Lee v. Dep't of Parks & Recreation

• Decision Date: 31 July 2019
• Docket Number: A154021
• Citation: 38 Cal.App.5th 206,250 Cal.Rptr.3d 456
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Michele LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

38 Cal.App.5th 206

250 Cal.Rptr.3d 456

Michele LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A154021

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Filed July 31, 2019

Plaintiff and Appellant in pro per: Michele Lee

Counsel for Defendants and Respondents: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Johnathan Wolff, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Danielle F. O'Bannon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Rosailda Perez, Deputy Attorney General, Robert Sandoval, Deputy Attorney General

BROWN, J.

Plaintiff Michele Lee injured herself on a stairway in the Bootjack Campground within Mt. Tamalpais State Park and sued respondent California State Department of Parks and Recreation ("State Parks") for premises liability. The trial court awarded summary judgment to State Parks on the basis of trail immunity under Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b). It also awarded attorney's fees and defense costs to State Parks under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. Lee appeals both aspects of the judgment.

We affirm the trial court's ruling that State Parks is entitled to immunity because the stairway is a "trail," or at least an "integral part" of a trail, within the meaning of Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b).¹ However, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs, as we agree with Lee that the issue of immunity was not so clear cut that her lawsuit lacked reasonable cause.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bootjack Campground is located in Mt. Tamalpais State Park, which is owned and controlled by State Parks. From the nearest parking lot, there are two ways to access Bootjack Campground: a stone stairway, built into a hill, and a longer ADA-compliant path. Photographs show the stairway is relatively flat and wide, and winds through a wooded hillside. A sign indicates that the stairway leads to a "Campground and Picnic Area," "Bootjack Trail," and "Matt Davis Trail."

In August 2015, Lee fell and suffered an injury on the stairway. The relevant facts surrounding her injury are undisputed. After camping overnight at Bootjack Campground with her boyfriend, Lee started to descend the stairway from the campground to the parking lot. She slipped on an "uneven portion" of the stairs, fell, and broke her ankle in three places. Both Lee and her boyfriend asserted that the stairway contained uneven and protruding stones and depressions. They also claimed that leaves from a nearby tree shaded and concealed those protrusions and depressions.

One year after her injury, Lee brought a single cause of action in pro per against State Parks and its Director for premises liability, claiming the dangerous condition of the stairway caused her injury. In its answer to Lee's complaint, State Parks raised an affirmative defense under Government Code section 831.4, asserting that it is immune from liability for injuries caused by any trail or unpaved road that provides access to recreational or scenic areas. It also alleged that Lee's action was filed without reasonable cause and good faith, such that State Parks was entitled to recover defense costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1038.

Lee continued with the case and retained counsel. The parties communicated through case management conferences, a joint letter with proposed mediators, emails, and telephone calls. In those communications, State Parks repeatedly reminded Lee and her counsel of its trail immunity defense.

State Parks filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for defense costs. According to billing statements from the California Attorney General's Office, State Parks incurred $44,043.50 in attorney's fees and costs between the time Lee retained counsel and the filing of the summary judgment motion. Lee opposed the summary judgment motion, contending that no statutory immunity existed because the stairway is not a trail and, alternatively, that the stairway contained dangerous conditions.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Parks. On the finding that the stairway to Bootjack Campground is a trail, or at least an integral part of a trail, that provides access to recreational areas, the trial court concluded State Parks is "absolutely immune" from liability pursuant to the statutory trail immunity provided by Government Code section 831.4, subdivision (b).

In addition, the trial court granted State Parks' motion for defense costs, including attorney's fees, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1038. Because the trial court regarded the statutory immunity as " ‘conclusive,’ " it found Lee's maintenance of the lawsuit to be unreasonable as a matter of law and awarded fees. But it considered the claimed hours excessive and reduced the requested amount by 50% as a result. The court ultimately awarded State Parks fees and costs in the amount of $22,139.75.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. The Bootjack stairway is within the scope of the trail immunity statute.

A. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ( Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) ; Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002–1003, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d 30.) The moving party bears the burden of persuasion and must show that one or more elements of the causes of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to each cause of action. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) An order granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089.) The appellate court is not bound by the issues decided by the trial court but will affirm the judgment of the trial court if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted by the movant. ( Schmidt v. Bank of America (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 240.)

B. Trail Immunity Law

Section 831.4—the " ‘trail immunity’ " statute—provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a condition of: "(a) Any unpaved road which provides access to fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding ... water sports, recreational or scenic areas ... (b) Any trail used for the above purposes." ( Gov. Code, § 831.4, subds. (a), (b).) The purpose of trail immunity is to "encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use, because ‘the burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use.’ " ( Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 417, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 ( Armenio ).)

In a series of cases, appellate courts have expounded upon the reach of section 831.4. First, the Armenio court clarified that subdivisions (a) and (b) should be read together such that immunity attaches to trails providing access to recreational activities as well as to trails on which those recreational activities take place. ( Armenio , supra , 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 417, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 ). The court also held that the "nature of the trail's surface is irrelevant to questions of immunity." ( Id. at p. 418, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 631.) Following this trajectory, subsequent courts have explained that section 831.4 applies to paths, regardless of whether they are paved or unpaved. ( Carroll v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 606, 609, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 504 ( Carroll ); Farnham v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1101, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 720 ( Farnham ).)

Whether a property is considered a "trail" under section 831.4 turns on "a number of considerations," including (1) the accepted definitions of the property, (2) the purpose for which the property is designed and used, and (3) the purpose of the immunity statute. ( Amberger-Warren v. City of Piedmont (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078–1079, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 631 ( Amberger-Warren ).) In Treweek v. City of Napa (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 221, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 883 ( Treweek) , our colleagues in Division Two of this District suggested in dictum that, even if a property is not "in and of itself" a trail, it might nonetheless be immune because it is "integrated into" and "essential to" an immunized trail. ( Id. at p. 232, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 883.)

C. The Bootjack stairway is a trail, or at least an integral part of a trail, such that trail immunity applies.

Lee argues that section 831.4 is not applicable to the Bootjack stairway, contending that the trial court conducted an incorrect analysis of the first Amberger-Warren factor and an insufficient analysis of the third. We disagree.

The first Amberger-Warren factor is the accepted definition of the property. ( Amberger-Warren , supra , 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 631.) Merriam-Webster defines "trail" as "a marked or established path or route especially through a forest or mountainous region." (Merriam-Webster Online Dict. < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trail> [as of 7/31/19].) It defines "stairway" as "one or more flights of stairs usually with landings to pass from one level to another." (Merriam-Webster Online Dict. < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stairway> [as of 7/31/19].) The Bootjack stairway appears to satisfy both definitions because it is a marked path, made up of a flight of stairs, through a wooded region of the state park. We therefore agree with the trial court that "trail" and "stairway" are not mutually exclusive.

Lee claims the trial court erroneously equated "trail" and "stairway" and granted immunity solely because the stairway "provide[s] access" to a recreational area. Lee is correct that not every structure providing access to recreation can be defined as a...