Lenge v. Goldfarb

• Decision Date: 22 July 1975
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Constance D. LENGE v. Alexander A. GOLDFARB, Administrator (ESTATE of Joseph C. DiPIETRO), et al.

Page 110

363 A.2d 110

169 Conn. 218

Constance D. LENGE v. Alexander A. GOLDFARB, Administrator (ESTATE of Joseph C.

DiPIETRO), et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 22, 1975.

William J. Bumster, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (defendant Florence DiPietro).

William R. Moller, Hartford, with whom was Wesley W. Horton, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, MacDONALD, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

Joseph DiPietro died intestate, leaving his widow, Florence DiPietro, a defendant herein, and his daughter, Constance D. Lenge, the plaintiff, as his heirs. Before his death, the decedent was the president and major stockholder of the Pioneer Fruit and Commission Company, owning 960 of its shares. These 960 shares are the subject of the present litigation. The plaintiff contends that, on the night before he died, the decedent conveyed the 960 shares to her as a gift, and that, therefore, the shares do not constitute an asset of the decedent's estate. The defendant Florence DiPietro takes an opposing view, claiming that there was no valid gift, and that, accordingly, the 960 shares properly belong to the estate.

The named defendant was appointed by the Probate Court for the district of Hartford to serve as administrator of the estate and, on December 18, 1972, he filed in the Probate Court a 'Supplemental and Corrected Inventory' which did not list the 960 shares as an asset of the estate. Mrs. DiPietro, pursuant to § 45-202 of the General Statutes, filed an objection to that inventory on January 23, 1973. The Probate Court (Kinsella, J.) refused to schedule a hearing on the objection and directed Mrs. DiPietro to bring an action in the Superior Court. Mrs. DiPietro brought such an action, but the Superior Court (Barber, J.) sustained a demurrer to her complaint, holding that she lacked standing to bring the action. The Probate Court then scheduled a hearing on the objection, with Judge Thomas B. Coughlin of the Probate Court for the district of Stratford presiding at the hearing following Judge Kinsella's disqualifying himself to hear the case.

The hearing lasted seven days and assumed the form of an action to determine title to the controversial shares of stock. Judge Coughlin produced an elaborate ten-page memorandum in which he discussed at length the various claims of the parties and the applicable law. He concluded that the decedent had not made a valid gift of the 960 shares to his daughter and that title to the shares remained in the decedent's estate. He further concluded 'that the administrator failed to marshall all the assets of the estate of the decedent and to include the Pioneer Fruit and Commission Company stock as said assets in the inventory of the decedent.' The administrator was therefore ordered to file a second supplemental inventory listing the 960 shares as an asset of the estate.

The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Superior Court and the Superior Court (Naruk, J.) granted summary judgment sustaining the appeal on the ground that the Probate Court had acted beyond its powers in holding a hearing to try title to property. From that judgment, the defendant Florence DiPietro has appealed to this court.

Appeals from the probate courts to the Superior Court are governed by § 45-288, which provides that '(a)ny person aggrieved by any order, denial or decree of a court of probate in any matter, unless otherwise specially provided by law, may appeal therefrom to the superior court.' (Emphasis added.) 'The matter of aggrievement goes to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.' Maloney v. Taplin, 154 Conn. 247, 250, 224 A.2d 731, 734. Unless the plaintiffs are persons actually aggrieved by the order or decree, the Superior Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal. Kerin v. Goldfarb, 160 Conn. 463, 467, 280 A.2d 143; Weidlich v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 139 Conn. 652, 96 A.2d 547, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826, 74 S.Ct. 45, 98 L.Ed. 351.

To qualify as an aggrieved person, the plaintiff must have a pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the decree or order, and that pecuniary interest must be adversely affected by the decree or order from which the appeal is taken. Kerin v. Goldfarb, supra, 160 Conn. 467, 280 A.2d 143. If the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party, the appeal is void. Fuller v. Marvin, 107 Conn. 354, 356-57, 140 A. 731; Orcutt's Appeal, 61 Conn. 378, 382, 24 A. 276. The plaintiff's appeal should clearly state the basis for his claim of aggrievement; Maloney v. Taplin, supra 154 Conn. 249, 224 A.2d 731; and a mere conclusory claim that the plaintiff is aggrieved is insufficient. Fitzhugh v. Fitzhugh, 156 Conn. 625, 626, 239 A.2d 513; Sacksell v. Barrett, 132 Conn. 139, 147, 43 A.2d 79. The plaintiff's appeal did not state a basis for her claim of aggrievement nor can we conclude, regardless of this defect, that the decree resulted in any adverse consequences with respect to the plaintiff's pecuniary interests.

The order of the Probate Court from which the appeal was taken simply directed the administrator to list the 960 shares of stock as an asset of the estate; it is well established that the mere inventorying of an asset has no effect upon the rights of an adverse claimant. Gold's Appeal, Kirby 1008 103; Lynch v. Skelly, 138 Conn. 376, 379, 85 A.2d 251. A probate court has no power to make final determinations of title where title is disputed. It may make such incidental determinations of questions of title as are...