Lambert v. LQ Mgmt.

• Decision Date: 14 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–835.,12–835.
• Citation: 426 S.W.3d 437,2013 Ark. 114,2013 Ark. App. 114
• Parties: John R. LAMBERT, II, Petitioner v. LQ MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. Respondent.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2013 Ark. 114

2013 Ark. App. 114

426 S.W.3d 437

John R. LAMBERT, II, Petitioner

v.LQ MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. Respondent.

No. 12–835.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 14, 2013.

Sutter & Gillham, PLLC, by: Luther Oneal Sutter, Little Rock, for petitioner.

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by: Andrew T. Turner, for respondent.

KAREN R. BAKER, Justice.

This case involves a question of Arkansas law certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6–8 (2012). On October 11, 2012, we accepted the certified question in Lambert v. LQ Management, L.L.C., 2012 Ark. 391, 2012 WL 4848966(per curiam). The certified question is as follows:

By enacting Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–118–107, did the Arkansas General Assembly intend to revive the individual cause of action for common-law remedies for retaliation under Arkansas workers' compensation law which it expressly annulled at Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–107?

We conclude that the answer is no.

On November 1, 2011, Petitioner, John R. Lambert, II, filed a complaint against Respondent, LQ Management, L.L.C. (“LQ Management”) in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes. Lambert sought to recover damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 (Supp.2011). On February 3, 2012, the case was removed to federal court. After removal, on February 10, 2012, LQ Management filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the claim for retaliation had been abolished under Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 and therefore, Lambert failed to state a claim. Lambert responded that he was seeking relief allowed under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107, the crime victims' civil-liability statute for felonious conduct. On September 17, 2012, both parties jointly requested that the present question be certified to this court. After we accepted the certified question, both parties filed briefs, and the Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce and Associated Industries of Arkansas, Inc. (as amici curiae) filed a brief as well.

The certified question presents an issue of statutory construction. The two statutes at issue are Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 under the Workers' Compensation Act, and § 16–118–107.

In 1993, the General Assembly passed Act 796 and made comprehensive revisions to the Workers' Compensation Act. 1993 Ark. Acts 796; Ark.Code Ann. §§ 11–9–101 to –1001 (Repl.2012). Section 6 of Act 796 codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 provides,

(a)(1) Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on account of the individual's claim for benefits under this chapter, or who in any manner obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under this chapter, shall be subject to a fine of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as determined by the Workers' Compensation Commission.

....

(c) The employer may also be guilty of a Class D felony.

....

e) A purpose of this section is to preserve the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annul any case law inconsistent herewith, including, but not necessarily limited to: Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).

Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 (Repl.2012).

Subsection (e) provides that the remedies for willful discrimination under the workers' compensation statutes are the exclusive remedy. See alsoArk.Code Ann. § 11–9–105(a) Subsection (e) also explicitly annulled this court's case law permitting the additional recovery of damages by individuals on account of discriminatory treatment by the employer for filing a workers' compensation claim. Since section 11–9–107's enactment in 1993, no changes have been made to the statute.

Four years later, in 1997, the General Assembly enacted Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107. This statute, “Civil Action by Crime Victim,” allows for the recovery of damages by victims of felonious conduct and provides,

(a)(1) Any person injured or damaged by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law may file a civil action to recover damages based on the conduct.

....

(c) The remedy provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies in law or equity.

(d) This section does not apply to offenses under § 5–28–101 et seq. or § 5–55–101 et seq.

Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 (Supp.2011). Accordingly, Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5–28–101 et seq. (Supp.2011) (Abuse of Adults Act) and Ark.Code Ann. § 5–55–101 (Supp.2011) (Fraud Against Government Act) are specifically excepted from Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107.

Lambert contends that Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 allows him independent relief separate from Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 and permits him to recover additional damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107. Lambert asserts that by enacting Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107, the General Assembly provided additional remedies for willful violations of the workers' compensation laws because interference with the filing of a workers' compensation claim may constitute a Class D felony. As a result, he contends that the victims of a Class D felony arising from retaliation-related claims have the right to recover additional damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107. Lambert further argues that in harmonizing the two statutes and reading the two together, Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 provides that an employer's conduct “may be a felony,” and Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 allows for recovery of additional damages for such conduct. Finally, Lambert contends that this interpretation is clear because certain offenses are specifically excepted from suit under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107, Ark.Code Ann. § 5–28–101 et seq., and § 5–55–101 et seq.; but, Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 was not listed as an exception. Lambert asserts that if the General Assembly had intended for Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 to be excepted from the recovery of additional damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107, it would have expressly done so.

LQ Management responds that § 6 of Act 796 annulled the common-law-retaliation cause of action and reaffirms the exclusive-remedy doctrine. It further asserts that the Act provides two remedies: to treat the retaliation as a crime, and to provide an administrative procedure where the employer could be fined. Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107(a)(1) & (c) (Repl.2012). However, LQ Management explains that these remedies under the Act are exclusive and that there are no additional remedies available. It further argues that the language of Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 does not repeal or modify the exclusive-remedy doctrine or otherwise reinstate the common-law action of retaliation. LQ Management contends that the statutes address different subject matters and are not similar or related and cannot be harmonized. Finally, LQ Management responds that an “additional remedy” under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–118–107 cannot be harmonized with an exclusive remedy under Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–107 because the General Assembly intended for the Workers' Compensation Act to be an exclusive-remedy act.

In reviewing these statutes, the basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature by giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. Ark. Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. City of Bentonville, 351 Ark. 289, 92 S.W.3d 47 (2002). “When a statute is clear, it is given its plain meaning, and we will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. In other words, if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the analysis need go no further.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard's Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 52, 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001). This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Id., 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001). Further, we must give effect to the specific statute over the general. Searcy Farm Supply, LLC v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 369 Ark. 487, 256 S.W.3d 496 (2007). “This court has long held that a general statute must yield to a specific statute involving a particular subject matter.” Comcast of Little Rock, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 2011 Ark. 431, at 9, 385 S.W.3d 137, 142–43.

Additionally, we have outlined our statutory-construction rules regarding repeal by implication on numerous occasions. “A statute of a general nature does not repeal a more specific statute unless there is a plain, irreconcilable conflict between the two.” Winston v. Robinson, 270 Ark. 996, 1001, 606 S.W.2d 757, 760 (1980). Repeal by implication is recognized in only two situations: (1) where the statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, and (2) where the legislature takes up the whole subject anew, covering the entire subject matter of the earlier statute and adding provisions clearly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the former provision. Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261, 2011 WL 2412740.

Finally, we must strictly construe the workers' compensation statutes. Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–704(c)(3) (Repl.2012). “This court recognizes its duty to strictly construe workers' compensation statutes pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 11–9–704(c)(3) (Repl.1996). Strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. The doctrine of strict construction...