Levy v. Sherman
| Decision Date | 14 June 1945 |
| Docket Number | 50. |
| Parties | LEVY v. SHERMAN et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; E. Paul Mason, Judge.
Suit in equity by Esther B. Levy, surviving widow of Joseph Levy deceased, against Bessie Sherman and another, administratices of the estate of Joseph Levy, deceased, to have declared void an antenuptial agreement entered into by plaintiff and her deceased husband. From a decree dismissing the bill plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Abram C. Joseph, of Baltimore (Jacob A. Gross, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
H Mortimer Kremer, of Baltimore, for appellees.
Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and MARKELL, JJ.
This appeal brings up for review the action of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City in decreeing that the bill of complaint of the appellant be dismissed, with costs to the appellees.
The principal object of the bill was to have the Court declare null and void and of no effect an antenuptial agreement entered into by the appellant and her deceased husband, Joseph Levy. The agreement may be summarized as follows: It states it was made in contemplation of marriage; states that Levy had fully informed appellant of his financial standing, amount of his assets, liabilities and income, and that Levy desired to make a fair and reasonable provision for the appellant in lieu of her rights after marriage. It provides, in case appellant survive Levy, that she receive all household furniture and one thousand dollars. In it appellant waives all rights as widow in the property he then possessed or would acquire in the future, and it provides that she would join in any instrument with Levy to divest her of dower in any property he wished to convey. It is dated December 17, 1925, signed and sealed by both parties and acknowledged on the same day before a notary public, and duly recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore City on December 19, 1925.
The parties were married on December 20, 1925, and the bill avers that they had been engaged to be married for some two weeks prior to the marriage. At the time of the execution of the antenuptial agreement, Levy was possessed of leasehold properties which the real estate expert testified were worth $23,800, subject to mortgages aggregating $16,487.68. Levy's equity in these properties at that time was worth $7,312.32. The cash which Levy had on deposit in bank at the time together with his equity in these properties, establishes his net worth at the date of the agreement to be around $10,000. Since his death his administrators, his two daughters, who are the sole appellees in this action, sold, through the Orphans' Court, his leasehold properties, and the net aggregate amount from these sales was $14,500. The cash on deposit to Levy's accounts in banks at the time of his death was trivial, amounting to something less than $200.
The bill charges that Levy was guilty of fraud in procuring the appellant to sign the antenuptial agreement.
It recites that he had an appointment to take appellant to see a moving picture, but that instead, he took her to the office of one Wolpert, whom she did not know before that time, nor has seen since; that almost immediately upon entering Wolpert's office, he produced the antenuptial agreement and she was asked to sign it. Upon inquiring what it was, Levy stated that it was a paper necessary for him to have in order to carry on his business after they were married; and, having full faith and confidence in her fiance, she signed and acknowledged the agreement. Their acknowledgments of the instrument were taken by Wolpert as notary public. The whole matter only took a very few minutes, and they left the office to go to the theatre. Appellant avers that at the time she executed the agreement she did not know its contents and relied implicitly upon the statement of her fiance of what it was, and that she did not know its contents until after the death of Levy. She avers that she owned no property at all at that time and that the allowance provided for her in the instrument is so disproportionate to the worth of Levy at the time, that it implies bad faith on the part of Levy and that the instrument was intended to deprive her of her future marital rights. She lived with Levy, after the marriage, until his death, a period of about eighteen years.
The answer admits the marriage, the death of Levy, the execution of the antenuptial agreement, but denies all of the other material allegations of the bill and charges appellant with laches. Testimony was taken in open court, solicitors heard, and thereafter the decree was filed.
At the outset of this opinion it may be said that antenuptial agreements, in contemplation of marriage, are lawful. Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532; Busey v. McCurley, 61 Md. 436, 48 Am.Rep. 117; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 92 A. 891, Ann.Cas. 1916D, 988; Wlodarek v. Wlodarek, 167 Md. 556, 175 A. 455; 26 Am. Jur., Sec. 275, page 882.
'An antenuptial settlement or agreement to the extent that it is executory must be supported by consideration, but marriage itself is consideration for such a settlement or agreement, and indeed, it is said to be perhaps the most valuable and highly respected consideration of the law in this as well as other cases.' 26 Am.Jur., Sec. 277, page 884 (); Braecklein v. McNamara, 147 Md. 17, at page 21, 127 A. 497, 41 A.L.R. 1159; Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239, 90 Am.Dec. 106.
An important question in this case is whether, at the time of the execution of the antenuptial agreement, a confidential relationship existed. That is, whether the law, under the relations existing between the parties, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction at the time of the execution of the antenuptial contract, would impute to Levy an influence over the appellant that would cast upon him, and those holding by or through him, the burden of showing that the contract was fair and reasonable. Some cases hold that unless the parties to such an instrument were engaged to be married at the time of its execution, a confidential relationship does not arise, and even though the man and the woman contemplate marriage they deal with each other at arm's length, like two astute business men, each endeavoring to gain an advantage over the other in the matter. All the cases hold that where the parties, at the time of the execution of the antenuptial contract, were engaged, a confidential relationship exists, and it is held that after the instrument is signed by the parties they become engaged, even though such was not the case a minute or two before the execution of the contract.
In 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 97, under the heading 'Presumptions and Burden of Proof' at page 571, it is said:
'The rule under which inadequacy or disproportion of the provision for the wife raises a presumption against the husband and throws the burden on him or on those claiming under him of proving fairness or knowledge applies where the parties were engaged to be married at the time of the agreement and a confidential relationship existed between them.'
All of the cases cited to support this text are Illinois cases, with the exception of Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737. In that case the agreement was entered into after their engagement to marry. Yockey v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342, 110 N.E. 34; Mann v. Mann, 270 Ill. 83, 110 N.E. 345; Kuhnen v. Kuhnen, 351 Ill. 591, 184 N.E. 874.
In Williamson v. First National Bank, 111 W.Va. 720, 164 S.E. 777, 779, it is said:
In Re Malchow's Estate, 143 Minn. 53, 172 N.W. 915, 917, it is said:
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