Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 16 May 2019
• Docket Number: SJC-12660,SJC-12625
• Citation: 122 N.E.3d 532,482 Mass. 325
• Parties: LAZLO L., a juvenile v. COMMONWEALTH. Miles M., a juvenile v. Commonwealth.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

482 Mass. 325

122 N.E.3d 532

LAZLO L., a juvenile

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Miles M., a juvenile

v.Commonwealth.

SJC-12625

SJC-12660

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued April 4, 2019

Decided May 16, 2019

Melissa Allen Celli (Katherine J. Perry-Lorentz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for Miles M.

Eva G. Jellison (Stephanie Stolk Ormsby, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for Lazlo L.

Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, & David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Benjamin L. Falkner, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Mary E. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Bristol District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

GANTS, C.J.

Before July 12, 2018, "a child between seven and [eighteen] who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the commonwealth" could be adjudicated a "delinquent child" in the Juvenile Court. See G. L. c. 119, § 52, as amended through St. 2013, c. 84, § 7; G. L. c. 119, § 58. On and after that date, as a result of the enactment of St. 2018, c. 69, entitled "An Act relative to criminal justice reform" (act), a child who commits an offense before the age of twelve or who commits a civil infraction, violates a municipal ordinance or town bylaw, or commits a first offense of a misdemeanor "for which the punishment is a fine, imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than [six] months or both such fine and imprisonment" can no longer be adjudicated a "delinquent child." St. 2018, c. 69, § 72.¹ The cases before us concern two juveniles who allegedly committed offenses before July 12, 2018, but whose cases remained pending before the Juvenile Court on and after that date. There is no dispute that, if their cases had been adjudicated before July 12, each could have been subject to adjudication as a "delinquent child." There is also no dispute that, if they had committed the same offenses on or after July 12, neither juvenile could be adjudicated a "delinquent child" under the amended definition of that term because of age (in the case of Lazlo L.² ) or because of the nature of the offenses (in the case of Miles M.³ ).

The issue presented on appeal is whether the amended definition of "delinquent child" should be applied retroactively to cases pending on July 12, 2018. We conclude that it should, and that a child may not be adjudicated a "delinquent child" on and after this date if he or she does not fit within the definition of that term as amended by the act. We therefore vacate the orders denying the juveniles' motions to dismiss, and remand both matters to the Juvenile Court, where an order of dismissal for each case shall issue.⁴

Background. 1. Lazlo. At the time of the events at issue, Lazlo was eleven years old and living with his mother and stepfather.

The complainant, A.M.,⁵ is the juvenile's stepsister. She lived primarily with her mother, but would occasionally spend the night at her father's (Lazlo's stepfather's) home. A.M. alleges that on one such night in 2017, when she was thirteen, Lazlo entered her bedroom uninvited and performed unwanted sexual acts upon her.

On April 10, 2018, a complaint issued charging Lazlo with one count of rape and abuse of a child in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23. On June 13, Lazlo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint prior to arraignment, arguing that the act's amended definition of "delinquent child" should apply retroactively to his case, and that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate him a "delinquent child" because he was eleven years old at the time of the alleged offense. The Commonwealth opposed the motion to dismiss, and the motion judge denied it.⁶ Lazlo's case was pending when the amended definition of "delinquent child" became effective, and remains so.

2. Miles. On June 13, 2018, police filed an application for a complaint against Miles for trespassing in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120, and disorderly conduct in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 53 (b ). The following day, a Juvenile Court clerk found that both charges were supported by probable cause. A delinquency complaint issued against Miles on June 15. When he appeared for arraignment on July 9, Miles moved to dismiss the charges against him prior to arraignment, arguing that because he had no prior criminal or delinquency record, neither charged offense was a qualifying offense under the amended definition of "delinquent child."⁷

The Juvenile Court judge denied Miles's motion to dismiss, as well as his request to postpone the arraignment. The judge asserted that the act did not apply to the juvenile's case because he was not charged with a school-based offense or a civil infraction. The judge further reasoned that arraignment was proper because "[t]here are no fines that are affixed under the juvenile law" and because the Department of Youth Services (department) "is not a place of incarceration," but one of rehabilitation. The Juvenile Court judge proceeded to arraign Miles, and his case was pending when the amended definition of "delinquent child" became effective (and remains pending).

3. Petitions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. Both juveniles filed interlocutory petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, requesting that a single justice of the county court exercise this court's general superintendence power to reverse the decisions of the Juvenile Court judges in their respective cases. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported both cases for determination by the full court.

Discussion. Because this case turns on a question of statutory interpretation, we review the juveniles' motions to dismiss de novo. Commonwealth v. Martin, 476 Mass. 72, 75, 63 N.E.3d 1107 (2016). The parties agree that neither juvenile could qualify as a "delinquent child" under the term's amended definition.⁸ The only question, then, is whether this definition should be applied retroactively to cases, such as these, that were pending at the time that definition became effective.

1. Statutory presumption of prospective application. To determine whether the amended definition of "delinquent child" applies retroactively, we first must determine whether the rule of statutory construction described in G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second, is applicable here. General Laws c. 4, § 6, Second, provides in relevant part:

"In construing statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute: ... Second, The repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an offence committed ... under the statute repealed" (emphasis added).

Because this particular rule of construction applies only to "strictly penal" statutes, Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 99, 966 N.E.2d 811 (2012), quoting Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. 584, 588, 171 N.E.2d 157 (1961), we must decide whether the repeal accomplished through the amended definition of "delinquent child" in St. 2018, c. 69, § 72, affects a penal statute.⁹ If it does, the new "delinquent child" definition is presumptively prospective in its application, that is, it would apply only to cases adjudicating offenses that were committed on or after July 12, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 497-498, 735 N.E.2d 1222 (2000) ("When the conduct triggering the statute's application occurs on or after its effective date, the statute's application is deemed prospective ...").

The juveniles argue that G. L. c. 4, § 6, is not applicable here because the Juvenile Court is not a penal institution and the department's purpose is rehabilitation, not punishment. They contend that a statute articulating the jurisdiction of a nonpenal institution cannot qualify as a "strictly penal" statute subject to the rule of construction outlined in G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second.¹⁰ The juveniles are correct that that our statutes governing the adjudication of children "shall be liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance." G. L. c. 119, § 53. In accord with that statutory principle, we have recognized that the "rehabilitation of the child remains front and center" in the Juvenile Court, Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 654, 1 N.E.3d 237 (2013), and that delinquency is "legally and constitutionally different from crime." Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 506, 36 N.E.3d 12 (2015), quoting Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651-652, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1959). See G. L. c. 119, § 53 ("Proceedings against children ... shall not be deemed criminal proceedings").

A statute, however, need not be criminal to be penal. Any "statute designed to enforce the law by punishing offenders, rather than simply by enforcing restitution to those damaged, is in the nature of a penal statute." Johnson's Case, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 834, 838, 872 N.E.2d 1131 (2007), quoting Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686, 488 N.E.2d 401 (1986). A child adjudicated delinquent in a Juvenile Court may suffer a loss of liberty, including commitment to the department. See G. L. c. 119, § 58.¹¹ Even if the purpose of commitment is "primarily rehabilitative," Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 461, 961 N.E.2d 581 (2012), a deprivation of liberty imposed by the State as a direct...