Kwok T. v. Mauriello

Decision Date22 November 1977
Citation43 N.Y.2d 213,401 N.Y.S.2d 52
Parties, 371 N.E.2d 814 In the Matter of KWOK T., a person alleged to be a juvenile delinquent, Respondent, v. Neil MAURIELLO, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

JASEN, Judge.

On February 20, 1975, two police officers assigned to an anti-crime unit investigating youth gangs in New York's "Chinatown" spotted a juvenile for whom a Family Court warrant was outstanding. Having parked their patrol car, the officers returned to the location where they had seen the juvenile only to find that he was no longer there. In an attempt to determine his whereabouts, the officers decided to investigate a nearby clubhouse known to be frequented by the juvenile. While outside these premises, the police officers observed five boys exiting from the clubhouse. When four of the boys, including the respondent, crossed the street, the police stopped and questioned the group.

In the course of their inquiry, the police obtained from one of the boys photographs depicting the respondent holding firearms. Seeking to determine the immediate location of the weapons displayed in the photographs, the police focused their questioning upon the respondent. In response to this questioning, the respondent admitted possessing two guns and led the police to his home where the guns were seized and the respondent arrested. Prior to his arrest, respondent was not advised of his rights either with regard to the assistance of counsel or of his right to remain silent.

The Family Court denied a motion to suppress the seized weapons and, after a trial, adjudicated the respondent a juvenile delinquent. The Appellate Division reversed, on the law, granted the motion to suppress the physical evidence, and dismissed the proceeding. The court was of the opinion that the interrogation of the respondent after the discovery of the photographs was custodial within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 and, therefore, the police were required to give the respondent the necessary warnings before conducting their interrogation.

On this appeal, by the People, it is argued that the respondent was not in custody during the street investigative inquiry and, thus, preinterrogation advice and warnings were not required prior to the inquiry.

Once again, we are asked to draw a line between conduct which is a permissible exercise of the investigative function of the police and conduct which must be characterized as a seizure, which places the individual interrogated in custody, necessitating the giving of preinterrogation warnings. At what precise point in a street encounter the police are required to give an individual preinterrogation warnings is a question which cannot be resolved by resort to a simplistic answer. Certainly, "there is no litmus-paper test for determining what kind or degree of interference with one's freedom of action brings the (fifth) amendment into play." (La Fave, "Street Encounter and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 Mich.L.Rev. 40, 97.)

In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined custodian interrogation as " questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person had been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (384 U.S., at p. 444, 86 S.Ct., at p. 1612, supra.) There is, of course, a wide spectrum of police conduct separating custodial interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere and an investigative inquiry addressed to an individual during a street encounter. To be sure, an interrogation held in an environment selected deliberately to subjugate the will of an individual may not proceed without the police informing the individual of his rights. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at pp. 457-478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, supra; People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228, 233 N.E.2d 255, 257.) However, routine police investigation of suspicious conduct on the street generally does not entail a significant deprivation of freedom which would require Miranda warnings. (See People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d, at pp. 10-11, 286 N.Y.S.2d, at pp. 233-234, 233 N.E.2d, at pp. 260-261, supra.)

Often police may not have probable cause to arrest an individual, but only a reasonable suspicion that he is engaged in criminal activity. Lacking probable cause the police may not lawfully place an individual in custody. Nonetheless, to ensure effective law enforcement the police have the right to stop and inquire as to the conduct of an individual whom they have reasonable suspicion to believe has committed a crime. (See People v. Cantor,36 N.Y.2d 106, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 324 N.E.2d 872; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562; People v. Stewart, 41 N.Y.2d 65, 390 N.Y.S.2d 870, 359 N.E.2d 379; People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 359 N.E.2d 402.)

Certainly, in a brief street encounter in which the police suspect an individual of some criminal activity, it should not be required that warnings be given before questions are asked. To do so would unnecessarily hamper the ability of the police to thwart criminal activity. The need for allowing police a certain degree of latitude in this area is amply demonstrated in the present case.

While in search of a juvenile for whom a warrant had been issued by Family Court, two police officers stopped and questioned a group of boys exiting from a clubhouse which the officers were aware had been frequented in the past by the juvenile wanted on the warrant. As a result of their inquiry, the officers obtained from one of the boys, other than the respondent, photographs depicting the respondent holding weapons. At this point, although the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest the respondent since they did not know whether he still possessed the guns, they certainly had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime may have been committed,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
87 cases
  • People v. Ryan
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • December 1, 1986
    ... ... denied 26 N.Y.2d 883, 309 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 258 N.E.2d 223, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89; Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814). Moreover, in reviewing the suppression court's findings on the issue of whether the ... ...
  • People v. Alba
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1980
    ... ... whether the ensuing warrantless frisk or search was justified because the "exigencies of the situation made that course imperative" (Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56, 371 N.E.2d 814, 818). A "Terry " emergency frisk is permissible where the officer has reason to believe ... ...
  • People v. Smith
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • February 3, 1983
    ... ... Rodney, P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255; People v. Kwok, T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814]. The People adduced proof to show that on May 21, 1981, the defendant was in the ... ...
  • People v. Gibson
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • May 29, 2014
    ... ... does not justify a warrantless entry” ( People v. Lott, 102 A.D.2d 506, 509, 478 N.Y.S.2d 193 [1984], citing Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 220–221, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814 [1977];see People v. Coles, 105 A.D.3d at 1363, 966 N.Y.S.2d 288;compare People v ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT