Kruse v. Kruse
Decision Date | 09 November 2010 |
Docket Number | No. S-10-0077.,S-10-0077. |
Citation | 242 P.3d 1011,2010 WY 144 |
Parties | Jan KRUSE, n/k/a Jan Twyford, Appellant (Defendant), v. James KRUSE, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: C.M. Aron, Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Edward A. Buchanan of Sawyer, Warren & Buchanan, Torrington, Wyoming.
Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] This is an appeal from the district court's distribution in a divorce decree of two specific assets. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
[¶ 2] 1. Whether property separately reserved to a spouse by prenuptial agreement can be disregarded in considering where the parties will be left by a divorce?
2. Where a prenuptial agreement states that pre-marriage property will be the separate property of each spouse, can the district court disregard the exclusivity of that provision by also treating the pre-marriage portion of marital property as separate property?
[¶ 3] After entering into a prenuptial agreement, the parties married on August 16, 2000. The appellant (Wife) filed for divorce on October 3, 2008. The appellee (Husband) answered and counterclaimed a few weeks later. The district court tried the case on August 17, 2009, issued a decision letter on September 4, 2009, and entered a divorce decree on March 2, 2010.
[¶ 4] The prenuptial agreement is not in the record, and there is no trial transcript, but the parties do not dispute the district court's recitation of the agreement provision that underlies this dispute:
[¶ 5] Wife did not in the district court contest the prenuptial agreement or the distribution of assets each party owned before the marriage, nor does she do so now. She contests only the district court's distribution of two particular assets: (1) a brokerage account established after the marriage by Husband in both their names; and (2) a house owned by Husband before the marriage, but deeded to both parties after the marriage. The district court distributed the brokerage account to Husband in its entirety because it had been established with funds inherited by him. The district court divided the value of the house between the parties in a manner that will be discussed more fully below.
[¶ 6] We recently re-stated the standard we apply in reviewing a district court's division of the parties' property in a divorce:
Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2009 WY 140, ¶ 8, 220 P.3d 498, 501 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Pittman v. Pittman, 999 P.2d 638, 640 (Wyo.2000)). For some time, we held that an error of law under the circumstances also constituted an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 254 (Wyo.1997); Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Wyo.1996); and Lund v. Lund, 849 P.2d 731, 738 (Wyo.1993). That position was abandoned in Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998), however, because "a court does not enjoy any discretion with respect to an error of law." Instead, we focus upon "the question of reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court." Id.
[¶ 7] The appealing party "has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence adduced before the district court did not support the property division as a whole." Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 917, 921 (Wyo.2003). Where the record does not contain a transcript of the trial, and where the record has not been settled pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03, we are left to presume that the evidence supported the district court's findings. Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo.2007); Seherr-Thoss v. Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 111, ¶ 24, 141 P.3d 705, 716 (Wyo.2006).
Whether property separately reserved to a spouse by prenuptial agreement can be disregarded in considering where the parties will be left by a divorce?
[¶ 8] The district court's exercise of discretion in distributing the property of divorcing parties is guided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2009), which reads as follows:
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party.
[¶ 9] Our interpretation of this statute for application by the district court has been as follows:
"There are no specific guidelines as to how much weight is given to each of the factors;" the "trial court has the discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors." Barney v. Barney, 705 P.2d 342, 346 (Wyo.1985); Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo.2004). There are " 'no hard and fast rules' governing property divisions." Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo.1980) ( quoting Young v. Young, 472 P.2d 784, 785 (Wyo.1970)).
Stoker v. Stoker, 2005 WY 39, ¶ 22, 109 P.3d 59, 65 (Wyo.2005).
[¶ 10] As mentioned above, Wife only takes issue in this appeal with the district court's distribution of two assets. See supra ¶ 5. The first disputed asset-a $75,000 brokerage account held by the parties under joint ownership-was distributed to Husband "as his inheritance was the sole source of the funds." Distribution of the second disputed asset-a house owned by Husband before the marriage-was a bit more complex. The district court stated its reasoning as follows in its decision letter:
[¶ 11] We will affirm the district court's holding in regard to the first stated issue, for several reasons. First, the gravamen of Wife's complaint, given her wording of the issue, is that, in considering the statutory factor of how the parties would be left after the divorce, the district court should not have disregarded the parties' pre-marriage property governed by the prenuptial agreement. Without the evidentiary basis that might be...
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