Lindheimer v. Gaylord Bldg. Corp.

• Citation: 16 N.E.2d 901,369 Ill. 371
• Decision Date: 20 June 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24604.,24604.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. LINDHEIMER, County Collector, v. GAYLORD BUILDING CORPORATION.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

369 Ill. 371

16 N.E.2d 901

PEOPLE ex rel. LINDHEIMER, County Collector,

v.GAYLORD BUILDING CORPORATION.

No. 24604.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1938.¹

Action by the People, on the relation of Horace G. Lindheimer, County Collector, against the Gaylord Building Corporation for judgment and order of sale against realty owned by the Gaylord Building Corporation for nonpayment of general taxes for 1935, wherein written objections were filed to the tax levy of the Chicago Park District. From a judgment overruling an objection to the rate extended for corporate purposes under a supplemental levy ordinance, objector appeals.

Affirmed.

STONE and FARTHING, JJ., dissenting.Appeal from Cook County Court; Edward K. Jarecki, Judge.

Adelbert Brown, of Chicago (George P. Foster and George P. Latchford, Jr., both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., Charles Center Case, and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, all of Chicago (Joseph B. Fleming and Thomas M. Thomas, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

ORR, Justice.

The county collector of Cook county applied to the county court for judgment and order of sale against real estate owned by the Gaylord Building Corporation for non-payment of general taxes for the year 1935. The Gaylord Building Corporation filed written objections to the tax levy of the Chicago Park District pursuant to section 191 of the Revenue Act of 1872, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 120, § 179,) all of which were sustained except an objection to the rate extended for corporate purposes under a supplemental levy ordinance adopted August 6, 1935. This objection was overruled and objector has appealed directly to this court.

Prior to amendment, section 19 of the Chicago Park District Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 105, § 333.19) imposed a maximum rate for general corporate purposes of three mills per $100 valuation. On December 31, 1934, the district adopted its annual appropriation ordinance for 1935, and on January 15, 1935, passed its tax levy ordinance for that year. Subsequently, the legislature amended section 19 to authorize a rate for corporate purposes in the year 1935 sufficient to produce the sum of $9,000,000, and empowered the district to adopt a supplemental tax levy up to an amount which, when added to the amount theretofore legally levied, would not exceed that sum. Pursuant to authority granted by the amendment, the park district, on July 23, 1935, adopted a supplemental appropriation ordinance for the sum of $1,800,000 and thereafter passed a supplemental levy ordinance for that amount. The sole issue presented to us on this appeal is the constitutionality of the amendment to section 19.

Objector first contends that by this amendment the legislature has imposed a tax upon the inhabitants of a municipal corporation in violation of section 10 of article 9 of the constitution of this State, Smith-Hurd Stats.Const. art. 9, § 10. That section prohibits the legislature from levying a tax for corporate purposes upon a municipality or the inhabitants thereof. It not only prohibits a direct levy by the legislature but also the creation of a debt for local purposes which must be met by local taxation. People v. Block, 276 Ill. 286, 114 N.E. 527. Where, however, the debt imposed is not for a corporate purpose but arises from the performance of a governmental function benefiting alike all the citizens of the State, this section is not a restriction since, under such circumstances, the municipality acts as an agency of the State. People v. County Com'rs 355 Ill. 244, 189 N.E. 26 (fees of petit jurors); DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 Ill. 530, 189 N.E. 893 (judicial pensions); St. Hedwig's School v. Cook County, 289 Ill. 432, 124 N.E. 629 (support of dependent girls); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Lake County, 287 Ill. 337, 122 N.E. 526 (grade crossings); People v. Williamson County, 286 Ill. 44, 121 N.E. 157 (bridges); Board of Trustees v. Com'rs of Lincoln Park, 282 Ill. 348, 118 N.E. 746 (police pensions); People v. Abbott, 274 Ill. 380, 113 N.E. 696, Ann.Cas.1918D, 450 (same); City of Chicago v. Knobel, 232 Ill. 112, 83 N.E. 459 (expenses of petit jurors). In fact, it has been held that this section does not apply at all to debts imposed upon quasi-governmental units such as counties or townships. Bolles v. Prince, 250 Ill. 36, 95 N.E. 40;Wetherell v. Devine, 116 Ill. 631, 6 N.E. 24. This provision has also been applied to prevent legislative validation of a local tax levy, void at its inception. In People v. Stitt, 280 Ill. 553, 117 N.E. 784, and People v. Mathews, 282 Ill. 85, 118 N.E. 491, it was held that such validating acts were inoperative only if enacted after judgment and sale of the property. See also People v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 284 Ill. 87, 119 N.E. 914;Fisher v. Fay, 288 Ill. 11, 122 N.E. 811. In a long line of subsequent decisions, however, we have held that a statute which purports to validate a levy originally made by a local taxing body without or in excess of then existing authority, actually results in the imposition of a tax upon the inhabitants of a municipality by the legislature and consequently violates this section of the constitution. People v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Co., 365 Ill. 202, 6 N.E.2d 119;People v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Co., 343 Ill. 101, 175 N.E. 4;People v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 340 Ill. 102, 172 N.E. 13;People v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 328 Ill. 440, 159 N.E. 797;People v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 316 Ill. 452, 147 N.E. 494;People v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 316 Ill. 410, 147 N.E. 492;People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 311 Ill. 113, 142 N.E. 473;People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 310 Ill. 212, 141 N.E. 822. Section 10 of article 9, however, does not prohibit the enactment of enabling acts by the legislature, pursuant to which a municipality may or may not, as it chooses, take advantage of the power to impose additional local taxes for corporate purposes. People v. Mills Novelty Co., 357 Ill. 285, 192 N.E. 236. As we said in Braun v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 186: ‘There is no limitation on the legislative power to invest * * * municipalities with power to tax for corporate purposes, but they shall be uniform as to persons and property within the corporate limits.’ One exception to this rule exists, however, as we recently pointed out in People v. Baum, 367 Ill. 249, 11 N.E.2d 373. Where a statute, although in the form of an enabling act, actually validates an illegal levy already made, it is void under section 10 even though, thereafter, the municipal authorities re-adopt the levy originally illegal.

The amendment to section 19 of the Chicago Park District Act is in the form of an enabling act permitting the park district to adopt supplemental appropriation and levy ordinances to raise additional funds needed for the year 1935. No duty is imposed upon the park district to make the supplemental levy; the statute merely authorizes it so to do if, in its discretion, it deems it advisable. The legislature did not exceed its powers by granting this authority. People v. Mills Novelty Co., supra. Nor does this statute validate a levy originally illegal, as was the fact in People v. Baum, supra. While it is true that the original levy ordinance adopted by the park district in 1935 resulted in a rate of taxation approximately .053603 in excess of the rate then authorized, there is no evidence in the record tending to prove that the amendment to section 19 purported to validate that excess. On the other hand, in the Baum Case (page 376) we found ‘that the record in this case shows these acts to have been passed for the purpose of validating the levies made in excess of the then existing legal rates, which excess was illegal when levied.’ Furthermore, unlike the present case, the action of the legislature condemned in the Baum Case came in 1935, after the tax books for the year 1934 had been closed. It therefore clearly appears that the reasons underlying our decision in the Baum Case are not supported by the facts in the case before us.

It is further objected that the amendment to section 19 of the Chicago Park District Act amends section 17 of that act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 105, § 333.17, but fails to so state in its title, thereby violating section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats.Const. art. 4, § 13. Section 19, prior to amendment, granted authority to the Chicago Park District to levy a tax, prescribed the maximum rate therefor and described the manner in which it should be levied. The amendment thereto increased the amount which might be raised by taxation in the years 1935 and 1936, and provided that supplemental appropriation and levy ordinances might be adopted. Section 17, Ill. Rev.Stat.1937, c. 105, § 333.17, authorizes the adoption of annual appropriation ordinances by the park district but provides that only one appropriation ordinance may be passed in one fiscal year. Because supplemental appropriation ordinances are permitted under the amendment to section 19, the objector asserts that section 17 is likewise amended. In our judgment, this position is untenable. Section 17 was, prior to 1935, and is now, a limitation upon the powers of the park district. The amendment to section 19 provided a scheme of taxation complete in itself which was operative for only a limited period of time. It did not conflict with section 17-it merely suspended its operation for two years, 1935 and 1936. This court has held that section 13 of article 4 of the constitution does not require that ‘when a new act is passed, the entire body of all prior acts in any way modified by the new act shall be published at length in the amendatory act. Only the section or sections amended need be inserted at length. The purpose of the...