Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board

• Decision Date: 11 December 1914
• Citation: 170 S.W. 437,161 Ky. 562
• Parties: KENTUCKY STATE JOURNAL CO. v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

170 S.W. 437

161 Ky. 562

KENTUCKY STATE JOURNAL CO. v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 11, 1914

For majority opinion, see 170 S.W. 1166.

MILLER J. (dissenting).

The opinion of the majority of the court is of such farreaching importance that I feel justified in giving the reasons for my dissent from the conclusions there reached, and in doing so I will be as brief as the necessities of the case will permit. The opinion of the majority makes it impossible for the Legislature to pass any effective Workmen's Compensation Act under our present Constitution.

The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act was approved March 21, 1914. Acts 1914, page 226. It is a very elaborate statute, of 75 sections, providing for the creation of the compensation fund, and its administration, in every detail. The Compensation Board created by that act instituted this action for the purpose of obtaining a mandatory injunction directing the defendant, the State Journal Company, an employer of labor within the state, and whose business is enumerated in section 15 of the act as subject thereto, to furnish the board certain information relative to its business. The circuit court sustained the act, and the defendant appeals.

Counsel for appellant have gone at great length into the merits of the act. Under my view of the province of this court's powers and duty, the wisdom or propriety of the act is not before us. We are to pass only upon the questions of law--upon the constitutionality of the act. It is sufficient to say that this court has repeatedly held that the fairness or wisdom of an act is a legislative question; and without citing the many authorities which establish so elementary a proposition, it may be sufficient to refer to the language of this court in the late case of Eastern Kentucky Coal Lands Corp. v. Commonwealth, 127 Ky. 717, 106 S.W. 275 32 Ky. Law Rep. 152, where we said: "There are a number of other objections made to the statute by appellant, all of which may be grouped under the general complaint that it is harsh, oppressive, and unjust. Were these objections well grounded, they would afford no basis for relief at the hands of the court. The policy of the Legislature may be looked into by the courts for the purpose only of interpreting statutes. If, then, they are found to be within the power of the Legislature to enact, the business of the court is ended. * * * It is not tolerable in our form of government, with its distinct separation of powers, that acts of the legislative branch should stand or fall according as they appealed to the approval of the judiciary; else one branch of government, and that the most representative of the people, would be destroyed, or at least completely subverted to the judges."

The courts must necessarily assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) page 257. In the interpretation of statutes, it is an elementary rule of construction that all laws enacted by the Legislature are presumed to be valid, and that it is the duty of the courts to declare them valid unless they clearly transgress some limitation upon the power of the Legislature, imposed by the state or federal Constitutions. The public policy of a state is expressed in its Constitution and statutes, and in its common law as found in the opinions of its court of last resort; and if the Constitution or statutes speak upon a subject, the public policy of the state is fixed to that extent.

If we were permitted to consider the reasons which actuated the Legislature in passing this act, they might easily be found in the generally conceded harshness of the common-law rules governing the liability of employers to employés injured while engaged in service, which was forcibly stated by Chief Justice Winslow, of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in deciding Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 144 Wis 468, 129 N.W. 408, where he said: "It gives me no pleasure to state these long-established principles of the law of negligence. I have no fondness for them. If I were to consult my feelings alone, I would far prefer to let the case pass in silence. No part of my labor on this bench has brought such heart-weariness to me as that ever-increasing part devoted to the consideration of personal injury actions brought by employés against their employers. The appeal to the emotions is so strong in these cases, the results to life and limb and human happiness so distressing, that the attempt to honestly administer cold, hard rules of law, which either deny relief entirely or necessitate a new trial, make draughts upon the heart and nerves which no man can appreciate who has not been obliged to meet the situation himself. If it be said that some of these rules are archaic and unfitted to modern industrial conditions, I do not disagree; in fact, that has been my own opinion for long. Upon reflection it seems that this could hardly be otherwise. Principles which were first laid down in the days of the small shop, few employés, and simple machinery could hardly be expected to apply with justice to the industrial conditions which now surround us."

The basic principle underlying the laws of this character, of which the Kentucky act is typical, is that the business of the country should bear the financial burden of all industrial accidents rather than the workmen who happen to be the victims of particular accidents. The question of direct fault is not considered. The fact alone that the victim suffers loss of wages or bodily impairment entitles him to compensation, unless the injuries received are due to his own willful negligence. Under the common law, damages for personal injuries are recoverable only when the accident was due to the fault of the employer or of his servants; and in many cases a recovery cannot be had, even though the employer or his servants had been negligent, if the employé had been guilty of contributory negligence. This method of adjusting individual rights is necessarily expensive, uncertain, and unsatisfactory to all parties concerned.

But whether the Legislature acted for the reasons above suggested, or for any of them, if it had the right to pass the act in question, the case is ended so far as this court is concerned. With this limitation in view, I will consider as briefly as possible, the principal objections urged against the constitutionality of the act.

It is urged that the act is compulsory, in that it, in effect, compels the employer and the employé to accept its provisions under penalty of losing their rights under sections 54 and 241 of the Constitution, which read as follows:

"54. The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property."

"241. Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so causing the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the recovery shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made the same shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person." As I understand the majority opinion, this is the only ground upon which it holds the Kentucky act of 1914 invalid. It tacitly overrules the many other constitutional objections urged against the act.

Section 29 provides that any employé, subject to the act, may contract with his employer, who is subject to the act, and who elects to pay the premiums provided thereby, to accept the compensation provided by the act for injured employés in lieu of any cause of action which he or his representative might have, arising from the negligence of his employer, or his agents or servants, and to waive all causes of action against said employer conferred by the Constitution or statutes of this state, or by the common law, for his injury or death occurring through the negligence of the employer or his agents.

Section 30 provides that such a contract between an employé and employer shall be conclusively presumed to have been made in every case where an employer has elected to pay into the fund, if such employé shall continue to work for the employer thereafter with notice that the employer has elected to pay into the fund; and the posting of printed or typewritten notices in conspicuous places about the employer's place of business, at the time of the election by the employer to pay into the fund, that he has so elected, shall constitute sufficient notice to all of his employés of the fact that he has made such an election; and the continuance in the service of such employer shall be deemed a waiver by the employé of his right of action, except as provided in section 32.

Section 32 provides that any employé prior to receiving an injury, may give notice to his employer, who has elected to pay into the fund, that he will not accept the benefit of the act and waive his right of action as provided thereby, such notice to be served on the employer and a copy mailed to the Compensation Board. If, thereafter, the employé shall be injured or killed while in the service of the employer, who has elected to operate under the act, and an action shall be instituted against the employer to recover damages, the employer may rely upon the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk, and the fellow-servant rule.

Section 34 provides that an employer who shall not elect to pay into the compensation fund the premiums provided by the act shall not, in a suit against him...