Lithium Corp. of America, Inc. v. Town of Bessemer City

Decision Date08 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 163,163
Citation135 S.E.2d 574,261 N.C. 532
PartiesLITHIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC., Petitioner, v. TOWN OF BESSEMER CITY, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation, et al., Respondents. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. TOWN OF BESSEMER CITY, a North Carolina Municipal Corporation et. al., Respondents.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Mullen, Holland & Cooke, Gastonia, and Davis & White, Kings Mountain, for petitioners.

Henry L. Kiser, Bessemer City, and Hugh W. Johnston, Gastonia, for respondents.

MOORE, Justice.

This is a proceeding for extension of the corporate limits of Bessemer City, N. C., a municipality having a population of less than 5000. The proceeding is had pursuant to Chapter 160, Subchapter VI, Article 36, Part 2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina (G.S. § 160-453.1 to G.S. § 160-453.12).

On 19 November 1962 the City's governing board adopted a resolution of intent (G.S. § 160-453.5) to consider annexation of an area of 69.62 acres contiguous to the City's western boundary.

The northern portion of the area proposed for annexation consists of an arcshaped segment of the Southern Railway Company right of way, about 1600 feet in length. State Highway 216, running generally east and west, crosses the area a short distance south of the railroad. Lithium Corporation of America, Inc., (Lithium) owns all of the land in the area except that embraced within the railroad and highway right of ways. A road leading from the highway southwardly bisects the area. Between the highway and railroad right of ways there is a small parcel, about 2 1/2 acres, of vacant land. From the bisecting road westwardly to the highway there is about 25 acres which is vacant except for a 4-acre artificial lake which was constructed by Lithium and is maintained by it as a standby source of water should an emergency require its use. Between the road and the city limits is about 30 acres upon which is located Lithium's plant, buildings and structures, including some lagoons. The area sought to be annexed contains no residences, and it has not been subdivided into streets and lots; it consists only of the properties of Lithium and the Railway Company. To the north, west and south of the area is open and undeveloped country. Lithium owns 425 acres contiguous to the area. The land to the east of the area and within the city limits is vacant and undeveloped for several hundred feet except along the highway. Lithium has about 180 employees; it purchases from the city approximately 15 million gallons of water per month; Lithium provided the water lines and a pumping station at a cost of $52,000. The city provides no other utilities or services to Lithium. If the annexation becomes effective Lithium will pay annually about $31,000 in city taxes.

A report setting forth plans for extension of services to the area was approved by the governing board of the municipality and filed with the Clerk. On 14 January 1963 a public hearing was held pursuant to notice given. Lithium and the Railway Company had representatives at the hearing and opposed annexation. On 4 February 1963 the governing board adopted an ordinance annexing the area.

In apt time Lithium and the Railway Company, in separate petitions, requested review pursuant to G.S. § 160-453.6. Each alleges, among other things, that the area does not qualify for annexation in that it is not 'developed for urban purposes' in accordance with the requirements of G.S. § 160-453.4(c), which provides as follows:

'The area to be annexed must be developed for urban purposes. An area developed for urban purposes is defined as any area which is so developed that at least sixty per cent (60%) of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional or governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty per cent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts five acres or less in size.'

The annexation ordinance recites that the area contains two tracts, none residential, one commercial and one industrial, that the 'area is developed for urban purposes as defined by the statutes in that 100 per cent of the total number of lots and tracts in the area are used for industrial and commercial purposes.'

In superior court the petitions were consolidated for hearing. It was stipulated by petitioners and respondents 'that all of the property under consideration for annexation is either commercial or industrial and that there is no subdivision of any of the acreage into tracts of five acres or less. That the Southern Railway right of way is used for commercial purposes and that the land belonging to Lithium * * * is used for industrial purposes.'

The court entered judgments, concluding that 'the character of the area to be annexed is developed for urban purposes and meets the requirements of General Statute 160-453.4,' and affirming in all particulars the action of the municipality in annexing the subject area. Both petitioners appeal.

Petitioners contend that to meet the statutory test for annexation 'some portion of the subject area must consist of or be composed of lots and tracts five acres or less in size, not counting the acreage used by Lithium and Southern Railway for industrial and commercial purposes.' Petitioners say that G.S. § 160-453.4(c) contains two clauses setting up standards for determining whether an area is 'developed for urban purposes'--an area is so developed, (1) if at least 60% of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional or governmental purposes, and (2) if the area is subdivided into lots and tracts such that 60% of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts of five acres or less in size. They point out that the two clauses are connected by the conjunctive 'and', and contend that the clauses are coordinate and mutually complementary, and that an area does not meet the test, 'developed for urban purposes,' unless it substantially complies with the requirements of both clauses of the statute. Ordinarily, when the conjunctive 'and' connects words, phrases or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered jointly. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 281, p. 267. Obviously the subject area does not comply with the last clause of the second sentence of G.S. § 160-453.4(c).

On the other hand, respondents contend that an area may be annexed if it meets the standards set by the first of the clauses, that it need not comply with both. The subject area clearly complies with the requirements of the first clause, for more than 60%, 100% in fact, of the lots and tracts are used (according to the stipulation of the parties) for commercial and industrial purposes.

The narrow question thus presented is not without difficulty. Changes in municipal boundaries are legislative matters, and the exercise of legislative permission therefor is not subject to judicial interference. Town of Dunn v. Tew, 219 N.C. 286, 13 S.E.2d 536; Town of Highlands v. City of Hickory, 202 N.C. 167, 162 S.E. 471; Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville, 149 N.C. 65, 62 S.E. 758. However, where a statute is of doubtful meaning it is the function of the courts to construe it. This function encompasses the duty, in some instances, to determine whether administrative authority is applying the provisions of the statute in an arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust manner, not in keeping with legislative intent. In re Hickerson, 235 N.C. 716, 71 S.E.2d 129; Duncan v. Carpenter and Phillips, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410; Hilgreen v. Sherman's Cleaners & Tailors, Inc., 225 N.C. 656, 36 S.E.2d 252.

The spirit and intent of an act controls its interpretation. Porter v. Yoder & Gordon Co., 246 N.C. 398, 98 S.E.2d 497; Smith v. Davis, 228 N.C. 172, 45 S.E.2d 51, 174 A.L.R. 643. When the meaning of a statute is doubtful the history of the legislation may be considered in connection with the object, purpose and language of the statute in order to arrive at its true meaning. Victory Cab Co. v. City of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 572, 68 S.E.2d 433. The statute we are considering is section 4, Chapter 1010, Session Laws of 1959. It was not copied from the laws of other states. It is a result of a study and recommendations made by the Municipal Government...

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