Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 November 1995
• Citation: 421 Mass. 344,657 N.E.2d 224
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: , 104 Ed. Law Rep. 1302 William J. LEARY v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another. 1

Page 224

657 N.E.2d 224

421 Mass. 344, 104 Ed. Law Rep. 1302

William J. LEARY v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD & another. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 2, 1995.

Decided Nov. 14, 1995.

Michael J. Long, Quincy, for plaintiff.

Peter Sacks, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY and FRIED, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

At issue is whether salary earned out-of-State is "regular compensation" within the meaning of G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a ) (1994 Ed.). An administrative magistrate ruled in favor of the plaintiff, William J. Leary, but the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB), relying on the definitions of "employee" and "regular compensation" in G.L. c. 32, § 1 (1994 Ed.), affirmed the Teachers' Retirement Board's (TRB) refusal to consider the out-of-State salary figures. A Superior Court judge affirmed CRAB's decision. We transferred the case here on our own motion. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

1. Facts. William J. Leary served first as a teacher and then as a superintendent in the Boston public schools from 1954 through 1975. From 1978 through 1988, Leary worked as a superintendent in New York and Florida. He returned to Massachusetts in 1989 and began employment as superintendent of the Gloucester public schools. On his return to Massachusetts, Leary requested information regarding the purchase of credit for his out-of-State service in New York and Florida. TRB notified Leary that pursuant to G.L. c. 32, § 3(4) (1994 Ed.) he could purchase up to ten years of creditable service for services performed out-of-State. Leary then inquired whether his Florida salary figures, which were considerably higher than his in-State salary figures, could be used in calculating the amount of his retirement allowance. ² TRB informed Leary that the Florida figures could not be used. Leary appealed this decision to CRAB. ³ CRAB affirmed TRB's decision as did the Superior Court judge.

2. The statute. "[S]tatutory language itself is the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose." Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). "[W]e need not look beyond the words of the statute where the language is plain and unambiguous." State Bd. of Retirement v. Boston Retirement Bd., 391 Mass. 92, 94, 460 N.E.2d 194 (1984). General Laws c. 32, § 5(2)(a ), ⁴ sets out three separate and independent factors to be considered in determining annual benefits: three-year highest average annual rate of regular compensation, age, and number of years and full months of creditable service. Leary contends that his purchase of creditable service for his work in Florida affects his high average rate of regular compensation and his number of years and full months of creditable service. We conclude, however, that when Leary purchased credit for out-of-State service, he was affecting only the number of years and full months of creditable service. ⁵

"Regular compensation" is defined in G.L. c. 32, § 1, as "the full salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form, lawfully determined for the individual service of the employee by the employing authority ..." (emphasis added). The meaning of "regular compensation," therefore, depends on the meaning of the term "employee." "Employee" is defined "as applied to persons whose regular compensation ... is paid by any political subdivision of the commonwealth ... [as] any person who is regularly employed in the service of any such political subdivision." Because Leary was neither regularly employed in the service of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth nor paid by any political subdivision of the Commonwealth while employed in Florida, the compensation paid to him by Florida is not "regular compensation" within the statutory definition.

The words "regular compensation" are modified in G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a ), by the clause "received by such member during any period of three consecutive years of creditable service." That does not imply, as argued by Leary, that all compensation received for creditable service must be treated as regular compensation. This clause ensures that only years of creditable service are considered in determining the highest three-year average annual rate of regular compensation. ⁶ It does not alter the definition of regular compensation.

Our construction of § 5(2)(a ) is consistent with a reading of the entire statute. See Williams v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 304 Mass. 601, 605, 24 N.E.2d 525 (1939) (statute ought to be construed, whenever possible, as a whole). See also Negron v. Gordon, 373 Mass. 199, 201, 366 N.E.2d 241 (1977), quoting Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, 250 (1823) ("When the meaning of any particular section or clause of a statute is questioned, it is proper, no doubt, to look into the other parts of the statute: otherwise the different sections of the same statute might be so construed as to be repugnant, and the intention of the legislature might be defeated"). Our reading is further supported by G.L. c. 32, § 3(4) (1994 Ed.), which provides for the purchase of credit for out-of-State service. ⁷

Leary's assertion that § 3(4) alters § 5(2)(a ) does not give effect to the absence of any provision for out-of-State compensation in the definition of regular compensation. Although very detailed, G.L. c. 32, § 3(4), does not provide that out-of-State compensation should be included in the calculation of retirement benefits. In these circumstances, where the statute is detailed and precise, we regard the omission as purposeful. "As a general rule, when the Legislature has employed specific language in one part of a statute, but not in another part which deals with the same topic, the earlier language should not be implied where it is not present." Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 321, 613 N.E.2d 881 (1993), quoting Hartford Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 410 Mass. 279, 283, 572 N.E.2d 1 (1991). Accord Bagley v. Illyrian Gardens, Inc., 401 Mass. 822, 825, 519 N.E.2d 1308 (1988).

Leary argues that our reading of the statute frustrates his reasonable expectations. ⁸ However, TRB has never acquiesced to Leary's view that out-of-State compensation was includable, and TRB informed Leary before he voluntarily purchased the out-of-State service, that it would not consider his out-of-State salary in determining his benefits. Therefore, Leary's expectation that his retirement benefits would be based on his Florida salary was not reasonable. See Boston Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs & Supervisors v. Boston Retirement Bd., 383 Mass. 336, 343, 419 N.E.2d 277 (1981). Cf. DiGianni v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 421 Mass. 350, 657 N.E.2d 221 (1995).

We conclude that Leary was not an employee of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth while employed by Florida and that, therefore, his Florida salary was not "regular compensation" within the meaning of G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(a ). The Superior Court judge...