Keough v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1976
• Docket Number: M--405
• Citation: 344 N.E.2d 894,370 Mass. 1
• Parties: Ellen E. KEOUGH v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 894

344 N.E.2d 894

370 Mass. 1

Ellen E. KEOUGH

v. DIRECTOR OF the DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

M--405.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 5, 1976.

Decided March 24, 1976.

Argeo P. Cellucci, Hudson, for plaintiff.

Timothy J. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Joseph S. Ayoub, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and WILKINS, JJ.

REARDON, Justice.

Ellen E. Keough worked as a spinner for a firm in Hudson, Massachusetts, from August, 1971, to March 1, 1974, when she became separated from employment. She filed a claim for unemployment compensation on March 4, 1974. She was disqualified pursuant to a decision of the Director of the Division of Employment Security, which decision was affirmed by a review examiner. The decision was predicated on the fact that she had placed 'a restriction on her employability, namely, that her acceptance of any work not within walking distance of her home, depended on whether transportation arrangements could be made,' and he found her not to meet the eligibility requirements of G.L. c. 151A, § 24(b). ¹ On January 23, 1975, the board of review upheld the decision of the review examiner, and the case then proceeded to the District Court of Marlborough for review under the provisions of G.L. c. 151A, § 42. There a District Court judge affirmed the decision of the board of review and, on Mrs. Keough's claim of appeal, reported the case under § 42 to this court for determination. The challenge by the claimant here is to the director's interpretation of G.L. c. 151A, § 24(b), defining eligibility for benefits. The claimant also alleged a violation of her right to equal protection under the law.

It appears that the claimant and her husband have one car which the husband uses to commute to work. Public trasportation in the area where they reside is 'meager,' and the claimant does not have the use of a motor vehicle on a daily basis. She had evinced her willingness to accept full time employment day or night on the basis that she has transportation. In effect she has restricted her acceptance of work not within walking distance of her home to employment where transportation arrangements could be made.

There was no error. Review in the District Court of decisions of the Division of Employment Security board of review is governed by G.L. c. 151A, § 42, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1114, § 18, which provides in part that the 'findings and decisions of the board shall be reviewed in accordance with the standards for review provided in paragraph (7) of section fourteen of chapter thirty A.' Under G.L. c. 30A. § 14(7), as appearing in St.1973, c. 1114, § 3, the decision of the board may be set aside or modified if the court determines that substantial rights of any party have been prejudiced because, among other reasons, the decision violated constitutional provisions, was based on an error of law, or was unsupported by susbtantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined in c. 30A, § 1(6), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1, as 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' We have had occasion in a series of cases to make it clear that findings of the review examiner, adopted by the board of review, supported by substantial evidence with conclusions not based on any error of law, should be affirmed by the District Court. Bogdanowicz v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 341 Mass. 331, 335, 169 N.E.2d 891 (1960). See Martin v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 347 Mass. 264, 268, 197 N.E.2d 594 (1964), and cases cited. We have further stated that where the board is the sole judge of credibility and the weight of evidence, and where its findings are supported by evidence, it is not open to a District Court judge or to this court to substitute other views as to what should be the determination of the facts. Wagstaff v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 664, 667, 79 N.E.2d 3 (1948). See Olechnicky v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 325 Mass. 660, 662, 92 N.E.2d 252 (1950).

To the extent that this case presents a question of law, namely, whether a person can be deemed unavaliable for work and thus ineligible for unemployment benefits due to a lack of trasportation, we answer in the affirmative. The Commonwealth contends, correctly in our view, that '(a)vailability places the responsibility of getting to work upon the claimant.' ² Other jurisdictions considering this question under analogous provisions of their own unemployment compensation laws have come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 84--85, 97 N.E.2d 762 (1951); Moya v. Employment Security Comm'n, 80 N.M. 39, 40, 450 P.2d 925 (1969); Kontner v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 148 Ohio St. 614, 620--621, 76 N.E.2d 611 (1947); Copeland v. Oklahoma Employment Security Comm'n, 197 Okl. 429, 432, 172 P.2d 420 (1946); Rabinowitz Unemployment Compensation Case, 177 Pa.Super. 236, 239--240, 110 A.2d 792 (1955); Inre Barcomb, 132 Vt. 225, 231, 315 A.2d 476 (1974).

The question then arises whether in the circumstances of this particular case the claimant, by making her acceptance of work dependent on whether transportation can be arranged, has so restricted her employability as to remove herself from the labor force and render herself not 'available for work' within the meaning of G.L. c. 151A, § 24(b). This is primarily a question of fact that has been entrusted to the informed judgment of the board. See Farrar v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 45, 50, 84 N.E.2d 540 (1949). In reviewing decisions of the board the courts of this Commonwealth are directed to 'give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the . . . (board), as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it.' G.L. c. 30A, § 14(8). Based on the record in this case it could be found that the claimant had effectively made herself unavailable for work. Applying the appropriate standards of appellate review outlined above, we cannot say in this case that the review examiner and the board of review erred in finding that the claimant did not meet the requirements for benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 24(b), or that their conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.

RAYTHEON CO. V. DIRECTOR OF DIV. OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 364 MASS. ---, 307 N.E.2D 330 (1974)^A, a case the claimant relies on heavily, is not to the contrary. In the Raytheon case, the claimant left a job on the night shift when a co-worker who had been providing her with transportation was laid off. The claimant sought but was unable to obtain work on other shifts. The issue presented was whether she left work 'voluntarily' so as to subject her to temporary disqualification under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), as amended through St.1973, c. 899, § 2. A review examiner decided that under the facts of that case her leaving was involuntary and that she was not disqualified; the board of review agreed. The Raytheon case does not compel a conclusion favorable to the present claimant. First, in Raytheon to court affirmed a decision of the board of review, applying the same standard of review as we do in the present case. Furthermore, Raytheon was concerned with a different section of C. 151A, and was construing a different statutory requirement. Whether a person has left work 'voluntarily' (§ 25(e)(1)), and whether she is 'available for work' once unemployed (§ 24(b)), are not identical questions. It is possible a person could leave a job for involuntary reasons and yet not be 'available for work,' e.g., on account of illness. In Raytheon, the question of the claimant's availability for work under § 24(b) was not at issue and was not addressed by the court.

Finally, we see nothing in the argument of the claimant that she has been denied equal protection. In the area of economics and social welfare, State classifications need not be perfect so long as they have some rational basis reasonably related to the purposes of the statutory program. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495, 94 S.Ct 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974). Unemployment compensation is not a social welfare program based on need but is specifically directed toward a class of unemployed persons who have been and continue to be attached to the labor force. 'Unemployment benefits are not for those who are incapable of working.' Rivers v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 323 Mass. 339, 342, 82 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1948). See Corrado v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 325 Mass. 711, 713, 92 N.E.2d 379 (1950). Cf. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130--131, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1971). Compare Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F.Supp. 1201 (N.D.Cal.1970), aff'd 403 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 2215, 29 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971), with United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). Under this type of program, availability for work is clearly a valid condition on eligibility for benefits, and the classification of a person unable to transport herself to employment opportunities as 'unavailable for work' cannot be considered arbitrary, irrational, or an invidious discrimination. It follows that the decision of the District Court judge should be affirmed.

So ordered.

QUIRICO, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the decision of this court upholding the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to the plaintiff. The sole issue in this case is whether, during the period for which the plaintiff seeks benefits, she was 'available for work and unable to obtain work' within the meaning of G.L. c. 151A, $ 24(b). She was in all other respects eligible for benefits.

The question whether the plaintiff was 'available for...