Koppel v. Ochoa

• Citation: 243 So.3d 886
• Decision Date: 17 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC16–1474,SC16–1474
• Parties: Donna KOPPEL, Petitioner, v. Laura OCHOA, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

243 So.3d 886

Donna KOPPEL, Petitioner,

v.Laura OCHOA, et al., Respondents.

No. SC16–1474

Supreme Court of Florida.

[May 17, 2018]

Anthony J. Russo of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, Florida; and Paul U. Chistolini of Smoak, Chistolini & Barnett, PLLC, Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner

George A. Vaka and Nancy A. Lauten of Vaka Law Group, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent Laura Ochoa

QUINCE, J.

We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Ochoa v. Koppel , 197 So.3d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), in which the district court certified conflict with Goldy v. Corbett Cranes Services, Inc. , 692 So.2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), regarding whether the filing of a motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 to enlarge the time to accept a proposal for settlement automatically tolls the 30–day deadline for accepting the proposal until the motion is decided. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a motion to enlarge does not toll the time to accept a proposal for settlement. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Second District and disapprove the decision of the Fifth District.

FACTS

The Second District set forth the following facts:

On December 9, 2011, Ms. Ochoa was injured in a crash with a car driven by Ms. Koppel. In April 2013, she sued Ms. Koppel, alleging negligence and seeking damages to compensate her for her injuries.

On September 3, 2013, Ms. Ochoa served Ms. Koppel with a proposal for settlement pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442. The proposal offered to dismiss the action with prejudice in exchange for a lump-sum payment by Ms. Koppel of $100,000. Rule 1.442(f)(1) provides that a proposal for settlement is "deemed rejected" if not accepted within thirty days after service of the proposal, and Ms. Ochoa's proposal stated that it would be withdrawn if not accepted within that time. On the same day she served the proposal, Ms. Ochoa filed a notice that the case was ready for trial.

On October 2, 2013—one day before the thirty-day period to accept the settlement proposal expired—Ms. Koppel filed a motion seeking to enlarge the time in which to respond to the proposal. The motion cited Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, which governs enlargements of time, and alleged that Ms. Koppel had not had sufficient time to evaluate the proposal because (1) she had recently received through discovery a new MRI report bearing on Ms. Ochoa's alleged injuries and (2) the case remained "in its infancy" and Ms. Ochoa's deposition had not been taken. Ms. Ochoa later filed a notice setting a hearing on the motion for December 2, 2013.

Although we do not have a transcript of the hearing, the parties agree that the court did not render a decision on December 2 and that it instead requested that the parties submit additional authorities on or before December 5. The day after the hearing, on December 3, 2013, Ms. Koppel served a notice purporting to accept the proposal for settlement. Two days later, on December 5, 2013, she provided the court with the authorities it had requested. Later that day, the court entered an order denying Ms. Koppel's request to enlarge the time in which to accept the proposal for settlement.

Ms. Ochoa next filed a motion to strike Ms. Koppel's notice accepting the proposal for settlement on grounds that it was untimely. Ms. Koppel opposed the motion and argued that under the Fifth District's decision in Goldy [v. Corbett Cranes Services, Inc. , 692 So.2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ], her filing of a motion to enlarge time under rule 1.090 tolled the thirty-day period in which she was authorized to accept the proposal. According to Ms. Koppel, the period remained tolled until the trial court denied her motion for enlargement of time on December 5, 2013. Ms. Koppel coupled her response to the motion to strike with a motion to enforce the settlement that she asserted was created by her acceptance of Ms. Ochoa's proposal for settlement.

After a hearing, the trial court agreed that Ms. Koppel's filing of a motion to enlarge time tolled the time she had to accept the settlement proposal, denied the motion to strike the notice of acceptance, and granted the motion to enforce settlement. The trial court then entered a final judgment dismissing Ms. Ochoa's case with prejudice based upon the proposal and acceptance. Ms. Ochoa timely appealed.

Ochoa , 197 So.3d at 78–79.

On appeal, the district court reversed the trial court, finding that the texts of rules 1.090 and 1.442 were "unambiguous in that neither contains language that could in any way be construed as providing that the time to accept a proposal for settlement is tolled when a motion to enlarge the time to do so is filed." Id. at 80. In rejecting Koppel's argument that Goldy was controlling, the court stated that the Fifth District's decision "seem[ed] ... inconsistent with the concept of a strictly construed deadline" and certified conflict. Id. at 83.

ANALYSIS

The conflict issue presented is whether the filing of a motion under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 to enlarge the time to accept a proposal for settlement automatically tolls the 30–day deadline for accepting the proposal until the motion is decided. The standard of review in determining whether an offer of settlement and purported acceptance comport with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), is de novo. Pratt v. Weiss , 161 So.3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015). Similarly, the standard of review of a court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure, in this case Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b), is also de novo. Strax Rejuvenation & Aesthetics Institute, Inc., v. Shield , 49 So.3d 741 (Fla. 2010).

Relevant Provisions

Section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2013), governs offers of judgment, and "provides a sanction against a party who unreasonably rejects a settlement offer." Willis Shaw Exp., Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. , 849 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003). Section 786.79 provides, in relevant part:

(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the award ....If a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand.

Rule 1.442 outlines the procedures that must be followed when implementing section 786.79. The rule provides, in relevant part:

(f) Acceptance and Rejection.

(1) A proposal shall be deemed rejected unless accepted by delivery of a written notice of acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal. The provisions of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(b) do not apply to this subdivision. No oral communications shall constitute an acceptance, rejection, or counteroffer under the provisions of this rule.

Rule 1.090(b) governs the enlargement of time periods established by the civil rules. It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time by order of court, by these rules, or by notice given thereunder, for cause shown the court at any time in its discretion (1) with or without notice, may order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made and notice after the expiration of the specified period, may permit the act to be done when failure to act was the result of excusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for making a motion for new trial, for rehearing, or to alter or amend a judgment; making a motion for relief from a judgment under rule 1.540(b); taking an appeal or filing a petition for certiorari; or making a motion for a directed verdict.

Certified Conflict

In Goldy , the conflict case, the plaintiff submitted an offer of judgment to the defendant. 692 So.2d at 226. In accordance with rule 1.442, the offer was set to expire in 30 days, on March 6. Id. The plaintiff then granted the defendant a gratuitous extension of time. Id. Under the extension, the offer would expire on March 29. Id. On March 14, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 1.090 to enlarge the time to respond to the offer. Id. In response, the plaintiff directed a letter to the defendant stating that the offer would be withdrawn and no longer effective after March 29. Id. The motion to extend was never heard by the trial court in view of the plaintiff's absolute withdrawal. Id.

The jury verdict exceeded the plaintiff's settlement offer by 125%. Id. at 226. Following the verdict, the plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions against the defendant. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the request for sanctions, finding that the plaintiff's offer was withdrawn and rendered void in the March 25 letter. Id. On appeal, the Fifth District agreed with the trial court, which held that the defendant's motion to extend time "effectively tolled the responsive period until the motion could be heard." Id. at 228. Thus, the offer did not expire on March 29 and instead was withdrawn on March 29. Id. Consequently, the district court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to sanctions under a settlement offer that had not yet expired but instead had been withdrawn.

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