King v. McPherson Hosp.

• Decision Date: 19 October 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 284436.
• Citation: 810 N.W.2d 594,290 Mich.App. 299
• Parties: KING v. McPHERSON HOSPITAL.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

290 Mich.App. 299
810 N.W.2d 594

KING
v.
McPHERSON HOSPITAL.

Docket No. 284436.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 12, 2010, at Lansing.Decided Oct. 19, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.

[810 N.W.2d 594]

Mark Granzotto, P.C., Royal Oak (by Mark Granzotto), for Timothy King.

Johnson & Wyngaarden, P.C., Okemos (by David R. Johnson and Michael L. Van Erp), for McPherson Hospital.

Tanoury, Nauts, McKinney & Garbarino, P.L.L.C. (by William A. Tanoury and Anita Comorski, Detroit), for Michael Briggs, D.O., Merle Hunter, M.D., and Emergency Physicians Medical Group, P.C.

Before: KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY, O'CONNELL, TALBOT, WILDER, MURRAY, and FORT HOOD, JJ.

[810 N.W.2d 595]

MURRAY, J.

[290 Mich.App. 302] I. INTRODUCTION

The question presented to this panel is whether plaintiff may invoke MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) to reinstate a case after entry of a final judgment in favor of defendants because of a subsequent change or clarification in the law. In the prior decision in this case, King v. McPherson Hosp., 288 Mich.App. 801, 2010 WL 168635 (2010) ( King I ), the panel held that a plaintiff should be able to prevail under the court rule, but could not because of the prior decision in Farley v. Carp, 287 Mich.App. 1, 782 N.W.2d 508 (2010), with which it disagreed. Accordingly, the prior panel called for a vote of all members of the Court on whether to convene a conflict panel to resolve this dispute, MCR 7.215(J)(3)(a), which obviously a majority [290 Mich.App. 303] of the judges agreed to do. See King v. McPherson Hosp., 288 Mich.App. 801, 2010 WL 168635 (2010) (order vacating prior opinion). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court properly held that plaintiff could not reinstate the case under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f).

II. BACKGROUND

This case, as well as Farley and another pertinent case, Kidder v. Ptacin, 284 Mich.App. 166, 771 N.W.2d 806 (2009), involves the Supreme Court's decision in Mullins v. St. Joseph Mercy Hosp., 480 Mich. 948, 741 N.W.2d 300 (2007), in which the Court held that its prior holding in Waltz v. Wyse, 469 Mich. 642, 677 N.W.2d 813 (2004), had only limited retroactive application. Specifically, the Mullins Court held in its order:

We reverse the July 11, 2006, judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(G)(1). We conclude that this Court's decision in Waltz v. Wyse, 469 Mich. 642 [677 N.W.2d 813] (2004), does not apply to any causes of action filed after Omelenchuk v. City of Warren, 461 Mich. 567 [609 N.W.2d 177] (2000), was decided in which the saving period expired, i.e., two years had elapsed since the personal representative was appointed, sometime between the date that Omelenchuk was decided and within 182 days after Waltz was decided. All other causes of action are controlled by Waltz. In the instant case, because the plaintiff filed this action after Omelenchuk was decided and the saving period expired between the date that Omelenchuk was decided and within 182 days after Waltz was decided, Waltz is not applicable. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Washtenaw Circuit Court for entry of an order denying the defendants' motion for summary disposition and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. [ Mullins, 480 Mich. at 948, 741 N.W.2d 300.]

Because plaintiff's action fell within the “any causes of action” language and was otherwise within the [290 Mich.App. 304] pertinent time frame as described in Mullins, and plaintiff had litigated the statute-of-limitations issue up and down the judicial system, the prior panel held that relief should be available under the court rule. King I, 288 Mich.App. 801, 2010 WL 168635. We respectfully disagree.

III. ANALYSIS

As mentioned in the introduction, we hold that plaintiff cannot obtain relief from a final judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) based upon a partially retroactive change or clarification in the law because, as explained below, both the Michigan and United States Supreme Court, as well as our Court, have held that even a case given full retroactivity does not apply to a closed case, as this one was when Mullins was decided.

[810 N.W.2d 596]

We first have to recall that this case is before us on appeal from a trial court's grant of a motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). As explained in Heugel v. Heugel, 237 Mich.App. 471, 478–479, 603 N.W.2d 121 (1999):

In order for relief to be granted under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), the following three requirements must be fulfilled: (1) the reason for setting aside the judgment must not fall under subsections a through e, (2) the substantial rights of the opposing party must not be detrimentally affected if the judgment is set aside, and (3) extraordinary circumstances must exist that mandate setting aside the judgment in order to achieve justice. Altman v. Nelson, 197 Mich.App. 467, 478, 495 N.W.2d 826 (1992); McNeil v. Caro Community Hosp., 167 Mich.App. 492, 497, 423 N.W.2d 241 (1988). Generally, relief is granted under subsection f only when the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered. Altman, supra; McNeil, supra.

As recently noted in Rose v. Rose, 289 Mich.App. 45, 58, 795 N.W.2d 611 (2010), “[w]ell-settled policy considerations[290 Mich.App. 305] favoring finality of judgments circumscribe relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1),” and although relief under subrule (C)(1)(f) is the widest avenue for relief under this court rule, it nonetheless requires “the presence of both extraordinary circumstances and a demonstration that setting aside the judgment will not detrimentally affect the substantial rights of the opposing party.” And our caselaw has long recognized that this court rule “contemplates that extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from a judgment generally arise when the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of a party.” Id. at 62, 795 N.W.2d 611, citing Heugel, 237 Mich.App. at 479, 603 N.W.2d 121; see, also, Lark v. Detroit Edison Co., 99 Mich.App. 280, 283, 297 N.W.2d 653 (1980).

In order to obtain relief under this subsection, then, plaintiff had to prove that keeping in place a final judgment after the caselaw the judgment was based upon was partially retroactively reversed (i.e., the “circumstances”) was so extraordinary that plaintiff should be afforded relief and that doing so would not be detrimental to defendants. Such a conclusion cannot be squared with a clear and unequivocal rule from our Supreme Court, a rule that itself is premised on United States Supreme Court precedent. The rule, plainly and recently set forth in People v. Maxson, is that “ ‘ [n]ew legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed.’ ” People v. Maxson, 482 Mich. 385, 387, 759 N.W.2d 817 (2008), quoting Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995) (emphasis supplied).¹ The [290 Mich.App. 306] basis for this longstanding rule is that “at some point, ‘the rights of the parties should be considered frozen’....” Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745, quoting United States v. Donnelly Estate, 397 U.S. 286, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Sumner v. Gen. Motors Corp. (On Remand), 245 Mich.App. 653, 633 N.W.2d 1 (2001), our Court discussed this very point. Writing for the Court, Judge O'Connell explained why an intervening

[810 N.W.2d 597]

change of law was not a basis upon which to obtain relief from judgment:

In any event, we would not be inclined to grant relief from the judgment in Sumner I [ Sumner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 212 Mich.App. 694, 538 N.W.2d 112 (1995)]. An intervening change in law is not an appropriate basis for granting relief from a judgment; indeed, if it were, “it is not clear why all judgments rendered on the basis of a particular interpretation of law should not be reopened when the interpretation is substantially changed.” 2 Restatement Judgments, 2d, § 73, illustration 4, p. 200. [ Id. at 667, 538 N.W.2d 112.]

An earlier case coming to the same conclusion is Gillispie v. Detroit Housing Comm. Bd. of Tenant Affairs, 145 Mich.App. 424, 377 N.W.2d 864 (1985). There, the parties had agreed that a judgment after a trial should be entered in a particular, agreed-upon amount, and the defendant satisfied the judgment on January 20, 1984. Id. at 426, 377 N.W.2d 864. In August of that same year, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that a decision issued just after the judgment was entered ( Gage v. Ford Motor Co., 133 Mich.App. 366, 350 N.W.2d 257 [1984], aff'd in part and rev'd in part 423 Mich. 250, 377 N.W.2d 709 [1985] ) showed that the interest calculations used for the judgment were the result of a mutual mistake, GCR 1963, 528.3(1), which is now MCR 2.612(C)(1)(a). Id. at 426–427, 377 N.W.2d 864. The trial court denied the motion, and our Court affirmed. In discussing whether a subsequent decision should apply retroactively to a closed case, we stated:

[290 Mich.App. 307] Three considerations are often applied to control retroactivity: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the litigants' reliance on the old rule, and (3) the impact of the rule on the administration of justice. Consideration of the third factor alone militates in favor of denying the retroactive application of Gage to the present case. As the trial court noted, if Gage were to be applied to cases in which a satisfaction of judgment had already been executed, “[w]e could have 10,000 people coming back here and asking the court to change their judgments”. The court's concern is not without basis. The application of Gage to an action which is no longer pending could well open the floodgates to other litigants eager to increase their recovery and could lead to disasterous results in relation to matters properly considered closed.

Moreover, even if retroactive application was deemed fitting, it would not extend to cases in which the cause of action is no...