Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn

• Decision Date: 10 April 2000
• Citation: 271 A.D.2d 494,705 N.Y.S.2d 661
• Parties: SUSAN LANGFORD, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN et al., Defendants, and NICHOLAS SIVILLO, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

271 A.D.2d 494

705 N.Y.S.2d 661

SUSAN LANGFORD, Appellant,

v.ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN et al., Defendants, and NICHOLAS SIVILLO, Respondent.

Decided April 10, 2000.

Santucci, J. P., Sullivan and Florio, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as purportedly granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate the order dated January 9, 1998, and thereupon granted the motion of the defendants, other than Nicholas Sivillo, for summary judgment on the merits, is dismissed as the plaintiff's motion remains pending and undecided (see, Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs payable by the appellant.

The complaint asserted causes of action alleging, inter alia, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and battery, allegedly arising from a sexual relationship the plaintiff had with the defendant Monsignor Nicholas Sivillo. The relationship between Sivillo and the plaintiff commenced in 1989 when, after being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, the plaintiff "looked to God for direction". When the plaintiff's condition went into remission, the plaintiff believed it was due to Sivillo's prayers. While the relationship between Sivillo and the plaintiff initially involved spiritual counseling, it later evolved to include a sexual component. In 1992, the plaintiff began seeing a therapist and eventually she determined that Sivillo had manipulated and used her. According to the plaintiff's pleadings, each time Sivillo physically touched her, it was intentional, offensive, and unwelcome, but she acquiesced because she did not want to lose her spiritual link and her "best friend".

The cause of action alleging that Sivillo negligently handled the counseling relationship in fact stated a claim for malpractice (see, Scott v Uljanov, 74 NY2d 673; Gross v Kurk, 224 AD2d 582). As such, it was properly dismissed because any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters excessive entanglement with religion (see, Joshua S. v Casey, 206 AD2d 839; Schmidt v Bishop, 779 F Supp 321).

Further, the gravamen of the cause of action labeled as one to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, was clearly that Sivillo was guilty of clergy malpractice (see, Schmidt v Bishop, supra). The plaintiff, under the care of a psychiatrist because of suicidal thoughts, sought religious and spiritual counseling from Sivillo and any breach of Sivillo's fiduciary duties can only be construed as clergy malpractice, since it would clearly require a determination concerning Sivillo's duties as a member of the clergy offering religious counseling to the plaintiff. Further, while the dissent urges recognition of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, as the trial court stated, this would require the courts to "venture into forbidden ecclesiastical terrain". The same is true for the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress and therefore, that cause of action was also properly dismissed.

Finally, the cause of action allegedly based on breach of fiduciary duty, as well as the remaining causes of action alleging intentional torts, were untimely, as the one-year Statute of Limitations had run before this action was commenced. Regardless of how they were pleaded, these causes of action sought to recover damages for the unwelcome, intentional sexual conduct by Sivillo and were thus governed by a one-year Statute of Limitations (see, Tserotas v Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 251 AD2d 323; Sharon B. v Reverend S., 244 AD2d 878; Jones v Trane, 153 Misc 2d 822). Inasmuch as Sivillo interposed an affirmative defense which alleged that the causes of action for intentional or willful acts, including, but not limited to those labeled as such by the plaintiff, were untimely, the Statute of Limitations defense was not waived.

The plaintiff's claims concerning her motion to vacate the order dated January 9, 1998, which granted a motion by the remaining defendants for summary judgment upon her default in opposing the motion, are not properly before this Court as the order appealed from did not decide that motion (see, Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536, supra).

S. Miller, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and votes to modify the order appealed from by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Nicholas Sivillo which was to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion and reinstating that cause of action with the following memorandum:

I cannot concur in so much of the Majority's decision as holds that the plaintiff may not recover damages under a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. In my opinion, the plaintiff's allegations and the evidence in the record fully support such a theory—one that is gaining recognition throughout the country as a result of the disturbingly frequent incidence of sexual predation by clergymen against vulnerable members of their flocks.

I disagree with the Majority's conclusion that the plaintiff's cause of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty is equivalent to a cause of action for clergy malpractice. These two causes of action are markedly distinct, as will be demonstrated below.

I disagree most significantly with the Majority's holding that any attempt to define the duty of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters "excessive entanglement with religion". That holding will establish appellate precedent shielding from civil judicial examination even the most flagrant clerical misconduct perpetrated upon vulnerable parishioners, children as well as adults. The injured will be deprived of any recourse short of criminal prosecution. The miscreant clergy, unsanctioned, will remain free to continue undeterred. Such a holding flies in the face of precedent firmly established in this State (see, First Presbyt. Church v United Presbyt. Church, 62 NY2d 110, 119-121, cert denied 469 US 1037; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, cert denied 464 US 817). Moreover, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was not intended to protect the misconduct of clergy where examination of their conduct does not require any inquiry into church doctrine (see, Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 215; Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v Smith, 494 US 872, 879-890; First Presbyt. Church v United Presbyt. Church, supra; Avitzur v Avitzur, supra; Moses v Diocese of Colorado, 863 P2d 310, 319-321 [Colo], cert denied 511 US 1137). Clearly no examination of church doctrine is required in order for the plaintiff's claims against her priest to be heard.

FACTS

For purposes of this appeal, the following facts have been alleged and not expressly controverted. In February 1988, the plaintiff, Susan Langford, began suffering from vision problems that were diagnosed as symptoms of optic neuritis and she was told that this condition was a common precursor to multiple sclerosis. In January 1989, Langford was diagnosed as suffering from multiple sclerosis. Feeling fearful, hopeless, and suicidal, Langford turned to her parish church, the defendant Our Lady of Hope, for direction and counseling regarding the effects of her disease. In February 1989 she first spoke with the defendant, Monsignor Nicholas Sivillo.

Sivillo visited Langford's home where she confided in him her fears, anxieties, and sense of hopelessness. He consoled her with assurances that he would beseech the Lord to fill her with peace. Shortly thereafter, Langford saw a psychiatrist who recommended that Langford not be left alone because of her suicidal tendencies. Sivillo visited Langford's home three to four times per week and counseled Langford regarding her life, her personal problems, her depression, her marriage, and her future, while also continuing to assure her that God would not forsake her and that he (Sivillo) was her "lifeline". Several months later, the multiple sclerosis went into remission and Sivillo told Langford that it was his prayers that "made her better". He continued to counsel her regularly.

One day in May 1990 Sivillo visited Langford and told her that he loved her. At this juncture he transformed their relationship from priest/counsellor and parishioner to sexual predator and victim. Although he acknowledged that he had taken a vow of celibacy, he told Langford that celibacy prevented only sexual intercourse, and that any relations besides intercourse were condoned by the church as part of the "human condition". Langford began to cry and declared that their relationship must end because of his advances, after which Sivillo grabbed and hugged Langford, telling her that only his prayers were keeping her well and preventing her illness from recurring. On the following day Sivillo explained that Langford needed him to continue her recovery. Convinced that Sivillo was indeed her "lifeline" without whose counseling her physical condition would certainly regress, Langford succumbed to his advances and began to have sexual intercourse with him. The sexual relationship continued from 1990 through 1993, during which time Sivillo even met with Langford's husband and advised him "to move on with his life" because their marriage was not salvageable. When Langford and Sivillo met, he supplied tranquilizers to calm Langford's anxiety.

Despite pressures exerted by Sivillo to induce Langford to keep their relationship a secret, in 1992 Langford began seeing a secular therapist to help her resolve her anxiety and inner conflicts. With the aid of her therapist, Langford slowly realized that Sivillo had manipulated her, and she began seeing him less frequently. She saw Sivillo only four times in 1994, but he...