportionment may be set is September 1, 1965. The express mention in § 5A of the dates on which proportions shall be established excludes by implication the establishment of proportions at other times. Spence, Bryson, Inc. v. China Prod. Co., 308 Mass. 81, 88, 30 N.E.2d 885; County of Bristol v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 403, 406-407, 86 N.E.2d 911.

The individual sections of St.1959, c. 612, are not in conflict with one another when read in context. See Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm., 324 Mass. 309, 312-313, 86 N.E.2d 65. Taken as a whole the legislation embodied in c. 612 is plain and unambiguous.

General Laws c. 92, § 5A, imposes upon the commission the duty to establish, not later than September 1, 1960, and in every fifth year thereafter, the proportions in which each city and town in the Metropolitan Sewerage System shall annually pay money to the Commonwealth to meet interest and principal requirements of the system, using the formula enunciated in § 5 of G.L. c. 92, as inserted. The Legislature, by means of St.1959, c. 612, § 5, has determined the percentages which the commission must adopt in establishing the proportions on or before September 1, 1960. Section 5 of c. 612, St.1959, does not nullify or replace the formula set down in G.L. c. 92, § 5, so far as the September 1, 1960, establishment of proportions is concerned, but rather effectuates it. Since it was the purpose of the Legislature to set up a new system of apportionment of debt charges it is only logical that the...

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