Columbia Terminals Co. v. Koeln

• Decision Date: 17 March 1928
• Docket Number: 26694
• Citation: 3 S.W.2d 1021,319 Mo. 445
• Parties: Columbia Terminals Company, Appellant, v. Edmond Koeln, Collector of the Revenue of City of St. Louis
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

3 S.W.2d 1021

319 Mo. 445

Columbia Terminals Company, Appellant, v. Edmond Koeln, Collector of the Revenue of City of St. Louis

No. 26694

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 17, 1928

Motion for Rehearing Overruled March 17, 1928.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Victor H Falkenhainer, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Thompson & Thompson and Richmond C. Coburn for appellant.

(1) The entire system of administration in the assessing, levying and collecting of taxes throughout the State exhibits a consistent policy of protection to the taxpayer by providing for the taxpaper's knowledge of the amount of his assessment and right of appeal therefrom if he deems himself aggrieved, notice in the event of an increase in his assessment and a hearing thereon. Sec. 12766, Laws 1923, p 376; Secs. 12772, 12806, 12812, 12813, 12814, 12817, 12820 12821, 12822, 12825, R. S. 1919; Art. 15, Charter of St. Louis, secs. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16. Section 12825 has been construed to require notice to the owner of an increase in the assessment of his personal property as well as real property, though the statute makes express provision only as to real property. Pacific Ry. v. Cass County, 53 Mo. 17; State ex rel. Lemon v. Buchanan Co. Board, 108 Mo. 235; State ex rel. v. Spencer, 114 Mo. 574; Relfe v. Columbia Ins. Co., 11 Mo.App. 374; Rich Hill Mining Co. v. Neptune, 19 Mo.App. 438; Noll v. Morgan, 82 Mo.App. 112. The State Board of Equalization has no power to raise or lower the assessment of particular pieces of property within a county; its power is restricted to equalizing and adjusting the aggregate assessment of each class of property between the several counties of the State. State ex rel. v. Schramm, 190 S.W. 886; State ex rel. v. Vaile, 122 Mo. 33. The express duty rests upon the Board of Equalization for the City of St. Louis to notify a taxpayer of a proposed raise in an assessment on his property. Sec. 11, art. 15, Charter of St. Louis. When a taxpayer returns his list of taxable property to the assessor who accepts the same without objection, the taxpayer has a right to presume that the valuation stated therein has been accepted and will remain the same until notified of a proposed change. State ex rel. v. Spencer, 114 Mo. 574; Relfe v. Life Ins. Co., 11 Mo.App. 374; Rich Hill Mining Co. v. Neptune, 19 Mo.App. 438; Brown v. Douglass County, 98 Nebr. 299; Dixon County v. Halstead, 23 Nebr. 697; Glassford v. Dorsey, 2 Ill.App. 521. (2) Due process of law requires that the taxpayer at some stage of the assessment be entitled to proper notice and an opportunity to be heard upon the assessment of his property. Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64; Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373; Central of Ga. Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127; Rich Hill Mining Co. v. Neptune, 19 Mo.App. 438. Where the law requires notice to the taxpayer upon the raising of the assessment on his property a failure to give such notice is not a mere irregularity, but avoids the assessment. State ex rel. v. Spencer, 114 Mo. 574; Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cass Co., 53 Mo. 17; Noll v. Morgan, 82 Mo.App. 112; Rich Hill Mining Co. v. Neptune, 19 Mo.App. 438; Relfe v. Life Ins. Co., 11 Mo.App. 374; Mt. Sterling Oil Co. v. Ratliff, 127 Ky. 1; Banking Co. v. Hubbard, 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 279; Montana Ore Co. v. Maher, 32 Mont. 480. (3) Taxes in Missouri must be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. Sec. 3, Art. 10, Mo. Constitution; Charter of St. Louis, sec. 8, art. 15. Uniformity of taxation means uniformity in the burden of taxation -- uniformity in the mode of assessment as well as in the rate of levy. Greene v. Louisville Ry., 244 U.S. 499; Cummings v. Bank, 101 U.S. 157; People v. Weaver, 100 U.S. 544; Railroad & Tel. Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, 85 F. 302; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 15. (4) The legal standard of assessment of all property in Missouri is its true value in money. Secs. 3, 4, art. 10, Mo. Constitution; Secs. 12802, 12762, 12821, 12822, R. S. 1919; Secs. 5, 8, art. 15, Charter of St. Louis; State ex rel. v. Schramm, 269 Mo. 489; State ex rel. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 516; State ex rel. v. Stamm, 165 Mo. 79. (5) The allegations of the appellant's petition as admitted by the respondent's demurrer show grounds for equitable relief by the following authorities: (a) In a jurisdiction where taxes are assessed upon the true value of the property, equity will restrain an attempt to collect a tax levied upon an assessment in excess of the true value. State ex rel. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 502; Lee v. Mehew, 8 Okla. 136. (b) Equity will restrain the collection of an illegal tax whether the tax be illegal in whole or in part. If the latter, the proper procedure is for the taxpayer to tender the sum admittedly due and proceed in equity to restrain the collection of the remainder of the tax. Jacobs v. Cauthorn, 293 Mo. 154; State ex rel. v. Vaile, 122 Mo. 47; Railway Co. v. Epperson, 97 Mo. 300; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 569; Overall v. Ruerizi, 67 Mo. 203; 37 Cyc. 1259. (c) An aggrieved taxpayer may proceed in equity to restrain the collection of a tax founded upon a discriminatory assessment and the violation of his constitutional rights arising therefrom. State ex rel. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 517; Greene v. Louisville Ry., 244 U.S. 499; Raymond v. Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U.S. 157; Railroad & Tel. Co. v. Board of Equal., 85 F. 302; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Board of Comrs., 39 P. 1038; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Comrs. of Republic Co., 67 F. 411. (d) When the taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law to prevent or correct an illegal assessment upon his property, equity will assume jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief. Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.) sec. 1646; 37 Cyc. 1267. Where the remedy at law fails to provide for the plaintiff's case, equity will not require him to do an impossible or unreasonable act before seeking injunctive relief. C. B. & Q. Ry. v. Board of Comrs., 39 P. 1038. In an action at law to enforce the collection of taxes, the defendant cannot assert as a defense discrimination or overvaluation in the assessment of his property. State ex rel. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 502.

Julius T. Muench and Charles J. Dolan for respondent.

(1) Neither the Constitution nor laws of Missouri, nor the Charter of the City of St. Louis, requires notice to a taxpayer before adding to his assessment an increase which has been ordered by the State Board of Equalization to be added to all of the property included in a particular class designated by statute. Mo. Constitution, art. 10, sec. 18; secs. 12853-12857, R. S. 1919; Charter of St. Louis, art. 15, secs. 10-14. (2) Appellant's case is based on a misunderstanding of the provisions of the Missouri law requiring notice to the taxpayer. These provisions relate to increases of assessments ordered by county boards on their own motion in individual instances, and not to blanket increases ordered by the State Board of Equalization. (3) In carrying out an increase ordered by the State Board of Equalization, the local taxing authorities act in a ministerial capacity. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schramm, 269 Mo. 498. (4) The law does not expressly invalidate an assessment of property which happens to be greater than its value as determined by the taxpayer and the county assessor. Such an assessment may be valid if made without discrimination, and if there was no error or fraud involved in the making of the assessment. First Nat. Bank v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 173; Hacker v. Howe, 72 Nebr. 394. (5) An increase added to assessments generally, in pursuance of an order of the State Board of Equalization, is not invalidated by the failure of the assessor to add it to all property in the particular class affected, unless the assessor's action was based on systematic and intentional discrimination, or unless there was actual fraud. Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.) sec. 302; Coulter v. Railroad Co., 196 U.S. 599, 49 L.Ed. 615. (6) Assessments cannot be disturbed by the courts unless fraudulent or illegal, and alleged overvaluation. (7) Appellant failed to exhaust the remedies provided by law. It had the right under the general law to appear before the Board of Equalization of the City of St. Louis to demand that its assessment be equalized with that of other taxpayers assessed on the same class of property. This it failed to do. The proportion that appellant's assessment bore to other assessments of the same class of property was not different after the twenty per centum of increase had been ordered from what it was before the said increase had been ordered. Appellant, having failed to exhaust its legal remedies, has no standing in a court of equity. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441; First Nat. Bank v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 173; Hacker v. Howe, 72 Nebr. 394.

OPINION

Atwood, J.

This is a suit in equity to restrain defendant from instituting and prosecuting proceedings to compel the collection of an increase of twenty per cent in the assessed value of certain personal property belonging to plaintiff, resulting from an order of the State Board of Equalization, and to cancel the tax bill issued in connection therewith. Defendant filed demurrer to plaintiff's amended petition stating that "said petition does not state equity nor ground of equitable interference, and that the said petition does not state any cause of action against the defendant." From the judgment of the trial court sustaining this demurrer and dismissing the petition plaintiff has appealed.

Appellant contends that the increase was unlawful in its case, because (1) no notice was given to appellant of the proposed increase; (2) the original assessment of appellan...